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For over fifteen years, BCLA has been contributing to the creation 
of the two regional movements currently represented by the Central American 
common market and the Latin American Free-Trade Association. It has at 
all time followed up the programmes of both institutions with interest, 
has noted their admirable efforts and has co-operated with them to the 
full extent, of its abilities and resources. 
Today, awareness of the urgent need to accelerate the region1 s 
economic integration process is spreading throughout all sectors iri 
Latin America; and with that end in view, new decisions will obviously 
have to be adopted, to supplement what has already been achieved. If these 
are to crystallize, the first prerequisite is a full conviction on the 
part of the Governments that to press onward is an imperative necessity* 
The purpose of this document is to elucidate some of the problems 
at present constituting obstacles on the road to the common market, and 
to put forward a few suggestions as to how the region might more vigorously 
forge ahead« The ECLA secretariat had begun to analyse these difficulties 
some years ago. In the light of the experience acquired in the course 
of Latin America1 s economic integration movements, which has pointed up 
the limitations attaching to a mere free-trade area, it has been possible 
to consider new measures that might quite reasonably and feasibly be 
adopted in the iinraediate future. 
The subject is complex and controversial. It is ECLA's hope, however, 
that the ideas and suggestions propounded here may serve to promote a 
discussion at the technical level which will help Latin America to translate 
into terms of practical action its anxiety to devise an economic integration 
fonnula, as an indispensable requisite for its future development. 
The ideas in question reflect the motives of concern expressed during 
recent years in various circles, including the integration institutions 
themselves. Many of them will need further elaboration before they can be 
recast in the form of actual commitments. The aim of this document is 
precisely to offer a systematic presentation of the material that might 








ECONOMIC. INTEGRATION IN RELATION JO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LATIN AMERICA 
1* The tardiness of Latin America* s development 
In the twenty years that will shortly have elapsed since the end of 
the Second World War, Latin America1 s rate of development has been slow 
and fluctuating, and in vast areas of the region has so greatly slackened 
that average per capita income has increased only by 50 per cent in that 
length of time, rising from a minimal figure of 280 dollars to its present 
modest level of 430 dollars» Unless the trends that have thus evolved 
in the first half of the sixties are modified, the average per capita 
income of the 600 million Inhabitants that Latin America will have at the 
end of the present century will be only about 650 dollars, and even if 
the growth, rate registered in the last fifteen years were outstripped in 
the future, would not exceed 850 dollars«^ 
This slow rate of development, which entails such unsatisfactory 
material and cultural living conditions for the broad masses of the 
Latin American population, is thrown into sharp relief when it is borne 
in mind that such an average income - which, in default of radical reforms, 
could be expected to materialize only by the end of the century - represents 
no more than one-fifth of that currently enjoyed in the United States and 
little more than half the corresponding levels in Western Europe and in 
the USSR, while it is also lower than the figure registered in many other 
private-enterprise countries and centrally-planned economies» These gaps 
are bound to widen considerably, for while the Latin American countries 
in the aggregate have attained an annual growth rate of barely one per cent, 
the other regions mentioned are developing two or three times as dynamically, 
1/ Data expressed in terms of I960 prices. During the first four years 
of the present decade, average per capita income in the region as a 
whole increased at a cumulative annual rate of one per cent« In the 
interval between 1950 and 1964 the corresponding growth rate was 




quite apart from such examples of exceptionally rapid expansion as aye 
afforded by Japan and some of the centrally-planned economies. Thus, 
while Latin America took twenty years to raise its average per capita 
income by 50 per cent, the members of the European Economic Community 
achieved the same relative increase in under ten years, while the other 
areas referred to did so in less time still, after having already completed 
an arduous phase of post-war reconstruction. 
Moreover, in its cultural and material living conditions Latin America 
will go on lagging still farther behind on account of the wide disparities 
currently existing between its income levels and those of other areas. A 
4 per cent increase in income in the United States enables its .192 million 
inhabitants to expand their consumption, on an average, by .55.dollars 
per capita; in Latin America, when income rises by 5 per cent, the 
per capita increment in the consumption of the region1s 230 million 
inhabitants averages only 5 dollars. 
These various data testify to the slowness and inadequacy of 
Latin America's development, and to the region's failure to participate 
in the economic expansion that is taking place in vast geographical areas 
of the world. 
While it is true that particular characteristics, such as the high 
rate of population growth, help to retard per capita development, and that 
special circumstances, which have arisen in the past and still persist in 
some countries, at times permit more rapid spurts, it is equally undeniable 
that the experience of the past twenty years affords plenty of evidence 
of the difficulties attending Latin America's development, and that the 
foregoing comparisons of national income indexes reflect the. truth of 
this picture of the region's backwardness in relation to the world at 
large, which becomes yet more marked when future development prospects 
are considered. 
The contemplation of these problems, and the comparison.of Latin 
America's experience with that of other countries, makes it very clear 
that thé region has not succeeded in establishing the economic and social 




sources of dynamic energy are permanent and powerful enough for the desired 
objectives to be attained» A great deal is being done of late at both the 
national and the international level; but, at the same time, the limitations 
imposed upon Latin America's development by the policy of the industrial 
countries with which the region has trade and financial links have been 
and still are stringent» Nevertheless, the question may well be asked 
whether it does not lie with the Latin American countries themselves to 
adopt the strategic decisions that may help, again at both the national 
and the international level, to prevent a delay of thirty or thirty-five 
years before the region can attain that modest per capita income of 
650 dollars, which will still be accompanied by its train of unemployment, 
under-productive jobs, and minimal levels of living for fifty per cent 
of the Latin American population» 
In secretariat documents and at the sessions of the Commission, ECLA 
has repeatedly discussed the problems of Latin America* s economic development 
and the essential features of the policies that should be pursuedo But.it 
will not be superfluous to analyse a few points in the present document, 
which once again signposts regional economic integration as the only 
possible path for Latin America to take at this stage of its development» 
2« The present stage of development and the need for 
regional economic integration 
The problem of Latin America1 s development could be summed up by 
compressing the reciprocal economic and social relationships involved in 
its mechanics into the following terms» The low average income in 
Latin America is determined by the failure of the national economies to 
develop as dynamically as is needed not only for full utilisation of their 
available manpower and material resources, but also for the assimilation 
of technical progress, which is an indispensable requisite for the improvement 
of productivity» Many obstacles which the region has not had the skill 
or the power to circumvent have hitherto prevented the establishment of 




The world depression of the thirties and the policy applied by the 
industrialized countries disrupted the pattern of development that the 
Latin American economies had been following. Some countries were severely 
affected, while others were able to cushion the depressive impact by 
measures which later came to shape a new economic policy« Provisions which 
to begin with were primarily directed towards correcting the balance-of-
payments deficits, and mitigating the effects of the fall in world market 
prices and the contraction in Exports of primary commodities, spurred 
on an import substitution process which acquired major importance as time 
went by, and in many countries became one of the objectives of a deliberate 
industrialization policy* In practice, this process constituted the 
dynamic factor in a new growth pattern, and its repercussions made themselves 
felt in the economic and social changes that characterised one phase of 
Latin America's development. 
The economic variables representative of this growth pattern are 
well-known: a long-term downward trend in the ratios between foreign 
trade and the domestic product, and expansion of the industrial sector's 
share in the formation of that product, and a striking change in the 
composition of imports. If the existing situation is compared with that 
prevailing in 1923-29, the statistics for the region as a whole show that 
the import coefficient has rocketed down from 30 to 9 per cent and the 
export coefficient from 31 to 14 per cent, while industry1s contribution 
to the domestic product has risen from 13 to 23 per cent. Furthermore, 
the proportion of imports represented by consumer goods has dwindled from 
46 to 18 per cent, while the share of intermediate products, fuels and 
capital goods has climbed from- 54 to 82 per cent. 
The industrialization process has not taken place in all the Latin 
American countries simultaneously, or at the same pace. The grographically 
or economically smaller countries - i#e#, the majority - were slower to 
decide upon adopting this policy, and in many of them exports have 
continued to play the leading dynamic role in the growth process and in 
determining the economic situation. At the present stage of the region's 
development, the various countries display such marked disparities that 
they can be graduated in accordance with those economic ratios that indicate 




At one extreme, a relatively advanced stage of industrial development and 
low import coefficients are found in Argentira, Brazil and Mexico, 
especially in the first two^ Close to them, although.with special 
characteristics of their own, come Chile and Colombia® At the other 
extreme are the less developed countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and most of those of Central America, where as a rule export and 
import coefficients are still high* Venezuela exemplifies a different 
type of economy, which developed quickly on the basis of petroleum exports 
and has been undergoing a rapid metamorphosis in recent years® 
Despite these differences, all the countries have pursued a very 
similar policy as regards the conduct of the import substitution process, 
and all have continued to export primary products® In effect, the 
Latin American countries that are smaller in size or relatively less 
developed are embarking upon industrialization or proceeding from one stage 
to another through the same channels that were used by the more developed 
countries some time ago» Only recently have certain changes begun to 
creep in, with the initial integration efforts of the ALALC countries and 
the more trenchant decisions that are being adopted in the integration 
movement of the five Central American countries<> 
The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss some essential aspects 
of over-all development policy, especially those relating to the evolution 
of the external sector, in order to see how far it is contributing to the 
establishment of the basic requisites for an acceleration of the Latin 
American countries' economic gmwth rates which will enable them to make 
up their leeway. It is a matter of evaluating the possible alternatives 
that may present themselves, given existing conditions in respect of the 
national economies and of international policy, with the aim of defining 
the role that integration will have to play as an instrument of Latin 
America1 s development. 
While it is no easy matter to make such an evaluation for the region 
as a whole, because of the marked differences among the Latin American 
countries, the experience of recent years unquestionably provides adequate 
grounds for certain basic inferences in the light of which Latin America's 




The countries that made most progress in import substitution, 
reducing their import and export coefficientes, witnessed a slackening 
of their growth rate as time went by, and have found themselves faced 
with serious difficulties as they approach later stages of development« 
This state of affairs has arisen in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, 
although in different circumstances and periods. Mexico is the only 
one of this more advanced group of countries in which industrialization 
has continued intensively in recent years, thanks to peculiarly favourable 
conditions, but here too potential limiting factors exist, of the same 
type as those hindering the continuance of the process in the -other 
countries® 
The decline in the growth rate also affected the group of countries 
at less advanced stages of industrial development, whose economic 
development patterns were still compartivëly open t6 the outside world. 
In their case, the fluctuations of external demand or purchasing power were 
reflected in the marked instability of the rate of development, which 
decreased from the mid-fifties onwards. The improvement registered in the 
economic situation of many Latin American countries in the last two years 
is attributable to the rise in export prices for primary products - which 
in turn must be largely ascribed to factors that may alter over the very 
short term or are, already undergoing modification - rather than to changes 
in the basic conditions upon which development traditionally depends. 
Within the complex of factors and events that have been particularly 
influential in weakening and slowing down the rate of economic growth, 
attention must be drawn in the present over-all analysis and in the context 
of the topic under discussion, to those relating to the conduct of the 
import substitution process and those which have maintained and aggravated 
the external bottleneck in the Latin American economies. 
Although the import substitution process was a fundamental dynamic 
factor in the development of what are now the most advanced countries, and 
is playing a similar role, in conjunction with external demand, in those 
that are relatively less developed, it has had virtually no influence on the 
diversification of Latin American exports. The countries of the region have 
continued to rely on their exports of primary products, while the' " 
industrialization process, under the aegis of a strongly protectionist regime, 




In these circumstances, the Latin American countries have been unable 
to solve the problem of their balance-of-payments deficits» On the one 
hand, exports have suffered considerable losses through the deterioration 
of the terms of trade and external purchasing power has remained 
stationary or increased very slowLy® On the other, the substitution process 
has altered the composition of imports, but has not reduced the aggregate 
volume of external supply requirements, which, on the contrary, has tended 
to expand with the growth of income and of demand for the items not replaced 
by domestic production» External financing has covered balance-of-payments 
disequilibria, for given periods, and played an active part in the import 
substitution process, but the terms have tightened increasingly, so that 
the rate of economic growth and the further continuance of the substitution 
process itself have become unduly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the 
balance of payments. 
Two other features of this policy are of great significance for the 
region1s development problem» They concern the economic productivity of 
the substitution process and the implications of dependence upon exports 
of primary products. 
The economic yields of import substitution activities have fallen short 
of the levels they might have reached had a rational industrialization policy 
been applied» The process has been carried on at relatively high costs, 
partly imputable to excessive and indiscriminate tariff protection, and 
through an industrial organization which has failed to attain normal standards 
of efficiency, partly because the markets are too small for advantage to be 
taken of economies of scale and specialization in important branches of 
industry. At the same time, as exports have continued to depend upon primary 
commodities, foreign trade has not transmitted to the Latin American countries 
all the dynamic impetus that might have been expected of the intensive 
economic expansion registered in the industrialized countries» In short, the 
assimilation of technical progress has been held up and the improvement of 
over-all productivity impeded» 
Obviously, if the region is to regain this lost ground, some means of 
rapidly expanding domestic production and increasing the efficiency of 
Latin America1 s economic organization must be devised» To that end, 




productivity indexes of contemporary industry must be assimilated« This is 
impracticable, as events are demonstrating, if the policy of industrialization 
within the narrow confines of individual country markets is persistently 
adhered to, and if foreign trade is circumscribed to primary products® 
It is indispensable, therefore, to expand trade,Hows and gradually to 
establish a diversified structure of production,.demand for which will 
transcend the bounds of the national markets and, in addition, will mean 
that imports can be increased® 
' A solution of this kind is hardly conceivable if each individual 
Latin American country - including the most advanced within the region -
makes a defenceless stand against the powerful industrialized countries 
and the still more powerful regional and political groupings they have 
formed® The developing countries have neither the resources nor the 
technical ability to compete with others even in the developing areas 
themselves, much less in the industrialized regions® And in so far 
as they might be able to do so, experience is showing that they would 
encounter very strong opposition® 
The only way, therefore, is to establish a gradual integration process 
conducive to the economic union of the Latin American countries® By this 
means, the national economies would be enabled to take advantage of the 
region's resources and potential, and organize their activities, at much 
higher levels of productivity than at present, on the basis of a market 
of 230 million inhabitants, increasing at one of the highest population growth 
rates in the world* They would thus have found the means of remedying their 
present cramped foreign trade situation, in which their development 
possibilities are tied to the fluctuations and poor sales prospects 
encountered by their primary production on the industrialized countries1 
markets® 
Given the existing position in respect of production techniques and 
international economic policy, regional integration appears to be the only 
efficacious formula for the creation of new dynamic stimuli and a new 
national growth structure, more flexible and more productive than that 
afforded by the substitution process. This thesis must not be interpreted 
as the expression of an alternative policy or of a policy sufficient, in 
/itself, sine© 
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itself, since the integration process cannot be put into effect unless at 
the same time national development programmes are carried out, trade 
with other regions reaches specific levels, and adequate technical and 
financial co-operation is forthcoming from abroad« 
It will be useful, therefore, to analyse the arguments in favour of 
integration more thoroughly, and demarcate more precisely.its place within 
the framework of integrated national development policies. 
3» Development problems and the role of foreign trade 
It has been shown that the bottleneck in the external sector has been 
a very important cause of the low productivity and the lack of dynamic force., 
displayed by the Latin American economies. It must not be inferred, however, 
that policy has only to concentrate upon surmounting this obstacle. Latin 
America's development problem is much more complex, since other economic 
and social factors and conditipns, which have not yet been tackled, or at 
any rate not thoroughly enough, have combined with external difficulties 
to keep the Latin American countries in the rearguard of the world economy. 
Although these factors are all too well-known, it is worth while to restate 
them here in order to show the reciprocal relationships that link them with 
foreign trade and with the approaches to regional integration that are 
formulated in the present document. 
In the first place, attention may be drawn to the general limiting 
factors relating to the efficiency of economic and social organization, and 
still subsisting because of the slowness with which the structural and 
institutional reforms required by an up-to-date and progressive society 
are being introduced. Immediate manifestations of this state of affairs are 
the lack of social mobility and the extreme inequity of property and income 
distribution; these factors in turn determine the stagnation of the social 
structure in many countries, low levels of living, deficient training and 
organization of human resources, and the constant frustration of economic 
growth incentives. 
Secondly, there are other limiting factors more closely linked to 
economic policy and market size. Thus, the want of internal and external 




restrictive practices, which in turn have had repercussions in the shape of 
the concentration of ownership, ill-advised allocation of resources, 
undercutilization of production capacity and higher costs» At the same 
time, the small size of the individual country markets, which may not have 
been a serious obstacle in the early phases of industrialization, has 
made it impossible to reap the benefits of economies of scale and of 
particular degrees of specialization, and affords no incentives to the 
continuance of a dynamic investment process, especially in the relatively 
less developed countries of the region. Furthermore, the slow progress 
made in the organization of planning systems precludes sufficiently 
rapid implementation of efficacious policies, execution of plans and 
formation of investment absorption capacity® 
Thirdly, something must be said of the more specifically economic 
factors. These are TO ry numerous, but the following may be singled out 
as severely retarding the development of the Latin American countries: 
the underdevelopment and stagnation of the rural economy, especially in 
the sectors producing for domestic consumption} and the public sector1 s 
lack of funds - resulting from inefficient tax systems and, in most countries, 
from the absence of proper financial machinery and institutions which 
hinders the execution of the infrastructure investment projects needed to 
encourage private investment in productive activities. In this context, 
allusion must also be made to the financial and monetary disequilibria 
manifested in the dizzy speed of inflationary processes whose harmful 
effects on the allocation of resources and the formation of savings finally 
culminate in the disruption of the conditions required for economic growth. 
Fourthly and lastly, mention must be made of the limiting factors 
connected with the external sector. They derive from the inadequacy of 
external purchasing power, the deterioration of the terras of trade, the 
heavy burden represented by service payments on external loans and investment, 
the low levels of gold and foreign exchange reserves, the non-existence of 
a genuine policy of international financial co-operation, and the Latin 
American countries1 insufficient bargaining power for the purposes of 





The various socio-economic conditions cited here as obstacles to 
development, and the limiting factors of a more specifically economic 
character, combine.with the external bottleneck to weaken the rate 
of economic growth. 
In several important respects, it would be difficult to draw a 
line between the facts that represent primary causes and the phenomena 
that might be regarded as their manifestations or effects» The operation 
of all these obstacles and limiting factors is inter-related. Thus, a 
policy which succeeded in removing internal obstacles would make for 
the improvement of external conditions, but a more flexible and easier 
balance-of~payments position would be needed to facilitate the implementation 
of reforms and the execution of over-all development programmes. 
In these reciprocal relationships, the influence of the external 
sector is far-reaching and its operation, up to a point, autonomous, since 
its movements depend upon international market forces and on the policy 
of the industrialized countries, fields in which the Latin American 
Governments can exercise little control and take little action. 
Moreover, the situation is unfortunate in that as long as the 
external obstacles subsist, it is very difficult to make a clean sweep 
of the limiting factors of an internal nature. The reason is that the 
development of Latin America is largely dependent on imports of essential 
goods, on the application of„the technical progress that originates in . 
the industrialized countries, and on financial co-operation from abroad. 
It is worth while to , cite a few aspects of development which will „ 
illustrate the strategic importance of the external sector. For example, 
even if the countries carried out the necessary reforms to promote an , 
increase in domestic savings with the aim of augmenting real investment, 
these reforms could not be put into effect unless at the same time enough 
external purchasing power were acquired to cover the imports entailed by 
such investment* Progress in, planning will unquestionably increase 
investment absorption capacity, but again, investment projects could not 




countries are not and may never be in a position to. produce, because of 
the small size of their market or for want of technical know-how® In 
short, the implementation of a policy designed to improve the living 
conditions of the lower income sectors will encounter serious obstacles, 
if it proves impossible to expand imports, even in the case of actual 
consumer goods whose domestic production cannot immediately be developed® 
To sum up, when the restrictive effects of the various factors 
are more thoroughly analysed, there will be no reasons for surprise if 
in many countries the obstacles deriving from the external sector should 
prove to be as serious as others, or even more formidable, in the sense, 
that unless they are removed it will be impossible to surmount the rest® 
Finally, this study leaves no room for doubt on one point® Development 
policy must attack on several internal and. external fronts at the same 
time. Everything need not be done at once, for that will often be physically 
impossible® What is wanted is a strategy that will immediately, tackle 
the more vulnerable points, among which the external bottleneck, alongside 
the need for internal basic.reforms, has been plainly shown to constitute 
one of the most significant® 
4® Long-term limitations of a policy of import substitution 
and externâ , borrowing 
(a) Ctyonic balance-of-payments deficits 
The countries of the region have tried to get rid of the external 
bottleneck and stimulate economic growth by resorting more or less 
intensively to three basic measures: import controls and import substitution, 
external financing and the promotion of traditional exports or of new 
export lines® 
For a number of reasons, both external and internal - among which 
a lack of planned policies or an excess of caution have been common 
little has been achieved in respect of the diversification of exports, 




"on their, primary products» Policy has concentrated mainly on the , 
restriction of imports and their replacement by domestic production, 
and on the utilization of external financings It is in these sources 
c • - . . . . 
that the larger countries have found the dynamic growth factors for 
which they had previously relied on exports. In the smaller countries, 
these factors have been combined, to a greater or lesser extent, with 
export movements, and as a result more stable development conditions 
have been promoted® 
Ae time goes by, however, such a policy tends to lose its efficacy* 
Once the import substitution process and external borrowing reach a 
certain saturation point, extremely inflexible conditions are created 
that ultimately bring about a decline in the rate of growth» In the 
fpllowing pages the mechanics of this phenomenon will \>e analysed» The 
first step will be to study import substitution policy, with particular 
reference to the experience of the. countries that hav§. advanced farthest 
in their industrialization process, in order to draw generally; applicable 
conclusions. 
(b) Import substitution, economic growth and balance-of-payments 
equilibrium 
( . The evolution of the import. substitution process may conveniently 
be mapped out in several stages, although some rather arbitrary divisions 
are involved. An analysis of this kind is useful to clarify the effect 
of the process on the rate of growth and on balance-of--payments trends» 
In an initial phase, import substitution develops in the sector 
producing non-durable consumer goods, where the production techniques 
employed are relatively simple and capital-intensity is low. It is 
comparatively easy to make the necessary investment and launch these 
activities. By their means, the growth of the domestic product and of 
internal income is directly and indirectly promoted, and employment levels 
are raised. External resources may help to finance investment» And 
< * 
the foreign exchange released or transferred by the restriction of imports 




makes it possible for this phase of the substitution process to develop» 
The import coefficient decreases, and the cjynamic effects on tHb domestic 
product and internal income are stepped up in so far as substitution 
activities are based on the use of domestic raw materials. It was 
precisely because a high proportion of their direct raw material inputs 
was available that this stage was facilitated in many Latin American 
countries. 
The process continues in what may be demarcated as a second phase, „ 
when it extends to import substitution in respect of other consumer goods, 
including even certain types of consumer durables, branches of intermediate 
products and specific capital goods. The most highly industrialized 
countries of the region have completed this second phase, and several of 
the others are embarking upon it. 
These new industrial activities use more complex techniques and 
require higher levels of technical know-how and more efficient organizing 
capacity« The ratio of fixed capital to output and the,amount of 
investment per plant are higher, and,economies of scale, or cost reductions 
in accordance with production levels, also acquire considerable importance* 
The dynamic impetus of these activities is so considerable that they 
come to dominate the economic and financial process - as has been shown 
by the experience of Argentina and Brazil in recent years especially 
when the stage of installing the motor-vehicle industry is reached. 
Alongside these quantitative effects, there are others, no less significant, 
which influence development. This phase of industrialization involves 
the absorption of technical know-how and production techniques which raise 
the general level of training, organization and modernization in national 
economic structures. 
But serious difficulties set limits to the economic soundness and 
hamper the advance of this process in the conditions attending it in 
Latin America. In the first place, their effects on the balance of payments 




This phase is characterized by a marked substitution effort in 
respect of intermediate products, although there is an initial increase 
in requirement3 of imports of parts or spares which are not manufactured 
in- the country, but are later gradually replaced by domestic production. 
In any event, as the volume of production in import substitution 
activities is usually greater than that of the former external purchases 
concerned, demand for imported parts and spares may very soon exceed 
the value of the goods that used to be imported» If the high import 
content of industrial plant is also taken into consideration, together 
with the additional demand for imported goods that is generated by the 
increase in the product and in income, it will be seen that in the upshot 
the volume of imports tends to surpass the original import substitution 
output. 
Consequently,if there has not been an expansion of exports, the 
balance, of payments wiU tend to become unfavourable or deficits previously 
registered will increase. Efforts to restrict imports of other items are 
then redoubled, but little is gained in terms of foreign exchange, sine© 
the restrictions that have long been in operation have gradually limited 
imports to essential goods. In all likelihood, these new import substitution 
investments may affect investment plans in other public or private 
activities through the shortage of external resources. . 
If in Latin America's experience these effects did not immediately 
make themselves felt, it was because the countries concerned resorted to 
external financing or because an important part was played in the substitution 
process by.foreign direct investment, as was the case in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. But the foreign exchange commitments under the heads of 
service payments and remittances of profits to which this external 
financing gave rise soon began to aggravate the balance-of-payments deficits» 
In a third phase - upon which the most advanced countries of the 
region are now venturing - the import substitution process would have to 
cover basic intermediate products and various types of capital goods. The 
activities concerned are mainly of the type needing large-scale plant and 
heavy investment, and operating on the basis of complex technologies and 
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Argentina 414 658 208 113 1 393 
Brazil 619 631 62 52 1 364 
Chile 268 a/ 351 85 18 722 
Colombia 343 490 31 8 872 
Ecuador • - 1 714 y 3 1 680 
Mexico 288 319 120 82 809 
Paraguay 520 69 76 19 684 
Peru 227 72 56 32 367 
Uruguay 567 43 54 c/ 664 
Total I M 4 347 655 291 8 55ü> 
Sources: National Schedules of the member countries of ALALC. 
a/ Negotiated at the Special Conference held in February 1962, 
b/ In the third round "Ecuador vdthdrew certain concessions, thereby reducing 
the total to 1,677. 
c/ Uruguay granted no new concessions in the fourth round» 
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Development of these activities under adequate productivity and cost 
conditions and in line with up-to-date techniques will be difficult unless 
the policy of producing solely for the domestic market is drastically 
changed. A certain level of specialization and plant size is essential, 
which can only be achieved through expansion of trade. Moreover, the 
bottleneck in the external,sector creates serious obstacles to the 
channelling of the real resources needed for these investments. There 
are no non-essential imports that can be restricted in order to divert 
foreign exchange into the new activities, the critical financial situation 
does nothing to encourage direct foreign investment, and new loans are 
increasingly spent on servicing the debts that have built up. 
To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn from experience 
gained in Latin America's import substitution process: 
(a) Import substitution, at each separate stage, generated a strong 
dynamic impetus which has raised the national income and has decisively 
influenced economic arid social development; 
(b) The productivity and general efficiency of import substitution 
have fallen below the levels that might have been expected because import 
substitution was carried out indiscriminately under conditions of widespread 
de facto monopoly aimed only at a relatively small and undully protected 
domestic market; 
(c) In spite of the advances made in import substitution, the external 
imbalance was aggravated and the economies became more vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the balance of payments; and 
(d) The rigidity to which the process has led explains the present 
decline in the rate of development and the frequent economic recessions 
suffered by the more industrialized countries of the region, particularly 
Argentina and Brazil. By contrast, industrialization has been able to 
forge ahead in those countries that have contrived to raise their current 





However, many of the Latin American countries are still in the early 
stages of industrialization and have fairly high import coefficients* There 
are practical possibilities open to them of reducing those coefficients 
and making some headway in import substitution, just as they are doing now. 
But it must be borne in mind that, in general, their,domestic markets are 
far smaller in absolute terms and the obstacles to import substitution will 
arise at an earlier stage of industrial development. That is, even at 
different levels of industrialization these countries are now finding, 
Or vdll soon find that the dynamic potential of import substitution has been 
exhausted. In other words, the economicity of import substitution activities, 
the obstacles to their subsequent development and the decline in their 
dynamic impetus are determined in these countries by conditions far more 
restrictive than those obtaining in the more advanced countrieŝ  because their 
domestic markets are much snaller and other impediments to development are 
more serious. 
(c) External financing, rate of growth and balanc&-of^payments equilibrium 
Foreign capital, in its various forms, is the additional source of 
funds to which the developing countries have access in order to finance the 
increase in investment needed to step up their rate of growth. 
These external resources fulfil their dynamic role in the growth process 
if the conditions governing foreign investment, the movement of funds and 
the development of the economy making use of them, are clearly defined. 
Inflows should be sufficiently flexible and, in principle, should follow 
a given steadily upward trend. They should suffice to cover the mounting 
debt service and return on foreign investment, and possibly to provide a 
balance over a given period to finance the excess of imports over exports, 
which the country needs in order to increase the real resources upon which 
it can draw. 
Moreover, there must be a rise in domestic income and savings as 
well as exports, so that, after a certain stage has been reached, the external 
accounts produce a surplus with which to cover, in some measure, the transfer 
payments deriving from debt servicing and returns on investments. 
/While it 
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While it is true that, in practice, economic and financial factors 
cannot act as freely as might be required, there is no doubt that this 
must be the pattern if external financing is to operate satisfactorily. 
In this respect, Latin America's experience in the last few years is very 
enlightening, since the critical financial situation affecting many 
countries of the region has been due precisely to the fact that those 
essential conditions were not met. 
External sources of funds often lack the flexibility needed to- feed 
a flow of capital that will meet the aforementioned aims. In practice, 
capital flows tend to dry up when a country's borrowing increases, and much 
more so should the outlook for the balance-of -payments position be bleak. 
The short amortization periods and high interest payable on a large volume 
of external financing to which the Latin American countries have recourse 
merely aggravate the position. In addition, the decisions adopted by 
financing centres may be affected by political factors, while at the same 
time national policy imposes limits on foreign participation in production 
activities. 
In brief, if capital inflow fails to increase because of one of these 
factors, the time will inevitably come when transfer payments in respect 
of servicing and returns will tend to exceed new inflows. The higher the 
rates of amortization, interest and returns, the sooner this will come about. 
If capital flows are reduced and export earnings fail to increase sufficiently, 
the rate of economic growth will decline to the point of an actual recession, 
unless refinancing is secured on suitable terms. 
This, broadly speaking, describes Latin America's experience in recent 
years. The increase in its foreign exchange liabilities under the head of 
service payments and returns gradually absorbed increasing proportions of 
the new capital inflows, and current foreign exchange earnings from exports 
either remained at a standstill or went up all too slowly. In other words, 
the necessary financial and economic conditions were lacking for a sustained 
dynamic evolution of the process of absorbing external loans and investment. 




Two factors added to the rigidity of the process: the restriction of 
imports to essential items, leaving no i"oom for further retrenchment, and 
the effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade for primary products. 
The impact of the latter was so heavy that latin Americans losses exceeded 
the whole of the net external financing used by the region since the 
mid-fifties0 
It may be inferred, therefore, that a policy which lays emphasis on 
external financing and import substitution but fails to expand exports 
tend to lose its efficacy, often within a relatively brief period. Nothing 
can be done to put matters right after they have reached a certain pointy 
except at the expense of the growth rate. 
There are two reasons for this: in the first place, import substitution 
in the Latin American countries has failed to reduce the over-all demand 
for importsj secondly, debt servicing follows a rigid pattern, being only 
partly dependent on the evolution of export earnings. Amortization and 
interest payments constitute fixed-term outflows while returns on foreign 
investment in local production or import substitution activities are 
comparatively high and depend upon domestic market trends. Export trends 
can only affect returns on investment in export activities. 
Thus, the balance of payments of those countries which have made most 
headway in import substitution and in the use of external financing acquired 
a highly rigid real and financial structure. It was only when export 
earnings increased to some extent that the process could develop along 
fairly satisfactory lines. 
5* Latin America^ foreign trade deficit 
In the present analysis of general development problems and the short-
comings of the policies applied in Latin America, the expansion and diversi-
fication of exports emerges as one of the most important aims. Accordingly, 
it would be useful to examine the practical possibilities open to the latin 
American countries, taken individually, of achieving the aims for expanding 
their foreign trade, under existing conditions and based on the expected 
2/ trends in the world economy.-' 
2 This point was studied by the ECLA secretariat in Latin America and the 
~ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (E/CN.12/693) and 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Analysis of the 




From the technical projections made in relation to exports of primary 
products over the long term it does not appear that the Latin American 
countries can achieve the external purchasing capacity needed to meet the 
cost of imports and the servicing of the external financing required by 
a faster economic growth than at present. It is useful to remember that 
only in the early post-war years has Latin America attained a growth of 
3 per cent per capita, thanks to highly favourable export conditions which 
in some degree recurred during the hostilities in Korea. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the exceptional economic growth of the industrialized countries 
to which the region is linked, the last ten years have marked a gradual 
decline in Latin America1s foreign trade, either because of the deterioration 
of the terns of trade or the slow growth of the volume of sales. 
The improvement noted in the last two years has been due mainly to 
the higher prices caused by supply restrictions, which are now being 
largely adjusted, and not to an expansion in the volume of regional sales. 
Only a few Latin American exports - such as minerals - are expected to do 
better. Be that as it may, it is to be hoped that the concerted action 
adopted by the Latin American countries can bring about a change in the 
attitude of the industrialized countries which will prevent the existing 
conditions from worsening and might result in brighter prospects. 
It is obvious, however, that not even under the most favourable 
conditions can the Latin American countries proceed with industrialization 
and ensure their future growth if they continue to be dependent on exports 
of primary products. If they propose to speed up their growth rate, the 
size of the deficit between their export earnings and their liabilities in 
respect of imports and service payments will be such that the gap will be 
hard to fill by means of additional external borrowing. 
The Latin American countries will therefore have to find a way of 
pressing on with the process of economic and social change by creating 
an up-to-date industry which will produce for both the home and the export 
market* The question might be asked whether the Latin American countries 
would be capable, individually, of making the necessary investments and 
of competing with the industrialized countries on their home grounds and 




this respect, it is difficult to imagine that it can be done on the scale 
and within the span required by the acceleration of development. There 
are two implications illustrating the difficulty and, in certain respects, 
the physical impossibility of rapidly attaining such a target. First, 
the high production costs prevailing in Latin America and, secondly, the 
industrialized countries5 reluctance to import manufactures.from the 
developing countries« 
It dees not seem reasonable, therefore, to expect the Latin Am,erican 1 
countries to achieve those new forms of growth if they have to rely only ' 
on what the industrialized countries are prepared to grant them, either in 
respect of trade or financing» 
On the other hand, if the Latin American countries formed an economic 
union they will have created the economic and political conditions required 
for them to achieve their objective of industrialization and trade expansion 
and would represent a powerful instrument for securing better terms from ' 
the industrialized countries. 
6. Regional economic integration as an instrument of national development 
(a) The contribution of integration towards eliminating the foreign 
trade deficit 
Regional" economic integration will contribute directly, and in two 
ways, towards eliminating the foreign trade deficit which is preventing 
the faster growth of the Latin American countries. On the one hand, it 
will expand intra-regional trade through new flows of manufactured products 
and increased trade in traditional products, and, on the other hand, it 
will facilitate the continuation of import substitution in respect of 
purchases from third countries* 
During the course of this evolution, the coefficient of imports from 
the rest of the world can be reduced as required by the balances of payments, 
while that of imports from the integrated countries will soar. In fact, as 
the national economies forge aheact in the integration process, t r a d e is 
stimulated by the co-ordination of policies, the reduction of customs 
duties and the elimination of other stumbling blocks or obstacles, and the 
preferences or agreements, entered into with a view to reserving the domestic 





It should be borne in mind, however, that under easting conditions 
in latin America the benefits deriving from integration will, particularly 
in the early stages, depend primarily on the extent to which it enables 
each country to expand its trade over and above the level it could attain 
without the help of integration. This must, of course, be an over-all 
evaluation, since many items now imported from third countries will gradually 
be imported from other Latin American countries. But integration should, 
at the same time, generate additional exports from those countries which 
have cnanged the source of their supplies. Obviously, however, a unilateral 
shift in imports would not be harmful if the Latin American countries could 
secure equal or better terms in the integrated area than those obtainable 
from third countries. Be that as it may, the important fact is that 
Latin American integration must bring about the expansion and diversification 
of trade in every country of the region. 
While in all probability a conspicuous change will take place in the 
composition of extra-regional imports, their volume vail tend to increase and, 
indeed, there are good grounds for desiring this, especially in the early 
stages of integration. The experience of the European Common Market is 
highly illustrative in this respect. Extra-area imports by the countries 
of the Community went up by over 50 per cent between 1958 and 1963, t h a t 
in the same proportion as the product. In spite of this, area imports 
increased at a still faster pace, i.e., by 130 per cent over the same period, 
according to the values expressed in current dollars. In other words, these 
highly industrialized countries, in spite of having increased their reciprocal 
trade to a level representing 40 per cent of their total trade, nevertheless 
continued to import from the rest of the world without reducing the product-
3/ 
growth coefficient, which reached an annual average of 6.5 per cent."̂  
(b) Market size, productivity and efficient use of regional resources 
Most of the Latin American countries have extremely small markets. 
This is clear from a few comparisons using population and average per capita 
income as approximate indexes of market size, which is tantamount to 
considering the product or total income of each country« On this basis, 
The domestic product is expressed in constant prices, and imports 




Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, in that order, possess the largest domestic 
markets in the region. Brazil's market, for instance, is five times the 
size of Colombia's, and eight times larger than that of all the members 
of the Central American integration scheme as a whole. The ratios of 
Mexico's market to the same areas is apparently three to one and nearly 
five to one, respectively. Argentina occupies a middle place between 
Brazil and Mexico, Some thought should be given to the huge disparities 
there must be with respect to other countries of the region with smaller 
populations and income. 
The Brazilian, Argentine and Mexican markets, large though they may be 
when compared with the rest of Latin America, also seem small when measured 
against the markets of the industrialized countries. Thus, for example, , 
the comparative indexes reveal that France, with its 47 million inhabitants, 
has a market which might be anywhere from three to five times larger than 
those of each of the three leading Latin American countries. The gap would 
be even greater if they are compared with the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In these rough comparisons, the Netherlands and Sweden appear to have the 
same production volume as Mexico. 
In actual fact, La.tin America!s domestic markets are even smaller, 
relatively speaking, than would appear from the indexes, particularly in 
regard to manufactured products. A more accurate analysis should take 
into account such additional factors as the integration of the national 
economies, income distribution, the structure of demand and the level of 
industrial development, which adversely affect the position of the Latin 
American countries. 
The small size of the domestic markets prevents the Latin American 
countries from going ahead with industrialization on the baeis of productivity? 
levels and production costs similar to those in the.industrialized countries 
since they cannot establish industrial plants.of a size and degree of 
specialization required in order to take advantage of the economies of scale. 
Investments in certain key industrial development activities can only be 
made if strong protection is received from the State, and only at the expense 




In most Latin American countries the domestic market is so small that 
there are a great many industrial activities in which investment is not 
justified on technical grounds, and consequently, it is practically impossible 
for import substitution to proceed any further. Major countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico present more favourable prospects, and their 
market potential, combined with ample resources, largely explains their 
faster and more advanced stage of development. 
The economies of scale which cannot be turned to accotant because of 
market limitations are of significant proportions in important industries 
producing durable consumer goods, capital goods and basic intermediate 
products. Such economies depend on a number of factors, such as the 
indivisible nature of investment, the disproportion between the increase 
in a plant's production capacity and the cost of equipment, and the 
possibility of introducing up-to-date techniques and a certain degree of 
specialization when operating on an extensive scale of production. 
Regional integration will play a direct part in solving all these 
development problems deriving from the size of the market. As the integration 
process advances, production activities in each country will be able to count 
on the potential demand of the whole integrated area. It will therefore be 
possible to establish up-to-date plants of optimum size, with an adequate 
level of specialization, and to carry on with industrialization in other 
sectors where nothing can be done today within the limitations of the 
domestic markets. 
Concurrently with broadening the market, integration will provide the 
enormous advantages deriving from the optimum location of new investment, 
in terms of the cheapest sources of raw materials, energy, fuels and other 
inputs with an important influence on production costs. Some highly 
illustrative examples of economies in investment and reductions in costs to 
be achieved through optimum regional location and through the establishment 
of up-to-date plants as to specialization, techniques and size are to be 
found in the chapter dealing, with regional investment policy. 
The potential expansion of the market will assume exceptional proportions 
in those countries of the region of small or medium geographic or economic 




it can be stated that the five countries of the Central American economic 
community would have a potential additional market twenty-five times larger 
than that of their integration area itself; as regards Colombia, the rest 
of Latin America would represent a market fourteen times larger, and Chile, 
twenty-two times larger. 
The broader market will also play a very important part in the major 
countries of the region. Thus, it may be estimated that compared with 
Brazil the rest of Latin America represents a population of 150 million, and 
a market two and a half times larger than the local market; compared with 
Argentina, the population is 205 million, and the market four times larger; 
and in the case of Mexico, 190 million inhabitants and a market five times 
the size of the Mexican market. It is not out of place to stress that these 
comparisons give only an approximate idea of the potential market expansion. 
In practice, it cannot be taken for granted that a given industry of a country, 
can count on the whole economic space of the region as a market, since the 
advantages inherent in location, transport costs and other general factors 
will tend to limit the scope of the market within the integrated area, a 
limitation which is all the more important because of the geographical size 
of the region. That is why this document plays such stress on the need for 
embarking forthwith on a study of transport facilities with a view to the 
adoption of a co-ordinated policy for promoting integration. Whatever the 
difficulties, however, the huge disparities noted between the size of the 
domestic markets and the potential size of the regional market convey some 
idea of the force that would be gathered by the incentives to trade expansion. 
As progress is made in the establishment of a regional transport network and 
in the reduction of transport costs, the geographical size of Latin America 
will become an advantage, since, concurrently with enlarging the real market, 
advantage can be taken of the region's resources in the interests of the most 
statable location and the diversification and specialization of economic 
activities. 
A matter of some concern, and rightly so, is that the reduction in 
customs duties and the removal of obstacles to trade might give rise to an 
investment race aimed at the expansion of existing activities and the 




were it to deflect resources from other higher-priority investments and 
undermine the economic activity of the less industrialized countries or 
those which cannot at once promote a process of modernisation. These and 
other problems which will have to be provided for in establishing the 
instruments for an integration policy are dealt with later on this document. 
In the meantime, it should be stated here that integration will have to 
come about gradually so that the countries concerned will have time to 
introduce the necessary adjustments and reforms, as and when domestic 
output and income increase. In the first few years, action would be 
focused primarly on the integration of dynamic industries which have a 
strategic part to play in development, and in which, moreover, the economies 
of scale are usually considerable» 
(c) RecourseiLito technical progress 
Technical progress has been the basic factor of economic growth in the 
industrialized countries. Much research on the subject ascribes to it an 
equal or greater dynamic influence than to the human effort and the physical 
volume of capital applied to the production process. 
Nevertheless, the Latin American countries are not taking advantage of 
the potential offered by technical advances in order to step up their develop-
ment, A set of factors prevents them from so doing, pre-eminent among them, 
because of their bearing on integration being the narrowness of the market, 
the lack of dynamism in foreign trade and the limited resources allocated to 
manpower training and to scientific and technical research, 
As mentioned previously, the limitations of the market and the slow 
income growth preclude the establishment of industrial plants with up-to-date 
production techniques in a broad range of activities. Even if this were 
feasible, the Latin American countries feel obliged to adopt a cautious policy, 
because employment indexes cannot be increased. Regional integration will 
break this vicious circle since, in facilitating a faster increase in production 
and income, the two objectives - i,e,, the raising of productivity and employ-
ment levels -, which today are incompatible, can be pursued, 
2h the analyses of production in specific activities and of the economy 
as a whole, an effort is made to explain the part played in the expansion of 




human effort and capital* But in actual fact technical progress does not 
act entirely on its own, but through better training and organization of the 
human factor and a more efficient use of the new capital goods applied to 
new production techniques. Therefore, as long as the Latin -American countries 
continue to rely on exports of primary products and fail to increase their 
external purchasing power, owing to the deterioration of the terms of trade 
or the lack of external demand, they will be unable to take full advantage 
of this powerful factor of development« 
In removing the external bottleneck, integration will permit the 
countries of the region,to use their export earnings more efficiently for 
the acquisition of capital goods and for the establishment of up-to-date 
plants which will promote the necessary conditions for autonomous forces of 
scientific and technical progress to <;ome into being in Latin America. 
Clearly foreign scientific and technical co-operation and co-ordinated action 
in regional education, training and research programmes will be needed in 
this connexion. 
(d) Regional integration and international policy aims 
AS shown above, regional integration is essential if the Latin American 
countries are to speed up their economic and social development and emerge 
from the stagnation in which they find themselves at present. However, 
integration does not represent an alternative to the aims of expansion and 
diversification of trade with other regions, particularly with the 
industrialized countries. 
The Latin American countries must take decisive steps towards 
integration and at the same time press on with their international economic 
policy aims. No' other course is open to them since 90 per cent of their 
present trade is with areas outside the region} they rely on the industrialized 
countries for supplies of essential goods and require foreign financial and . 
technical co-operation if they are to make any headway in integration itself. 
Furthermore, it should be made plain right from the start that in the early 
stages of integration, requirements in respect of imports from other areas , 
will increase considerably, and at a later stage their structure vail change, 
though they will not diminish in absolute terms. Ch the contrary, it would 
be more logical for them to continue expanding, although on a lesser scale 





Two experiences which occurred under very dissimilar conditions 
in the Central American countries and in the European Economic Community 
illustrate these relationships between the evolution of trade and economic 
growth in an integrated area* The five Central American countries which 
are making steady progress in integration increased their reciprocal trade 
by a total of 150 per cent between 1961 and 1964* At the same time, their 
extra-area imports grew by 40 per cent. Undoubtedly the integration process 
has been helped in the last two or three years by the improvement in the 
export sector of the countries concerned, which enabled external supplies 
to be increased on the, scale indicated above. The countries of the 
European Common Market, with a caabined population of 175 million inhabitants 
a market probably three tames the size of Latin Americans, and a level of 
industrial development which is above comparison with the average for 
Latin America, increased their imports form third countries, as previously 
indicated, by over 50 per cent between 1958 and 1963, notwithstanding the 
tremendous growth of their reciprocal trade. 
All these considerations point to the need to co-ordinate on an over-
all plane integration aims with trade policy and international financing 
objectives. The Latin American countries will have to pool their efforts 
and work out a common policy vis-4t-vis the industrialized countries; their 
economic union would give them the negotiating power they lack individually 
and place them on a better competitive footing. Co-ordinated action with 
respect to the industrialized countries and international financing agencies 
is at once urgent and imperative, because radical changes must be wrought 
in the present situation so that the industrialized countries will facilitate 
the expansion of trade in primary products on the basis of adequate terras 
of trade, permit the entry of exports of manufactures from the developing 
countries, and increase their technical and financial co-operation in 







PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
INTEGRATION MOVEMENTS 
Any proposal for increasing the dynamism of the integration process 
in Latin America and of ensuring that it fulfils the requirements of a 
developing region should be viewed first and foremost as the development 
of the two movements that are already taking place in the form of the 
Central American Common Market and ALALC» Both were begun with the intention 
of creating more favourable conditions for the trade and development of 
their member countries and both have successfully accomplished the first 
stages of their work» 
The present chapter will review the history of the two experiments 
and examine their structure in the light of the conditions required of an 
integration process in a developing region» 
1» Economic integration in Central America 
Although covering a much smaller area than ALALC, the integration 
programme of the five Central American countries has some useful practical 
lessons to offer» Beginning in 1950 as a network of bilateral free trade 
agreements, by 1958 it had crystallized into a multilateral free-trade 
area» In I960 the bases for integrated regional development were laid 
down with the creation of the common market and of a number of institutions 
and mechanisms designed to co-ordinate the activities of the five member 
countries» 
Some of thé,results obtained in the course of these events merit 
special attention, particularly for their bearing on integration problems 
in the rest of Latin America» 
(a) The Central American countries have already lifted restrictions 
on intra-regional trade in 82 per cent of the tariff items and have 
undertaken to free all products by 1966, except for a few agricultural 
exports such as coffee, coffee extracts, cotton and cane sugar. During its 
first few years the integration process was focussed entirely on 
liberalizing the staple items of traditional commodity trade (the stage 




extended to all primary commodities and to new industrial products as well. 
The selective method employed was thus a means of setting the programme in 
motion and thereafter gave way to an automatic mechanism of tariff reduction 
and abolition» 
The adaptation of existing industries to the rapid tempo of intra-
regional trade liberalization has been fairly smooth, thus dispelling the 
fears aroused in seme sectors of private enterprise during the period of 
negotiation. No serious disruptions of either employment or production have 
been recorded in the established plants. On the contrary, automatic trade 
liberalization assured entrepreneurs of an open regional market for their 
products within not more than five years, a prospect which, combined with 
the common external tariff, acted as a powerful stimulus to the expansion 
and modernization of industry. During the initial period, the increase in 
regional trade was largely due to plant expansion and to fuller utilization 
of capacity in such industries as textiles, food processing and building 
materials. Moreover, enterprises that had to adapt their production 
processes to meet the new competitive requirements were able to obtain 
local financial assistance through the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration. 
(b) It is recognized that special rules and conditions for liberalization 
should be established in respect of a number of agricultural ccmmodities 
in the Central American Common Market. For instance, such staple items of 
diet as rice, beans and maize should be made the subject of special 
protocols for regulating trade, co-ordinating production and supply policies 
and ensuring the fullest possible freedom of movement. However, the 
Central American countries have not instituted special rules for their 
agricultural commodities as a whole, having found it possible to give certain 
items such as meat, butter, milk, cheese and fruit juices exactly the same 
treatment as industrial products. 
(c) The five countries have standardized import charges for third parties 
in respect of 98 per cent of the items in the Central American tariff 
nomenclature. Their task was made easier by the fact that they, unlike the 
rest of the Latin American countries, had all reached more or less the same 




levels, the bulk of their industrial products could be classified in the 
same categories throughout the area* But notwithstanding these favourable 
conditions, the tariff negotiations lasted for nearly three years- and: * 
another three years will be needed to complete the process of ratification 
and bring the tariff into full foreeM 
(d) Both the liberalization of interregional trade and the 
establishment of a common e:cternal tariff have been made easier by the 
fact that stable exchange rates have been maintained in the Central American 
countries for many years thanlçs to the particular structure of their 
economies. It has thus been possible to avoid the use of multiple 
exchange rates and similar types of exchange controls which, by affecting 
relative prices, would have tended to distort the competitive position of 
the regional industries, both between individual countries and between 
Central America as a whole and the rest of the world« 
Before the establishment of the Common Market, the Central American 
countries had already tali en steps towards monetary co-operation through 
informal annual meetings of Central Banks and bilateral compensatory 
arrangements. These arrangements were formalized in 1961 with the 
establishment of the Central American Clearing House and, more recently, 
of the Central American Monetary Council, which provides permanent . 
machinery for regular consultations among Central Banks, joint studies of 
the region1s monetary problems and the exchange of information through 
the medium of its sub-committees and Executive Secretariat, 
(e) The Central American countries have unified fiscal incentives 
to industrial development. Their object in doing so has been to prevent 
competition for new investment from becoming over-intensive with the 
establishment of free trade, and thus giving rise to unnecessary income 
losses and an uneven and uneconomic pattern of industrial development in 
the area. The uniform system of incentives improves on the previous 
national régimes in being selective, and extending the greatest benefits 
1/ By September 1963, the five member countries had ratified the special 
protocols bringing standard duties into force on approximately half 
the products included in the Central American common tariff. It was 
hoped that the process would be concluded at the end of 1964 or 
beginning of 1965 with the formal ratification of the remaining 




to industries that.are of key importance for the industrial development of 
Central America (e.g* producing capital goods, intermediate goods and raw 
materials). B>y helping this kind of industry, the new system also tends 
to give greater advantages to-the countries that are at a relatively 
less advanced staje of industrialization and have only just begun to tap 
their natural resources. In this way the benefits of integration would 
be spread fairly among the participating countries. 
(f) The balanced distribution of such benefits has been one of the 
prime objectives of the integration programme. The first step taken was 
the conclusion of an agreement on a regime for Central American.integration 
industries. In this it was stipulated that no country should be allocated 
a second integration industry until each of the five countries had been 
assigned their first plant. This rule was later made more flexible so 
that more benefits could be granted to the less advanced Central American 
countries, and now permits the allocation of additional plants to a 
country irrespective of whether each of the others has received one, 
provided that ,the additions do not belong to the same branch of industry 
as the original plant. 
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration is another 
instrument that is required by its statutes to promote the balanced 
economic development of the member countries. Through its loan policy, 
the Bank is able to provide an effective answer to the needs of the less 
advanced countries. It is specially concerned with assisting 
infrastructural projects designed to correct serious imbalances between 
the member countries. 
(g) The special instruments-that have been created to ensure the 
balanced development of the member countries also supply the necessary 
institutional incentive for taking full advantage of the Common Market 
potential. The régime for integration industries was planned as a body 
of conditions and incentives aimed at opening up the Market to certain 
dynamic sectors in particular, more rapidly than would be possible b y " 




The main purpose of the Central American Integration Bank is to 
provide financial assistance in a region where capital and thé spirit of 
enterprise are in short supply» The founding agreeement stipulated that 
the Central American countries may not receive loans or guarantees until 
they have ratified the treaties liberalizing trade and setting up the 
common external tariff, thereby ensuring that thè Bank's resources "are 
lent to projects directly connected with the economic integration programme. 
A prerequisite for obtaining financial assistance from the Bank is 
the preparation and technical study of the project in question by such 
organizations as the Central American Research Institute for Industry (ICAITI) 
and other technical assistance agencies. 
(h) Central America's experience with these mechanisms to promote 
balanced regione! development is still so recent that it would be difficult 
and. perhaps premature to try and assess their effectiveness. One instrument 
the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives, has not even entered into force, as 
ratification by two of the five countries is still pending. Some comments 
can however, be made which will help to determine the type of problem 
that is likely to arise during the early period of regional co-operation® 
The instrument that has so far proved itself to be most flexible in 
practice is the Bank, since it can act without waiting for the different 
countries to negotiate an agreement. As indicated above, its loans have 
mainly been given for the expansion and modernization of existing 
industries. It has also taken part in prior investment studies designed 
to explore the prospects-for industrial development in Central America and 
ascertain the corresponding investment requirement s in transport, telecommu-
nications and electric energy* In relation to new regional industries, the 
work of the Bank has been limited by the small number of projects that have 
reached the/financing stage* 
This has also been one of the main reasons for the relatively slow 
application of, the .régime for integration industries. Few projects have 
been submitted and those sent in have differed considerably as regards 
thoroughness of preparation and- economic importance. It has thus proved 




different Central American countries» So far the Governments have 
approved only two projects for integration industries, and three others 
have been assigned in principle pending submission of more detailed plans. 
It is to be hoped that this problem will gradually disappear as 
Central American entrepreneurs become more familiar vath the new industrial 
opportunities offered by the growth of the Market, with the aid of the 
different financial and technical organizations that co-operate closely 
in the preparation and execution of regional industrial development policy» 
This policy would be made more effective if it were made part of a 
development plan for the area as a whole, which would provide objective 
criteria for guiding negotiations on the location and distribution of 
industry among the different countries. A plan of this kind would also 
play a vital part in detemining the efficient use of the Bank*s funds, 
the application of the system of fiscal incentives, the co-ordination of 
public investment among the member countries and the proper chanelling of 
private investment. 
As a first step towards the establishment of a regional development 
plan, the Central American countries have instituted joint programming 
activities on the basis of an expert mission sponsored by several 
international organizations. In order to circumvent the difficulty of 
co-ordinating national plans that already exist, new plans are being 
prepared while the targets and regional guidelines to be used as a frame 
of reference for those plans are being worked out. The fact that the 
Joint Programming Mission is working at both the national and regional 
level is an additional guarantee that the necessary co-ordination will , 
be achieved, 
(i) The Central American countries have always been conscious 
of the fact that their economies were divided in the past not merely by 
tariff barriers but by the lack of a regional infrastructure. Plans were 
therefore made for a regional highway network to serve the needs of the 
Common Market which is now in process of construction. Joint electrification 
projects are being prepared which vail lead to huge savings in ccmparison 
with national electrification plans. A regional telecommunications system 




(j) The principle of unanimity is normally applied in the organs of 
the Central American Common Market, but for some technical questions the 
Governments have introduced the practice of decisions by majority vote. 
In the course of integration, an impartial evaluation of the facts is 
often required» The responsibility for this devolves on the Permanent 
Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration 
or on ICAITI« The Central American integration programme owes its dynamic 
spirit to the fact that institutions exist whose work is inspired by 
regional rather than national considerations« The Central American 
Economic Co-operation Committee, assisted by.its sub-committees and the 
ECLA secretariat, has been.the driving force behind integration and the 
forum in which solutions are found for the problems presented by. the 
creation of a Common Market. 
(k) The results so far obtained by the integration programme reveal 
the existence of an untapped potential for expanding reciprocal trade in 
the developing countries, Intra-Central American trade has increased from 
less than 3 per cent of the area's total trade in 1955 (13 million dollars) 
to 12 per cent in 1963 (66 million dollars)« The share of industrial 
products is expanding rapidly and is already nearly 75 per cent. As has 
been mentioned before, the main results of the new trade vistas opened up 
during the first few years of integration were the utilisation of idle 
capacity and the improvement and expansion of existing industries« The extent 
to integration furthers the. development of the region will largely 
depend on efficient use of the machinery that has been set up.to complement 
and strengthen the impact of free trade and the common external tariff* 
(l) The concept of reciprocity as expressed in the Central American 
integration programme has cone to acquire a broad significance« It is no 
longer a matter of distributing trade benefits- on an arithmetically equal 
basis, but of awareness that the capacity of economic integration to step 
up the process of growth for all the member countries is more important 




The Central American Common Market has already taken the decisions and 
entered into the commitments needed to push ahead with economic integration 
as far as it can within the possibilities offered by the region as a whole» 
From now on work must be concentrated on the application of investment and 
production plans to take full advantage of the joint economic and trade 
structure. The real benefits of integration for Central American 
development will, in the last analysis, depend on the efforts made by the 
countries acting severally and in unison to introduce the requisite 
changes in the,fabric of their economic and social life» 
There is, however, a nex-j task to be undertaken: that of linking up 
this sub-regional market mth a broader market for Latin America as a whole. 
The Central American market itself is limited in the variety of its resources 
and its capacity to use economies of scale, even more so than are some 
of the ALALC countries. Although much can be done through the 
Central American Common Market to introduce the structural changes needed 
for industrialisation and development, there is no doubt that the general 
and systematic linking up of this market with the sort of integration 
process that it is hoped to bring about in Latin America would open up new 
avenues for attaining the levels of industrialization and general 
productivity that are necessary for self-sufficient development» 
2» The history of ALALC 
The Montevideo Treaty is the most serious attempt made in the 
history of Latin America to unify the region's economic resources©^ It is 
essential to strengthen this endeavour, as expressed in the Latin American 
Free-trade Association, and to ensure the progressive achievement of its 
ultimate aim: the establishment of a Latin American common market. 
To do this, it is necessary to take stock of the progress that has 
already been made by ALALC, become acquainted with the main problems that 
have arisen and weigh the suitability of the present agreements as a basis 
for the more rapid progress that will be demanded by the region in future» 
Only then will it be possible to appreciate the complexity of the task 
that lies ahead. 
2/ Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 




(a) The scope, of the undertakings embodied in the Montevideo Treaty 
Although the specific undertakings contained in the Treaty of 
Montevideo were appropriate for the unhurried and sober fashion in which 
the countries embarked upon their economic integration in I960, the spirit 
of the Treaty is one of resolute determination to advance towards certain 
goals that, however unattainable at first, could be reached with the 
passage of time« 
Swifter process was out of the question in view of the difficulties 
inevitably encountered by a developing region in abandoning its restrictive 
trade practices and intensifying reciprocal trade« The fact that the method 
chosen was to establish a free trade area through the gradual liberalization 
of traditional exports and imports on the basis of selective negotiation 
offered the advantage of reconciling the region's inexperience in intra-1 
Latin American trade with the varied nature of its economies and the need, 
to move towards a common market with the m^xin^m stability and smoothness« 
Selective negotiations also offered the advantage of enabling items 
that presented no competitive problems to be liberalized from the outset 
with much greater speed than by the method of uniform linear reduction. 
Moreover, the fact that the countries as a whole were allowed twelve years 
in which to lift all restrictions on their primary commodity trade gave 
them a breathing-space in which to modify their national production in such 
a way as to ward off the adverse effects of an immediate or very rapid 
opening of the markets* 
ALALC fulfils five essential functions for Latin America: 
1* It is the framework for negotiations on the establishment of 
preferential treatment for numerous regional commodities and the reduction 
of trade protection and controls among the member countries« 
2* It is an institutional mechanism for proposing solutions to 
such problems as the lack of adequate transport facilities and of uniform 
trade instruments that are acting as barriers to trade« 
3% By acting in a liaison capacity between the entrepreneurs of the 
region it has made for greater mutual understanding and knowledge, thereby 




4» It has had a far-reaching catalytic effect on public opinion in 
a number of different sectors, thereby making a valuable contribution to 
the study and general understanding of the concept and problems of. economic 
integration in Latin America. 
5» It is the forum in which the future stages of integration have 
been mapped out. 
Since the entry into force of the Montevideo Treaty, ALALC has notable 
achievements of every kind to its credit. An outline of these is given 
below» 
(b) Application of the Treaty 
(i) Specific achievements in trade,, liberalization and expansion. The 
trade liberalization commitments have been completely fulfilled» In the 
course of the various rounds of negotiations, nearly 8,600 tariff 
reductions were granted representing the sum of the concessions made by 
each country to the other countries as a whole» Of these concessions, 
a fifth consisted in the total abolition of duties and other restrictions. 
The countries have already included on their National Schedules 
virtually all traditional import items, and have therefore given preferential 
treatment to such products from within the Area. Five of the nine countries 
have completely freed more than 30 per cent of the items on their 
respective schedules. A large proportion of the concessions agreed upon 
concern items that were not traded in the Area before the Treaty entered 
into force and for which no agreements had previously been negotiated» 
Over 50 per coat, of the concessions in question are for industrial products, 
mainly chemicals, machinery, electrical appliances and equipment and ccarmon 
metals and metal products. 
Intra-ALALC trade has taken on a fresh lease of life between 
1961 - the year that preceded the enforcement of the reductions - and 
1963, it expanded by 44,5 per cent»^It«s share in the total trade of the 
ALALC countries rose from 6 per cent in 1961 to 8,4 per cent in 1963» 
With the exception of Brazil and Colombia, the member countries have 
intensified their exports to the Area, in some cases doubling their previous 
2/ Figures for 1964 are not available, but aggregate data indicate that 




figure between the two years in question. No less than 75 per cent of 
over-all trade in 1963 (valued at 950.7 million dollars) consisted of 
products that were on the National Schedules 
The liberalization programme has also been instrumental in fulfilling 
the Treaty's pledge to increase the part played by the relatively less 
economically advanced countries in the trade of the Area® For example, the 
ALALC countries have granted Ecuador and Paraguay a total of about 1,200 and 
4,800 tariff concessions respectively, to which the most-favoured-nation 
clause is not applicable within the Area, The importance of.this treatment 
is that, by giving the two countries sole rights to a market, it enables them 
to step up their exports considerably and also affords extensive opportunities 
for developing investment in the industrial processing of their primary and 
resources and thus changing the traditional composition of their exports 
to ALALC. 
The establishment of ALALC has acted as a spur to trade among the 
countries of the Area. The preferential system that has been set up is 
an incentive to such activities and strengthens traditional commodity 
channels while opening up new paths to explore,^ 
Despite the difficulties encountered, it was clear from the first 
negotiations at which a start was made on the Common Schedule that the 
countries intended, by 1973, to free completely and simultaneously those 
products which constitute the bulk of intra-Area trade. The first section 
of the Schedule, as approved at Bogota, exceeded the minimum prescribed 
by the Treaty, Together with a variety of traditional commodities there 
were also new trade products, the entire number totalling 175 of which 
about 25 per cent consisted of articles that had not hitherto been traded 
in the Area, Some of the industrial products included may shortly become 
very important in view of their present incidence in the Area's total 
imports. Examples of these are chemical wood pulp, semi-manufactured copper 
products, machine-tools and some synthetic raw materials. The Common 
Schedule has an impressive dynamic potential whose full implications are 
¡J See Evaluación de las negociaciones de Ta Asociación Latinoamericana 
de Litro Comercio (27®»127717), ' which' reviews the results of the 




hard to gauge because the products it includes will bring a great deal 
of diversity into intra-area trade and because of the very significance 
attaching to the total liberalization of so many traditional commodity items» 
(ii) Other parallel achievements« ALALC*s achievements: in the field 
of tariff reductions have been matched by important advances in other -
operational aspects that facilitate liberalization and stimulate .intra-̂ Area 
. trade while paving the way for further progress. They include the follctóig: 
1, Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, ALALC has drawn up and 
approved a standard tariff nomenclature for the presentation of trade 
statistics and as- a basis for the negotiations. This nomenclature is now 
being revised and modified with a view to its adoption by the member countries 
,.as a common tariff nomenclature. Progress has also been made in formulating 
the bases for standardizing customs procedures in the different countries. 
The work done on these lines, together with the determination of comparable 
levels of customs duties and charges of equivalent effect imposed on imports 
i» 
by ALALC member countries, is laying the foundation for the future preparation 
and adoption0 of a coircnon e:rfcernal tariff. 
2» ALALC has established a body of criteria for determining and 
certifying the origin of goods traded within the Area, and thus enabling 
the products on which concessions are granted to be properly identified. 
The criteria are designed to give the greatest possible encouragement to 
the*use of inputs from within the Area, vdth due regard to the nature of 
the production processes there. 
3. As regards the infrastructure, attention should, be drawn to the 
f; 
work carried out on shipping questions. Although the,Treaty does, not -
contain any provisions on transport, the importance of.such facilities 
for intra-Area trade has led ALALC' to pay special attention to such questions 
as the development of merchant marines, maritime transport conditions,. 
costs and services and pdrt deficiencies. In addition, a draft general 
agreement on maritime, river and lake transport has been drawn up and is 
under consideration by the member Governments. Studies have also been' 




4» As regards intra-*Area trade statistics, ALALC has already . 
set up a uniform system which vail facilitate negotiations and the study 
of other problems stemming from the increased share of intra-Area trade 
in the total trade transactions of the member countries as a whole« 
5» It is proposed to strengthen the executive powers of the ALAlC 
organs through the establishment of technical committees for specific 
sectors» An endeavour is also being made to set up technical, political and 
administrative machinery to be administered by the persons who are 
responsible in the different countries for policy decisions in each of the 
economic sectors connected with integration» 
(c) The development of criteria and the search for new avenues of progress 
(i) Action taken on' specific problems^ The ALALC. organs have been 
engaged in seeking solutions to the problems that have cropped up during the 
implementation of the Treaty and in charting the future course of the 
integration movement» A valuable contribution has been made in this respect 
by the body of resolutions adopted at the various conferences and the work 
of the Standing Executive Committee and its secretariat» Some of the more 
recent resolutions, in particular, reflect the desire to forge ahead with 
the process of integration and to make every effort to fill the lacunae 
apparent in the Treaty undertakings, A case in point is afforded by 
complementarity agreements, whose conclusions has been blocked by the 
unlimited application of the most-favoured-nation clause. An attempt has 
been made to remedy this situation in resolution 99 (IV), which stipulates 
that the benefits of a complementarity agreement shall not be extended 
to countries that have not adhered to it unless they have previously 
granted satisfactory compensation» 
The new regulation has certain advantages over its predecessor, 




that were interested in entering into such agreements»-2' However, care 
should be taken that the more flexible attitude adopted to the conclusion 
of agreements between groups of countries does not lead to an undue and 
perhaps irrevocable ¿fragmentation-of-the integration of the industrial 
sector« 
Another step forward is the recognition by ALALC that integration 
presents special problems for the medium-size countries, and that they 
must be helped to play a satisfactory part in the process, particularly 
through the medium of complementarity agreements» 
The difficulties that would be caused for some countries by the 
complete liberalization of. agricultural commodities led ALALC to extend 
the application of the agricultural saving clause beyond the time-limit 
set for the formation of the Area in the hope that the development policies 
of the agricultural sector would be co-ordinated and regional markets 
organized. 
In order to foster the economic growth of countries at a relatively 
less advanced stage of development and'to provide additional help to thoir 
exports over and above the benefits extended by the Treaty, a plan of 
jj/ Little attempt has been made to conclude complementarity agreements» 
Up to the' present only two have been signed. One, in force since 
July 1962,-deals with calculating and other punch-card machines and 
has been acceded to by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay* The 
second, concerning electronic valves, came into force in April 1964, 
and has been signed by the same four countries and Mexico» 
The first agreement has already begun to have an effect on trade in 
the goods in question. Argentina has exported 354,000 dollars' worth 
of calculating machines to Brazil and Uruguay. In addition, more 
investment has been made to develop new market opportunities» 
A number of explanations are forthcoming for the scant use made 
of these agreements, including -the unlimited application of the most-
favoured-nation clause; the difficulties and inevitably slow tempo 
of any negotiations of this kind; the lack of specific multi-national 
projects in particular sectors; the want of an agency to study and 
promote such agreements; the incompatibility of industrialists1 interests 
those of their respective Governments; and lastly, the preference of 
these concerned for Common Schedules as a means of liberalizing trade 




financial, technical and other assistance was approved and it was decided 
to give them the exclusive advantage of being able to dispose of their 
exportable surpluses of manufactured goods within the Area« It was also 
agreed to set up special credit machinery for financing the exports of such 
countries. 
(ii) Resolution ICQ (IV)» This resolution is the most serious attempt 
made by ALALC to establish a general work programme for the immediate future, 
including a definition of the basic economic policy principles that should 
complement commitments dealing exclusively with questions of trade. It deals 
in a fairly comprehensive way with the main aspects of a general integration 
policy: the characteristics of trade policy, industrial development and 
agricultural development, financial and monetary aspects, and fiscal, labour 
and infrastructural questions. 
itfith respect to foreign trade, the resolution states that the object 
is to create conditions favourable to the establishment of a common market» 
With this in mind, it sets forth possible guidelines and instruments for 
the adoption of a common trade policy. It requests the countries and 
secretariat to carry put specific work on tariff questions with a view to 
achieving the greatest possible equalization of duties and restrictions 
on imports from third countries, and sets a deadline for the completion of 
the secretariat's work on a draft common tariff nomenclature. 
It outlines an industrial development policy for the Area, with special 
reference to the problems that stem from the different stages of industriali-
zation reached by the members of ALALC, the nature of their respective 
industrial structures and each country's special capacity to initiate 
or expand certain productive activities. More specifically, the industrial 
programme endorses the work of the study groups set up and recommends that 
their sphere of action be enlarged. Furthermore, it requests the secretariat 
to classify industrial activities in the Area with a view to determining 
suitable sectors for complementarity agreements and those in which industrial 
reorganization would have to be stimulated by a judicious amount of 




Resolution 100 further declares that national agricultural policies 
should be co-ordinated and reconciled as soon as 'possible and regulations 
laid doxvn for the organization of commodity markets. For this purpose 
the ALALC countries should compare their respective programmes and.decide 
on the sectors that offer the greatest relative advantages. The resolution 
also lays down guidelines for raising productivity and improving the use 
made of the. .area as a market for regional production, including 
regulations to systematize such trade once the period allowed for the 
formation of the Area has expired. 
As regards financial and monetary affairs, the resolution recommends 
the study of ;ways and means of setting up a credit system for financing 
intra-Area trade, the intensification of relations between banks, an 
analysis of the effects of exchange policy on trade movements and the 
adoption of criteria for foreign investment and capital movements within 
the Area* 
Other studies recommended by the resolution deal with the . 
establishment of a common policy for production and trade in raw materials; 
an analysis of fiscal régimes with a -view to ascertaining their effects 
on the programme for co-ordinating.economic policies; labour conditions 
in the Area and co-operation with inter-American organizations in . 
examining infrastructural projects.designed to further integration. 
Similarly, the resolution stipulates that, ALALC shall consider other 
infrastructural questions, such as transport, the adoption of technical 
and quality standards; regulations for industrial and other copyrights 
and patents; and the interconnexion of electricity services and traffic* 
Lastly, in. respect of development programming and vdth the aim 
of establishing bases for co-ordinating national programmes, the 
resolution proposes that close co-operation be maintained between the 
planning agencies and offices of the ALALC countries so that the 
respective national policies can be compared and eventually co-ordinated 
in the light of regional integration aims© 
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(d) The main limitations of ALALC 
If ALALC Is to attain completely its aim of achieving a common 
market, and play its full part in the region's development, two basic 
conditions must be met: (a) the system of tariff liberalization must 
lead gradually but effectively to a sufficiently free circulation of 
goods within the area to permit a real specialization of production, 
an adequate measure of competition, and full exploitation of the 
opportunities for import substitution on a regional scale; and (b) a 
regional investment policy must be formulated and effectively applied, 
that will make possible a joint effort to meet regional production and 
investment targets, an orderly solution of infrastructure problems, and 
a decision on the part of all member countries to benefit fully from 
the advantages offered by the integration process« 
Then again, the aims should be governed by certain basic conditions« 
Firstly, trade liberalization should cover all the present and potential 
lines of production in the region since, as already pointed out, the 
object is to establish in the region the maximum opportunities for the 
full play of the factors of competition, rational use of resources, and 
specialization« Secondly, liberalization must respect the right of all 
countries to attain higher levels of industrialization, which means that 
each country should be able to count on its fair share of the benefits 
deriving from the larger market. Thirdly, liberalization must be such 
as to permit the gradual adaptation of existing production to the new 
competitive conditions. 
It must be considered whether or not these aims can be achieved, 
in the context of existing agreements, with the speed and on the scale 
that the region needs. The first step is to examine the ability of 
the existing negotiation machinery to achieve a general and systematic 
liberalization of regional trade. 
It has already been stated that the adoption of this machinery 
had initial advantages that were made clear during the first years 
after the signing of the Treaty. In fact, as a result of the first 




of barriers to intra-ALALC trade. Subsequently there was a substantial 
decline in the number of products for which tariff concessions were 
made within the Area. In the first round 3,246 concessions ware granted, 
and in the second .4,347, but the number fell to 655 in the third round 
and 307 in the fourth. For certain countries the decline was even more 
marked. In the fourth round, one of the members of ALALC granted no 
concessions, and many granted very few; thus it can be asserted that 
this round provided no prospects of increasing trade (see table 1). 
Thus it is obvious that the liberalization process taking place 
through the annual ALALC negotiations is slowing down, and there is a 
danger that the.problem will persist and become mora serious as time 
goes on. Although in future negotiations countries may decide to save 
the situation by offering such substantial reductions that there will 
be a new stimulus to reciprocal concessions, this hardly seems probable 
at present, and the more realistic view is that the difficulties that 
have arisen are likely to continue in the future. 
The present procedure of selective negotiation has certain 
draitfbacks that make it difficult to achieve free trade within the Area 
by this means. . Above all, it is far too flexible. The present system 
is based on a minimum average annual reduction of the tariffs applied in 
the Area, and consequently countries are free to choose the moment, the 
form and the amount of the reduction for each individual product. 
This flexibility entails two further'problems. It is essential 
that the liberalization process should offer the potential exporters 
in the Area sufficient certainty as to when and to what extent restrictions 
on trade will be reduced or abolished, together with a formal guarantee 
that the reductions will be mantained. The lack of certainty is a factor 
that prevents full advantage being taken of the opportunities opened up 
by tariff reduction for the expansion and diversification of trade, and 
delays or limits the possible investments that could result from the 
process. 
The fact that each country is able, under the system of selective 
negotiation, to reserve the granting of tariff reductions on any given 
product until it considers it opportune to do so reduces the possibility 
that national production can prepare itself gradually for the foreseeable 
reduction of competition to a minimum. 7 
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Since the traditional commodity items are mainly outside the field 
of negotiation, being largely the subject of previous special treaties in 
the form of bilateral agreements, and possibilities of reductions are 
further reduced in respect of products already produced or to be produced 
in the near future in the country granting the concession, and which 
may be imported from other countries in the region at world prices, it 
should be recognized that under the present system the vast majority of 
the tariff items in which really active trade is to be expected, and 
for which the competitive factor is particularly relevant, are being 
excluded from the negotiations. 
Furthermore, during the transition period the present undertaking 
does not ensure uniform treatment for all products, or guarantee a 
standard margin of preference. The difference in the structure of the 
imports of each country from within the Area, and its right to choose 
what products are to be the subject of negotiation, and what reductions 
are to be accorded, means that not all countries undertake commitments 
for the same items, and moreover, the tariff reduction and preferential 
treatment granted are usually different. Thus, for example, if a given 
country wishes to export an item to the Area, it will find that different 
tariffs will apply according to the concessions granted by the different 
ALALC countries. Until the Common Schedule that is to enter into force 
in 1973 is applied, there is no guarantee that the products covered by 
the liberalization programme will receive a standard tariff treatment. 
This means that in fact there is as yet a regional market for hardly 
any of the products already included in the liberalization programme. 
The most that can be said is that certain opportunities, varying in 
effectiveness, have been opened up in one or two of the presumed importer 
countries. 
The difficulties in calculating the weighted averages for the 
reductions in customs duties and other charges of similar effect, and 
consequently in establishing whether the countries have met their minimum 
annual obligations, means that the negotiations are based essentially on the 
prior establishment of some balance of advantages. If a country considers that 




-it has granted aré:, in its own view, sufficient to maintain this balance, 
it may be that the country concerned will either refrain from negotiating 
in a particular round, or will grant very few concessions* This is in 
fact what has happened in ALALC, although it cannot be asserted that it 
is due solely to the defects of the negotiation system. 
' , To.judge by the course taken by the last round, progress along 
this path seems to have reached a stage where the possibility of new 
concessions being granted comes into conflict with the general tendency 
of the member countries to refrain from granting concessions on those 
products that are produced internally on any considerable scale, or 
which imports are controlled or prohibited for balance-of-payments 
reasons« All these limitations of the present selected negotiation 
undertakings are so serious that it can be foreseen that the aims of 
the common market cannot be achieved if the necessary progressive 
liberalization of intra-Area trade is entrusted solely to a system 
whose. tendency to come to a standstill may lead to future discouragement 
and frustration. 
Resolution 100 (IV) constitutes the formal recognition of the 
limitations of ALALC, and of the need that the Treaty of MontevideQ, 
should be amended as soon as possible to permit more far-reaching and 
ambitious agreements. 
Moreover experience in ALALC has shown that the aims of economic 
integration cannot be achieved through the mere liberalization of trade, 
which must be accompanied by other agreements that constitute a real 
regional programme for the achievement of a series of major common 
objectives® 
It cannot be said that the search for new principles undertaken 
by ALALC is a sufficient answer to the main problems of integration and 
to the weaknesses of the present system. This is because ALALC is 
essentially limited by the narrow scope of the specific agreements 
contained in the Treaty of Montevideo, in terms of their abiiity to give 
impetus and significance to the integration process. It is generally 
agreed in Latin America that the region needs new undertakings that will 




made an effort to escape the limitations imposed by the system within 
which it must now operate, but it is equally true that the programme of 
action dravnup for this purpose in resolution 100 (17) has not succeeded 
in going beyond a mere listing of basic directives for an economic 
policy for the area that the countries could perhaps adopt on the basis 
of the studies undertaken by ALALC. This programme does not represent 
the decision by the member countries that is so urgently required if 
the integration process is to make effective progress. 
As regards the substance of the principles adopted, it is clear 
that they are so closely linked with the fulfilment of the whole body 
of agreements that no progress can be made in one area unless it is 
made at the same time in all the others. The result is a vicious circle 
which is very difficult to break, as the past working of ALALC has shown. 
Thus, for example, if progress in tariff reduction is linked with the 
reconciliation of the various trade policies and instruments, the point 
may be reached where the process of liberalization is weakened or 
paralysed because that reconciliation has not been achieved. 
The declarative nature of the basic directives and the general 
aims and principles contained in ALALC *s programme of action deprives 
it of any real power to stimulate integration. There is at present no 
guarantee, for instance, that in the forthcoming negotiations of ALALC 
the member countries will bring their -actions into line with the 
•principles laid down in that programme, and they can hardly be expected 
to do so, since the basic directives have been conceived and formulated 
within the narrow margin of a system which in itself is Inadequate for 
the purpose of encouraging the real process of integration that Latin America • 
needs to solve its general economic difficulties. Thus a new stage must 
be embarked on, and for this purpose the region needs to adopt forthwith 
a body of new agreements at a high political level that will permit 
effective action in the various fields covered by the integration process* 
However great the desire to take such action, it cannot be done through 
the machinery of a free-trade area. 
E/CNt 12/728 
Page 54 
(e) The.potentialities of the present institutional structure 
In an integration process it is to he expected that national interests 
will not necessarily always coincide with the interests of the community 
of nationsProgress in integration cannot depend solely on negotiations 
in which the temporary interests of the individual countries are the 
only .factors taken into accountIntegration requires permanent contact 
between national interests and the bodies that represent the interests 
of the community of nations, all the more so if integration is taking • 
place'in a developing region. : The formulation of common policies implies 
the existence of institutions that are.responsible to the community. 
Furthermore, the application and-control of the rules of competition 
must be. based on standards that, although with an eye to the decisions 
and interests of individual countries,,take account of the community 
interests. These considerations lead to the conclusion that integration 
needs, in addition to bodies that directly represent the Governments, 
others that represent the community, with the necessary powers of action 
and with sufficient independence and financial resources to promote ' 
the region's development, prppose guarantees for the proper fulfilment 
of agreements, assess the facts on which requests for exceptions are 
made, and make recommendations on methods for dealing with them. 
In ALAIC the responsibility for carrying out the functions involved 
in the existing agreements has been entrusted to the system's political 
organs. The Conference, in addition to supervising the carrying out of 
the Treaty, is also responsible for formulating-the Association's policy 
and adopting decisions for putting it into effect; the Standing Executive 
Committee, composed of government representatives and answerable directly 
to the Governments, carries out studies, suggests measures and submits 
to- the Conference the recommendations it deems necessary for the proper 
fulfilment of the Treaty. 
This system of functions does not appear the most suitable for 
the effective carrying out pf the broader functions required for a new 
stage of integration. This is mainly,because of the nature of the • two 
organs. Their task is above all to represent, and defend the interests 
of, the individual countries, and consequently it is unlikely that they will 
be able to oarry due regard, on a continuous basis, to the aim of progressing 
towards integration. /The fulfilment 
E/CN« 12/728 
Page 55 
The fulfilment of other integration aims, such as the co-ordination 
of sectoral or infrastructure policies and the formulation of a regional 
development policy, is also a function that should be entrusted to bodies 
answerable to the community, with suitable powers and machinery to permit 
them to work effectively towards those aims. 
Here again, the ALALC organs have certain problems. The adoption 
of policies aimed at the promotion of regional integration calls for 
the reconciliation of national interests with the over-all aims of 
development of the Area, and this may sometimes be difficult for bodies 
that by their very nature do not represent the interests of the community 






THE BODY OF NEW AGREEMENTS 
As explained, ALALC's present activities in the field of regional 
Integration are of unquestionable importance, pnd m?y be expected to 
lead to real progress, although, pq h^s been shown, in future this 
progress will be too slow and limited in scope» 
Because of the urgent nature of Latin America's development problems, 
and the likelihood th^t these will increase progressively in the short 
run, it appears unreasonable in view of the t?sk facing the peoples of 
the region, *nd the hopes pinned to integration as a powerful driving 
force of the region's economic ?nd social growth, to wait while the 
present agreements of the Treaty of Montevideo grrdually come to fruition« 
Without prejudice to the care that will be needed in deciding on the 
necessary programme of action, certain additional pgreements of a more 
premising nature can even now be undertaken, agreements broader in scope 
and more effective than those now in force, and which would also make 
it possible for production in individual countries to adapt gradually to 
an increasingly competitive situation in the region« 
The circumstances that permitted the establishment of the European 
Common Market do not exist in the same form in Latin America* There is 
no such large-scale trade, as that which took place In Western Europe 
before the Treaty of Rome, nor the same experience with foreign 
competition, nor the ability to respond rapidly to the stimulus of a 
broader market. But it is the very absence of such positive factors 
that makes it more urgently necessary, even though it is more difficult, 
to aim at the outset at a full-scale integration in Latin America. 
ALALC1s activities in recent months in seeking new formulas to 
broaden the tariff reduction agreement, and adopt work programmes aimed 
at providing the basis for co-ordinating policies in various fields, 
is clear proof that the Association is *lso convinced that more r^pid 
progress towards integration is essential. It is a matter of urgency to 
speed up progress through a more decisive approach, which will inevitably • 




To speed up the pace of integration a first stage must be 
envisaged, involving the carrying out of agreements more far-reaching 
than those that now exist, and during which the final stage will be 
prepared* .There, is ample room, for immediate progress at a much more 
rapid pace, and on a broader scale,.than what could be achieved through 
the present system of selective negotiation, while in the meantime 
studies can be prepared and the proper conditions established both to 
solve the problems of a common external tariff and to est blish means 
of co-ordinating monetary and exchange policies, and national development 
programmes- in general* 
Firstly, an automatic tariff reduction system, broader in scope 
than the present system, would be established. There can be no progress 
towards integration if the products On which tariffs are lowered are 
those that would be traded in even without any tariff reduction,• 
Furthermore, as mere reduction of tariffs cannot automatically bring . 
about certain basic aims and objectives of the Latin American economy, 
it should go hand in hand with a regional investment policy, which , 
constitutes the second element in the programme of action.. Thirdly, 
the expansion of trade will make it essential to put into operation 
certain special machinery of a financial and monetary character. Lastly, 
the new tariff reduction agreements, the formulation and execution of, 
a regional investment policy, and the monetary and financial, problems, 
all require institutions capable of making studies, promoting action, 
and taking decisions. 
1, The new trade policy commitments 
The new commitments would be as follows: 
First. A progressive and automatic system of tariff reduction 
for intra-Area trade would be adopted, covering all products and based 
on an annual linear reduction, whose practical and technical details are 
examined later in the present document. At the end of ten years the 
participating countries would not be able to apply any customs duties 
to items of reciprocal trade, including other charges of equivalent 
effect, exceeding 20 per cent of the c.i.f. value of each item, except 
for the relatively less developed countries, for which the time-limit 
could be extended to fifteen years. /m . 
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To give greater,impetus to the process of tariff reduction within 
a fairly short period, and to promote the gradual increase of regional 
competition, it is proposed to reduce tariff barriers to intra-ragional 
trade fairly rapidly, so that by the end of the first five years the 
maximum tariff level that countries can apply to reciprocal trade shall 
not exceed 50 per cent of the c.i.f* value of each item. In this case, 
too, the relatively less developed country would benefit from a special 
treatment® 
Selective negotiation would continue to be used to effect more 
extensive reductions in customs charges, when the countries so ?gree. 
In addition sectoral complementarity agreements would also mpke a vslu^ble 
contribution to this more rapid reduction of tariffs» 
Second. During the ten-year period there would be a gradual 
abolition of the quantitative and other restrictions not equivalent to 
customs duties now in force, so that at the end of this period the 
restrictions on reciprocal trade would consist solely of customs duties 
within the maximum limit Indicated above. 
Third., Within five years a common external tariff would be drawn up 
and approved, and would be gradually put into effect in the subsequent 
years. However, every effort should be made to arrive at standard 
tariffs in a shorter period for raw materials and intermediate products, 
in order to eliminate a major source of difficulty in relation to the 
competitive footing of the individual countries. The sectoral agreements on 
industrial complementarity could provide an effective means of achieving 
this ?iim. 
Fourth. Until the common external tariff is negotiated, minimum 
preference margins would be negotiated and established for the products 
of the member countries where those resulting from the tariff reduction 
process prove inadequate. 
The new tariff reduction formula would plso mske it possible to 
achieve other basic aims, such as the introduction of a considerable 
element of competition between the countries of the region thpt, in 
addition to offering new trade prospects and contributing to the adoption 




countries, would prepare the ground for more advanced stages of integration. 
In addition, there would be from the outset a general preference in favour 
of area production, that would act as an effective stimulus to the 
substitution of imports from third countries. 
These various undertakings would be supplemented by escape clauses 
to permit countries to take emergency measures in cases where the fulfill 
ment of such agreements would result in serious harm to national production 
or in major balance-of-payments difficulties. Furthermore, countries 
could establish domestic taxes for the purpose of restricting the 
consumption of certain articles, especially luxury goods, when such 
action was considered necessary to offset certain adverse effects of 
trade liberalization or the adoption of the common external tariff. These 
taxes would be of equal effect for domestic and imported goods. 
2. A regional investment policy 
More particularly when a developing region is concerned, an 
agreement to reduce tariffs automatically and across the board is not 
in itself sufficient to achieve certain economic.and social aims. Just 
as in the field of national economic policy, the free play of market 
forces does not suffice to fill the structural gaps, and there must also 
be planned action if the desired aims are to be achieved. Consequently 
the second major element of the new stage for AIALC would consist of the 
defining of a specific series of regional production and investment aims 
in the basic sectors. Such aims should be co-ordinated with national 
plans so that in the sectors in question the most rapid progress possible 
can be made towards complete tariff abolition and the full use of the 
opportunities provided by a regional market. At the same time an 
immediate action programme should be adopted to solve infrastructure 
problems on a regional basis. 
Regional action can also be taken to activate the forces that . 
will help to achieve a. progressive rise in exports to third countries, 
especially in the form of manufactures and semi-manufactured goods. 
Consequently it will be necessary to adopt well-founded criteria 
for the achievement of regional investment aims, mainly, on the basis of 
sectoral and sub-sectoral agreements, and to agree on the general bases 
for a regional investment policy. 
/3. Financial 
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3* Financial and monetary action 
The region urgently needs payments systems to facilitate transactions 
between individual countries and to increase the supply of credit for 
the encouragement of exports and to help solve the unexpected problems 
that may arise« In addition there will have to be studies of problems 
of exchange and of monetary policies, with a view to proposing specific 
measures and machinery in relation to integration. 
4. The new institutions 
The fourth pillar of a new and more dynamic stage for ALALC is the 
establishment of institutions that can promote and supervise the fulfilment 
of the new agreements and that will be capable of playing an active 
part in furthering progress towards integration. 
An automatic system of tariff reduction and a regional investment 
policy directed towards a really dynamic integration process calls for 
institutions different frcm those of a system in which tariff reductions 
are achieved through negotiations between the countries. The character 
of the community organs is completely different: the new agreements 
require an institutional framework that is more complete, has more power 
of decision and more freedom of action to analyse problems and embark 
on an organized effort to find solutions that will be of benefit both 
to individual countries and to the whole community of nations. . 
Consequently a Council of Ministers should be established, as the 
highest authority on integration. In addition there should be a Board 
to lay down the lines of progress for the integration programme and to 
supervise the fulfilment and smooth working of the new agreements. 
There should also be a body that will co-operate in the promotion of 
regional investment. In addition, there should be ad hoc arbitration 
tribunals. 
Integration should not be based only on the participation of 
Governments and experts, but should also have the active co-operation of 
the whole population and all the economic forces in every country. 
Consequently, there should be a Latin American Assembly, and a committee 







1« Requirementsf pscope jand limitations of trade policy, measures 
In essence the establishment of the Latin American common market 
consists of merging the individual markets of the participating countries 
into one large regional market. From the trade policy standpoint this 
integration inevitably requires the reciprocal abolition of trade barriers, 
together with the adoption of a common external tariff and the standardiza-
tion of other aspects of the region* s trade policy towards the rest of the 
world* 
The free circulation of goods within a common market, while it 
permits the integration of national industries and provides them with 
a broader market, at the same time exposes them to the competition of 
similar lines of production* The creation of this competitive 
situation, and in general the merging of the markets, gives rise to the 
two main problems that a Latin American common market will involve: 
firstly, the adjustments that such industries and even perhaps an 
appreciable proportion of the economy in every country, will have to 
face in adapting to the new situation; and secondly; the danger that 
thé integration of several national economies in a single market may 
have harmful effects, for some of them, particularly those at a lower 
stage of development, whose development prospects may be adversely 
affected by the integration* More broadly speaking, this second problem 
is a question of reciprocity, that is, the need for a proper correspondence 
between what each country grants to the others and what it receives from 
them in the integration process, and for the benefits deriving from the 
process to be fairly distributed among all the participating countries* 
In the process of establishing a common market, adjustments to the 
competitive situation are inevitable, and are necessary if some of the 
most important benefits are to materialize, such as increased speciali-




efficient enterprises and higher productivity in those that are less 
efficient, or their conversion to other lines of production in which 
they would be more competitive $ the chance for industries to obtain . 
raw materials, intermediate products and other inputs at lower costs, 
etc. Although it is to be hoped that the common market will provide 
an effective stimulus to the expansion of the Latin American economies, 
.there is no doubt that such benefits will only be obtain«! to the 
extent that the serious distortions in those economies are corrected 
and there is consequently a more efficient use of resources. For the 
very reason that these distortions are so serious, the adjustments needed 
to correct them and to adapt to a competitive situation will eventually, 
but inevitably, mean the elimination or conversion to other lines of 
certain marginal production operations, with the resultant consequences 
not only for the industries concerned but also for the economy as a whole. 
The magnitude of these consequences will probably be much less than 
is generally expected. There is a tendency to exaggerate them on the part 
of those who, rightly or wrongly, fear that they may suffer from regional 
competition« Furthermore, it is to be expected that these consequences 
will be mitigated by the expansionist effect of the formation of the 
common market on the Latin American economies. 
For the economy of the individual countries as a whole, the 
consequences will be more than offset by the benefits resulting from 
the merging of the-markets. However, it is desirable to reduce the 
adverse effects to a minimum, and as far as possible to facilitate 
adjustments by allowing them to take place gradually over a transition 
period. 
But the aim of the transition period, in addition to pemitting 
these gradual adjustments, is to ensure that they do take place gradually. 
In other-words, it should not be possible for countries to avoid making 
the adjustments or, to delay them to the . last minute, since that would go 
against the whole purpose of the transition period. 
The securing of these aims, requires, a formula or procedure providing 
for specific and detailed agreements for the gradual reduction of tariffs 




Of a common external tariff applied automatically. Consequently tariff 
reduction, in addition to being gradual, should be linear and automatic, 
and cover all products» 
Similar considerations apply to the saving clauses« These clauses 
should be limited to what is essential for the temporary reliefs, in 
cases that are fully documented and justified, of a critical balance-
of-payments situation or serious harm to a given industry or sector as 
a result of the fulfilment of the tariff, reduction agreements or any 
others that may be adopted» In any case, any delays or exceptions to 
measures provided for in the liberalization agreements should have a 
time-limit, since the adjustments that will be needed both on the part 
of the enterprises and in government policies will be made only if 
there is certainty that there will be no interruption or change in the 
process of merging the markets and establishing conditions of full 
competition* 
Furthermore, there must be sufficient certainly with respect to 
when and how fast the trade restrictions will be removed or reduced for 
products of interest to potential exporters, together with a guarantee 
that, save in exceptional cases, the reductions made will be maintained» 
Without such certainty there will not be the necessary incentive to 
exploit the opportunities offered by the liberalization process and 
to effect investment to establish or expand enterprises, etc« 
Unless Latin America resigns itself to the ide^ thst x̂ e'gion-3! 
integration of industries can never be achieved, no attempt should be 
made to solve the problems of adjustment to the competitive situation 
resulting from the process of the gradual liberalization of reciprocal 
trade by excepting from liberalization the industries that are, or fear 
to be, threatened by the new competition» 
These adjustments can and should be facilitated and stimulated by 
other means that will effectively help industry and labour to adapt 
themselves to the new conditions resulting from the merging of markets 
and the integration of the separate economies» Possibly the most 
important and effective of these measures would be the financing of 




compensation of workers unemployed or displaced: as a result of the . 
adjustments, together with arrangements to retrain them. The accent 
should be not on measures that have the negative effect of permitting 
the continuance of an Inefficient use of resources, but on positive 
measures that will further the adjustments, encourage those concerned 
to take advantages of the new opportunities, and.expand trade« 
Although it is not particularly difficult to find a suitable 
formula for the gradual and automatic reduction of customs duties and 
other charges of similar effect, -the same does .not apply to quantitative 
and other restrictions whose .-nature precludes the recommendation of any 
procedure for their gradual reduction in all cases. 
In order to achieve the gradual abolition of quantitative 
restrictions, the best procedure would therefore be.to reduce their 
total number year by year. . This procedure offers, the advantages of 
being practical, simple, and easy to apply and control. In addition 
it allows each country to choose the products or tariff items that 
will be liberated from these restrictions each year. 
Such a system has the drawback that the restriction would be 
completely abolished for those products that the country concerned 
selects, and in some cases this might*be to abrupt a measure. This . 
shortcoming might be overcome by resorting to escape clauses when the 
question is one of serious harm, or relates to a major economic activity» 
Furthermore, authorization could be granted to replace quantitative 
restrictions by customs duties in circumstances, forms and conditions 
to be laid down by the community organs» 
Another procedure would be .to reduce gradually all the restrictions 
but its application might give rise to serious practical problems. In 
fact such a procedure would require that for each, product subject to 
quantitative restrictions there must be an initial quota free of 
restrictions for imports from within the area. This quota would have 
to be increased "annually by a gives* percentage. Apart from the problem 
that would be involved in agreeing on criteria for establishing the 




various countries, it would be extremely difficult and arduous to apply 
such criteria to a vast range of products, and even more so to administer 
the resulting quotas. . 
The second of the basic problems presented by the formation of a 
common market is the danger that the benefits of integrating the national 
economies in a single market might not be distributed equitably among 
the participating countries. 
The integration process should take place in such a way that there 
is reciprocity in terms of what each participating country grants to and 
receives from the others. Although this reciprocity should be understood 
in the broadest terms, it is usually taken to refer in particular, and 
sometimes solely, to reciprocity of the trade type, that is, that there 
should be reciprocity with respect to the prospects of each country's 
trade with the others that can be expected to result from the liberalization 
process, the granting of minimum preference margins, and eventually the 
standardization of the. treatment of imports from third countries. 
Reciprocity must, of course, be taken in a much broader sense than 
strictly trade reciprocity. The volume, and in particular the composition, 
of the trade flows will constitute a most important criterion in 
determining whether or not adequate reciprocity has been achieved. 
However, this should also be assessed in the light of other factors 
such as the form in which the individual economy has evolved, with 
particular emphasis on differentiating between the effects imputable 
to the integration process itself and those due to the action of lack 
of action of the country concerned. 
Both the liberalization formula and the other trade policy measures 
that are adopted in order to achieve a common market must be drawn tip in 
the light of the need to ensure a minimum degree of reciprocity for the 
participating countries. But it must be borne in mind that the 
effectiveness of these measures is rather limited, and that in any case 
the most they can achieve is to ensure some equality of opportunity. 
The difficulty or practical impossibility of finding satisfactory 




reduction and other trade policy measures- is due not only to the real 
limitations of such measures, but also, perhaps to a greatër degreê  
to the variety of factors that enter into the problem and the complexity 
of each of them, as well as the difficulty of predicting with any 
accuracy the'effect of any automatic system of tariff reduction oil 
specific economies or industries, and on the trade flows within the area» 
The problem of reciprocity in Latin America is particularly 
important because of the substantial differences in the levai of 
economic development of the various countries of the region. This 
problem is more, serious in relation to the relatively less developed 
countries which, precisely because they belong to- that category, do 
not have sufficient means and resources to take full advantage of the 
opportunities opened up by the integration process« The same problem 
may also affect other countries iri relation to particular activities' 
or industries. ' * 
There are also other factors that may enter into the effectiveness 
or value of the concessions that a country grants or receives under the 
liberalization programme, and affect the possibility of exploiting the 
opportunities offered, or the impact on the individual economies*1 These 
factors include the distortions in the structure of the Latin American 
economies and the consequent marked differences in costs, and hence' in 
the competitive footing, of many industries $ the great differences in 
customs duties' and other .charges on imports into Latin America, and the 
lack of relation between' these charges and the actual need for 
protection; and the distortions in the competitive situation resulting 
from unrealistic exchange rates and from the difference in the internal 
and external devaluation of national currencies. 
" The differences in the levels mid types of charges applied to 
imports by the Latin American, countries gives rise to three main 
problems: (à) they lead to marked differences in the costs of many 
raw materials and other inputs used by industry, and consequently in 
thé final cost of. manufactured products, thus introducing a strong 
element of distortion into the competitive position of the industries 
concernedj (b) they also give rise to marked differences between the 
; /preference margins 
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preference margins in each country, for imports from within the area, 
that result from the process of internal tariff reduction; (c) they 
considerably increase, the risk of the diversion of trade ftom the 
countries of the area, through the importing of a given product from 
outside the area by the country with the lowest tariff, which then 
re-exports it to another country in the area under the cover of the 
liberalisation of intra-area trade. 
These problems will be more sharply felt as further progress is 
made with trade liberalization.. Consequently, when liberalization 
has reached a significant level, it will be advisable gradually to 
eliminate the differences in the duties on imports from third countries 
by the progressive adoption of a common external tariff. It wall also 
be necessary for any accelerated tariff reduction - for example, by 
means of sectoral agreements on industrial complementarity — to be 
accompanied by a more rapid standardization of the treatment of imports 
from outside the area of products included in -the agreements, and 
particularly of inputs for those products. 
If it proved impossible to standardize tariffs for third countries 
with the necessary speed, other measures could be adopted - such as 
permitting the application of compensatory charges within the area -
in order to effect a temporary improvement in the cost distortions 
resulting from the differences in the external tariff, when these have 
a major effect on the competitive situation in a given industry* 
Until a common external tariff is adopted, the other two problems 
referred to above can be dealt with by the fixing of minimum preference 
margins, when those resulting from tariff reduction prove insufficient, 
and the establishment of conditions that must be met by products before 
they can be considered as originating within the area« 
The various factors referred to in the preceding paragraphs mean 
that there are appreciable differences in the ability of the various 
national industries to adapt to a competitive situation, and in the 
capacity of the whole economy of each individual country to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by a larger market. Moreover 
/the progressive 
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the progressive establishment of regional competition and the formation 
of a common market will modify the conditions in which national economies 
and individual industries are developing© 
Hence in most cases a knowledge of the tariff structure of the 
Latin American, countries, and of the comparative cost position of a 
given industry, will not provide a sufficient basis for correctly 
predicting the effect of trade liberalization. The differences in 
the levels of protection enjoyed by a single industry in different 
Latin American countries do not usually correspond to differences in 
production costs. Furthermore, the fact that the industry may produce 
in one country at costs considerably higher , than in the others does 
not mean that the industry will necessarily continue to be at a 
competitive disadvantage when tariff charges are gradually reduced© 
The reverse may be true, since under the stimulus of increasing 
competition and the opportunity to export to foreign markets, together 
with the reduction of the cost of inputs resulting from tariff 
reductions, the industry may succeed in achieving a favourable competitive 
footing,. especially if its high costs are due to factors that are easily 
remedied, such as obsolete machinery* inefficient organization, or costly 
raw materials. 
The difficulty in arriving at a tariff reduction system that will 
guarantee in advance an adequate measure of reciprocity between 
concessions and benefits has been made very clear by the diametrically 
opposed positions adopted in ALALC by the countries with the highest 
tariffs and those with the lowest. Whereas the first emphasize the 
considerable preference margin that they will be granting by reducing 
charges on imports from within the area, and minimize the value of 
concessions resulting from the reduction of tariffs that are very low,, 
by asserting that the resulting preference margin will be insufficient, 
the second group stresses the fact that their concessions will.open 
access to their markets, which is not the case when there is a partial 
reduction of charges that remain extremely high even after the reduction. 
This conflict shows the impossibility that any tariff reduction procedure 




accorded by the various countries to their imports will persist during 
the transition period; the most that any tariff reduction system can 
hope to achieve is gradually to reduce these differences, until they 
disappear through the full liberalization of reciprocal trade and the 
complete adoption of a common external tariff« 
These considerations also underline the fact that it is difficult 
to define or explain the actual concept of reciprocity, and that in any 
case it is impossible to know in advance what degree of reciprocity will 
be achieved by given trade policy measures. Although it would be 
possible, within certain limits, and with the avoidance of over-complicated 
formulas, to take such measures with a view to promoting reciprocity, with 
due regard to the differences in economic development, tariff levels, etc., 
of the participating countries,. it is only after they have been talc en, and 
a reasonable period has elapsed, that it can be ascertained whether 
reciprocity has in fact been achieved« If it has not, it -will be necessary 
to identify the factors responsible or partly responsible for the imbalance, 
in order to decide on the most suitable corrective measures« 
Furthermore, the. effectiveness of trade policy measures in helping 
to achieve an adequate measure of reciprocity will depend almost entirely, 
as already shown, on how far they are supplemented by measures of other 
kinds, such as financial and technical assistance, promotion and guidance 
of production, a regional investment policy, etc« 
As regards the relatively less developed countries, the tariff 
reduction formula and any other trade policy measures adopted should 
provide for their preferential treatment in tariff reduction agreements, 
saving clauses, the granting of unilateral concessions, etc® But such 
measures, although important, will not suffice in themselves to ensure 
a satisfactory situation with regard to reciprocity. Reciprocity should 
be essentially based less on trade policy measures than on those of the 
type referred to in the preceding paragraph, in order to establish in 
the relatively less developed countries the conditions needed for a more 
rapid development of their economies and to ensure that full advantage 
is taken of the opportunities provided by the expanded market. 
/Consequently the 
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Consequently the application of reciprocity must be dearly 
defined and must have an institutional "framework« The functions of . 
the community organs must include that of .ensuring a balance of 
advantages« Similarly, special treatment and measures in favour of 
the relatively less developed countries will ensure greater equality 
of opportunity for all the countries participating in the integration 
process. . 
All the foregoing considerations should be borne in mind in any 
attempt to evaluate and remedy the trade imbalances that are produced 
during the application of the new agreements. There must in any case 
be more clearly defined and expeditious procedures to'deal^ through 
the community institutions, with the problem of reciprocity during the 
transition period. 
The bases of such procedure might be the following. During the 
first stage a country whose trade deficit with the area had increased 
considerably, or one whose trade surplus had changed to. an appreciable 
deficit in relation to its total volume of trade, could approach the 
Board with a request for an enquiry into the reasons for the imbalance» 
When the Board examined the case, it would take into consideration, 
inter alia« the following factors: 
(a) Whether the imbalance is due to special circumstances of a 
temporary nature such as poor harvests, etc» \ 
(b) Whether or not sufficient time has elapsed for the effects of 
the tariff reductions to have been produced and taken advantage of, 
since it is very difficult'to establish hew export flows, especially 
in a region where there are few trade contacts and trade, channels between 
countries. Consequently it is not. easy to see how reciprocity has 
operated until a reasonable period, such as two years, has elapsed 
since the entry into force 6f the new agreements. 
(c) Whether or not thé country concerned has made the proper 
efforts to promote possible exports and abolish any unnecessary 
formalities or other difficulties that there may be. No country 
should expect the others to take special measures on its behalf if 




(d) Whether or not the insufficient volume of exports is due 
to an over-valuation of the national currency, 
(e) Whether or not the preference granted to the products of 
a given country in the markets of the area is sufficient to stimulate 
exports of those products. 
Once the Board has studied the situation it could recommend, 
where appropriate, that the country concerned should adopt any 
necessary internal measures, indicate the desirability that the 
countries trading with the country, concerned should provide additional 
stimuli (such as a greater margin of preference for its exports), or 
suggest special measures of promotion and encouragement to benefit the 
applicant country. 
The second stage of the procedure would relate to cases where 
the recommendations had not had the desired effect, or had not been 
applied by the other countries. In such a case the applicant country 
might be exempted from certain of the agreements it had signed, but. 
only to the extent necessary to correct the imbalance. In any case, 
the selection and application of the measures authorized to correct 
situations of considerable and persistent imbalance in one country's 
trade with the rest of the area should be such as to ensure that there 
is no unnecessary disturbance of trade flows or introduction of elements 
of instability that might affect the growth of intra-regional trade and 
the process of integration. 
/2. Specific 
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2. Specific agreements in the field of trade policy 
The tariff reduction agreements adopted in the Treaty of Montevideo 
are limited in scope, and the procedure of annual selective negotiation, 
apart from its tedious nature, does not ensure that tariff reduction 
takes place gradually for all products and all types of restriction. 
In general the system results in concessions of a limited and piecemeal 
nature. 
In order to give a new impetus to integration and make effective 
progress towards the formation of a common market between the latin 
American countries, it is therefore essential that those countries 
should adopt new agreements that will accelerate, broaden and make 
automatic the process of tariff reduction, so as to ensure that the 
reduction will in fact take place gradually for all products. These 
agreements should be formulated in the light of the problems of 
achieving reciprocity, the differences in levels of economic development, 
and in the levels of imports duties, etc. 
In addition to these agreements for the progressive abolition 
of barriers to intra-area trade, the countries will also have to adopt 
others relating to the progressive reconciliation of their trade policies 
towards the rest of the world, and in particular.to the adoption of 
a common external tariff and the establishment and effective application 
of adequate margins of area preference« 
In particular, the first agreement suggested is that the member 
countries of ALALC should consolidate their present levels of customs 
duties, and other charges and restrictions on their reciprocal trade0 
This is an essential requirement for any type of automatic tariff reduction. 
Secondly, it is suggested that the countries should adopt the 
following agreements as targets that should be attained within a ten-year 
periods 
(a) Gradual and automatic reduction of customs duties and charges 
of equivalent effect now applied to intra-area trade. At the end of the 
ten-year period these charges should not exceed, for any product, 20 per 




the period of gradual reduction could be longer, for example fifteen years* 
At the proper time agreement would have to be reached on the procedure 
and time-limits for advancing from this intermediate goal to the final 
abolition of all duties involved in the formation of a common market, 
(b) Gradual and automatic reduction, within ten years, of the 
quantitative and other restrictions not equivalent in effect to customs 
tariffs that apply to intra-area trade, so that at the end of the ten 
years they would be completely abolished, and the only remaining 
restrictions on intra-area trade would be the customs duties within the 
limits indicated above. 
(c) The drawing up, during the first five years, of a common 
external tariff, which would begin to be gradually put into effect at 
the end of the fifth year by means of annual percentage reductions 
made by each country in the difference between the level of its national 
tariff for each product and the level fixed in the common tariff. These 
annual reductions should amount to at least 10 per cent of the difference, 
so that at the end of the ten-year period the difference between the two 
levels would be reduced by at least 50 per cent. 
The process of standardizing the tariff in relation to the rest 
of the world should be speedier for raw materials and intermediate 
products, vhloh are important inputs for regional industries, in order 
to eliminate or minimize a serious element of distortion in the competitive 
footing of those industries. The sectoral complementarity agreements 
will be an effective means of determining the cases where more speedy 
standardization of the treatment of imports from third countries is 
called for. 
The automatic reduction of charges and quantitative restrictions 
to be undertaken by the countries in respect of their reciprocal trade 
would have the aim and effect of liberalizing that trade and, in 
addition, establishing margins of preference and thus of protection for 
area production, which would stimulate substitution of imports from 




The preference margins would eventually .be consolidated at standard 
levels for all the countries, when the common external tariff is adopted 
in ' full. But in the meantime these preferences may be insufficient 
for certain products for the purpose of achieving the aims set forth in 
the preceding paragraph. Consequently it is desirable that in those 
cases'the countries should agree to establish minimum preference margins, 
by means either of sectoral complementarity agreements, or of decisions 
relating to specific products. 
It will also be necessary to ensure that the preference margin is -
not changed unilaterally if this would affect intra-area trade prospects* 
For this purpose it is advisable to maintain and amplify the provisions 
set forth in ALALC resolution 53> that is, that countries undertake not 
to reduce their customs charges on imports from outside the ¿area without 
prior consultation with the community organs as to-when "this is to 
be done* Similarly, countries will undertake not to reduce or abolish, 
such charges, nor to make purchases from third countries through State 
or semi-public bodies, when the items in question can be obtained within 
the area on satisfactory terns with respect to price, quality, delivery 
dates, etc. Moreover it will be necessary to adopt provisions to ensure 
that the prices of products are not unjustifiably high for the area, as 
a result of the preference protection. 
A procedure to ensure the gradual &rtd automatic fulfilment of the 
agreement to reduce tariffs, as proposed above, will have to be found 
so that every country can make an annual reduction of 10 per cent in. 
the difference between the total level of customs and other charges now 
applied to every product within the area, and the 20 per cent established 
as the target level. Thus an initial duty of 50 per cent (including 
charges of equivalient effect) would be reduced by 3 percentage points 
a year, and a duty of 130 per cent would be reduced by 11 percentage points. 
This procedure will require, however, that all customs duties and 
other charges be expressed in ad valorem terns, since there is no other 
form that will permit the percentage difference to be established 
between such duties and the target 20 per cent, or ensure that the 




with the exception of Brazil, have mixed tariffs, and some have duties 
that are almost entirely of the specific type, it will be necessary, 
before the tariff reduction procedure can be applied, for the countries 
to adopt exclusively ad valorem duties, or else for them to draw up a 
special customs tariff for the area, in which the treatment of imports 
from within the area is consolidated in ad valorem terns, and on the 
basis of which the annual reductions can be made. The conversion of the 
duties would naturally be such as not to result in any less favourable 
treatment for the area than that existing at present* 
Even in the least difficult cases this task would take a considerable 
time, and only when it had been completed could a beginning be made in 
applying the procedure for the annual automatic reduction of tariffs. 
Moreover, such a method would have the drawback that the charges would 
be initially very high, and during much of the ten-year period they 
would be at such high levels that access to the market would be difficult. 
For example, an initial duty of 200 per cent (fairly common in many 
Latin American countries) would by the end of five years be reduced only 
to 110 per cent, and by eight years only to 56 per cent. 
In order to avoid these disadvantages another procedure might be 
adopted, whereby the ten-year period would be divided into two five-year 
periods, and countries would undertake to make, during the first five 
years, annual percentage linear reductions in their customs duties and 
other charges of equivalent effect. These reductions could be begun 
immediately, since they can be applied equally to specific and ad valorem 
charges. Before coming to the end of the first stage, the countries 
would agree on how the tariff reduction process would be conducted during 
the second stage, with a view to attaining the general goal proposed 
above by the end of the second five years. 
Such a procedure would have other significant advantages, since 
it would make it possible to adopt, during the first stage, a fairly 
rapid tariff reduction that could be put into effect immediately. Thus 
one essential condition would be met for giving the integration process 
the necessary dynamic force. It would also be possible to obtain during 
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this first stage uiost valuable, experience in the application of the 
system, as well as regarding the effects of automatic,, tariff ¡reduction 
and the speed with which it had taken place. In addition information. : 
would be gained as to the practicability and effectiveness of the other 
measures suggested to assist in attaining the aims pursued through 
tariff reduction, and any possible adverse effects could be counteracted* . 
At the. same time this first stage would permit the preparation of the t ; 
right conditions and the necessary basis for further progress during 
the second stage with a view to achieving the goal set for the ten-year 
period» 
In essence, what is suggested is that the. countries undertake, 
during the first five years, to make annual linear reductions of 12 per 
cent in their customs duties and other charges of similar effect that 
are now in effect for intra-regional trade. The annual reduction would 
be only 6 per cent for the relatively le.ss developed countries. 
Consequently, save for exceptions granted by virtue of escape clauses, 
by the end of the first.stage the level of such duties and charges would 
be below the present levels by 60 and 30 cent, respectively. 
These reductions would be the minimum that could be made during this 
stage, although for some products they could be higher if the fulfilment 
of other agreements (which are suggested later in this paper) so 
required, or when there had been such an undertaking in sectoral 
complementarity agreements or other multilateral or bilateral negotiations* 
In addition to this agreement to undertake linear and automatic . 
tariff reduction, it is suggested that countries also commit themselves-
to ensuring that in no case, at the end of the five-year period, will ; , 
any duties or other charges be applied to reciprocal trade that exceed 
50 per cent of the c*i,f€ value of any product. For the relatively less 
developed countries the ceiling would be 75 per cent. The ceiling has 
the aim of eliminating, during the first stage, all excessively high 
barriers, and thus making it possible within a relatively shprb period 
to arrive at a minimum degree of regional competition for all products to . 




The obligation to reduce charges to this ceiling obviously means 
that countries will reduce tariffs more rapidly in cases where a linear 
reduction in the form of the percentages proposed would not result after 
five years in a level equal to or below the ceiling* This increased pace 
can be established in an approximate and tentative form for each product, 
with a view to an adjustment at the end of the period. The fulfilment 
of this obligation would naturally be subject to the saving clauses 
proposed later in this paper« 
With respect to the quantitative and other restrictions not 
equivalent to customs duties, it is suggested that the countries 
undertake to abolish each year at least 10 per cent of the items in 
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) that are subject to such 
restrictions on a total or partial basis, in accordance with a list in 
line with the BTN that each country will submit. Thus the number of 
these restrictions will be reduced by 50 per cent at the end of the first 
five years, and abolished completely at the end of the ten-year period. 
At that point, in accordance with what was proposed earlier, no barriers 
to intra-area trade would remain apart from the customs duties, except 
for any restrictions whose maintenance, restoration or introduction was 
authorized by virtue of saving clauses. In order to reduce the possibility 
that in the first years liberalization would be concentrated excessively 
on items of no great interest to the other countries, or of interest 
to only a few of them, the 10 per cent annual reduction in the number of 
restrictions should be applied separately for each and every one of the 
chapters of the BTN* Furthermore, the desirability should be studied 
of authorizing countries, either on a general basis or in certain 
individual cases, and in accordance with the procedure and conditions to 
be established by the community organs, to replace such restrictions 
by customs duties. 
In the case of State monopolies for the importing or marketing of 
goods, and of any other State or semi-public bodies through which a 
country directly or indirectly controls, or exerts an appreciable influence, 
on the imports of particular products or groups of products, it is 
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suggested that the countries should undertake gradually, to;- abolish all 
discriininatipn against, suppliers within the area -.in. respect, of purchases 
or marketing undertaken, by such bodies« - ; ; ; .. \ . 
These tariff reduction agreements will be.supplemented:by,saving 
clauses vjhereby. a country can be authorized to adopt/.exceptional measures 
or be temporarily exempted from the fulfilment of one or/more of the 
said agreements, in cases .of emergency and wherê . t h e r e g o o d grounds 
for such action. If the fulfilment of the agreementŝ  for the liberalization 
of intra-area trade lead to serious harm to .certain productive activities 
that are important to the economy of a given countxy* or to serious 
balance-of-payments difficulties, the country .concerned may be authorized 
to impose or restore duties or quantitative restrictions on imports, but 
as a temporary emergency measure.. It may also be authorized temporarily 
to postpone the reduction of the import charges on one or more products . 
from third countries,, when the gradual adoption of the external tariff • 
gives, rise to serious problems. In addition, the relatively less 
developed countries may be authorized to maintain or increase for 
certain products and for a given period, the customs duties on imports > 
from within the area, in order to provide sufficient protection for new 
.industries for which there are reasonable expectations that they will • 
be economically viable. 
With respect to certain products such as luxury items, for which 
the liberalization process may.have adverse effects on the balance of 
payments or the allocation of resources, countries may establish internal 
taxes on such products. . These taxes will have the aim of restricting 
the consumption of such ±tms, or preventing their expansion, while at 
the same time they will not afford protection, since they will apply 
equally to the domestically produced and imported articles. ..That is, .. 
they will not affect the competitive situation within the area or 
encourgae anti-economic or otherwise undesirable forms of production, 
such as may result if action is. confined to import restriction. 
The countries will also be empowered to replace by internal taxes.-: 
any customs duties and pther revenue charges on imports, but in line with 
the provisions of chapter V of the Treaty of Montevideo, 
' • /Without prejudice 
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Without prejudice to the right to invoke, in exceptional and 
well-grounded cases, saving clauses aimed at the temporary alleviation 
of a critical situation, the permanent solution of the problems posed 
by trade liberalization must be sought in positive measures which 
facilitate adjustment, open markets for countries that are not obtaining 
a sufficient measure of reciprocity, and in general stimulate the 
expansion of trade and the development of industries« 
There is, of course, no reason why countries should not reduce 
tariffs and other restrictions more rapidly than is established in 
the agreements, either in general or for particular sectors or products» 
In fact countries should expressly state their intention of doing so as 
soon as the general economic situation in the country, or in its industrial 
sector, makes this possible. This action could be taken either on a 
unilateral basis or through periodic negotiations, or, most probably, 
through complementarity agreements. 
If after the minimum percentages of automatic tariff reduction had 
been in effect for a reasonable time it was found that there was not an 
adequate degree of reciprocity, the countries obtaining the greatest 
benefits should increase the rate of reduction of their tariffs, either 
in a general form or for specific products, in line with decisions or 
recommendations of the community organs, without prejudice to other 
non-trade-measures that can be taken at the same time to correct the 
imbalance» 
3h addition to the general agreement, there will have to be other 
more specific agreements aimed at compensating for the disadvantage at 
which countries with small markets may find themselves, and, even more, 
those whose economic development is not sufficiently advanced, to enable 
them to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the 
integration process« 
For the countries with small markets such measures should concentrate 
on ensuring conditions that will enable them to establish or expand 
particular productive activities. The sectoral agreements will no doubt 
be the most appropriate means of attaining this aim, as proposed in 




In addition to maintaining the ALALC provisions. ;in favour of the 
relatively less developed countries, and to adopting the tariff reduction 
agreements proposed for those countries, other measures:wiH be needed 
to encourage their participation in.the.process of integration« With 
this aim it is suggested that the most advanced countries of the region 
should remove any restrictions on.their imports of industrial products 
from the relatively less developed countries. 
This preferential treatment would have the essential aim of • . 
stimulating the incipient industries in the less developed, countries. 
Hence the period of duration of such preferences should be determined 
with this aim in view. Unlike the present ALALC procedure, the period 
of the preference should be calculated from the moment when the first 
exports from the benefitting country are made. Nevertheless, the 
abolition of this treatment at the end of the period concerned should 
not take place at once, but gradually, without prejudice to the 
possibility that in some cases, when circumstances seem to justify such 
a decision, the preference may be extended. 
With respect to the exclusive concessions, that have been granted, 
or may be granted in the future, to the relatively less developed 
countries under the terms of,article 32.of the Treaty of Montevideo, 
the level of tariffs established in the concessions should be subject 
to the same annual automatic percentage reduction in tariffs proposed 
above for all countries. 
These and other measures relating to trade applied in favour of 
the relatively less developed country should, in any case, be supplemented 
by financial and technical measures that will help and encourage those 






THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
1» Introduction 
The situation in the agricultural sector has special features 
that deserve separate treatment» The main object of integration in 
relation to agricultural products must be to make use of the resources 
available in the region by means of a higher level of specialisation 
that can be reflected both in output that increases in line with the 
growth of demand, and in lower prices for food products and agricultural 
raw materials, to the benefit of all Latin American consumers. 
Because of the many economic, political, social and technical 
problems posed by Latin American agriculture, the liberalization of 
the trade in agricultural products calls for a special approach» 
Among these problems are the great differences in productivity 
and cost levels in the various Latin American countries. Because of 
natural conditions and technical factors, yield.per hectare varies 
widely from country to country, and in addition, as a result of other 
variables (wage systems, prices of inputs, tax treatment, exchange rates, 
etc«,) the competitive situation of certain basic commodities varies 
to an extraordinary degree» Thus, for example, there are six-fold 
differences in the price of rice, and three-fold differences in the 
prices of wheat and maize» The changes in the exchange rates mean that 
the price ratios between countries fluctuate sharply from year to year, 
which is a major cause of instability and uncertainty*, 
It should also be noted that the groat bulk of the population work 
in agriculture, mainly at the mere subsistence level. Either for 
structural or for other reasons, a large part of the agricultural 
population cultivate poor soils and use primitive technioues, and this 
situation is reflected in the region's low agricultural yields. 
The fact that such a large proportion of the population work in 
agriculture gives the sector an inherent rigidity, which in many countries 




types of cultivation. Agricultural research, both scientific and 
economic, is still very limited. A more detailed study of existing 
and potential resources would undoubtedly point the way to changes 
that could be made in the cultivation of the land, and a study of 
future Latin American demand for agricultural products would indicate 
just what changes would be advisable. 
In addition there are technical reasons why a given crop should 
not be eliminated altogether, even though from an economic standpoint it 
might be "better to produce it elsewhere. For example, there are areas 
where for climatic reasons the agricultural production possibilities are 
very limited, and production might even be regarded as anti-economic 
from a regional standpoint; nevertheless, it does not appear advisable 
to break the continuity of cultivation the type in question.because over 
the long term it may be necessary to. call on all the resources available 
for the production of food and agricultural raw materials in order to 
meet the region*s future needs. 
The same principle applies to the opening up of virgin lands. If, 
for example, it proves necessary to take over new lands for crops or 
livestock, in remote areas with a low yield, the. output will have to 
be treated in a special way, since it will hardly be able to compete 
on the.open market from the outset. A case in point is land reform. In 
the first stages of modification of the agrarian structure it will be 
essential to ensure that the new farmers and beneficiaries of land, 
reform are able to compete with the more ê perieiicod and better organized 
farmers of other countries. The foregoing observations indicate that 
the process of trade liberalization for agricultural products must be 
so managed as not to result in a severe disruption for the existing 
groups, in some countries of what.might appear to be marginal farmers 
in comparison with other cultivators. . . . . 
From the long-tern standpoint it is essential that all the land, 
available in Latin.America should be used to meet the demand for food, 
in order to avoid inroads into the capacity to import other goods. In . 
•fact, estimates by ECIA and FAO show that the regional demand for wheat, 
for example, will by 1980 be 12 million tons: above its present level, 
/and amount 
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and amount to about 24 million tons* For maize the increase is expected, 
to be even greater« If these higher levels of output are to be attained,a 
technological revolution in the countryside will be essential, in order 
to achieve a significant increase in,yield per hectare, since the area 
under cultivation cannot expand indefinitely. 
Moreover it should be noted that there is a substantial margin 
for the substitution of imports from outside the region* It is 
estimated that agricultural exports from the rest of the world now amount 
to about 600 million dollars a year, although a considerable proportion 
represent imports made under the special conditions of United States 
Public Law 480, The great range of climates in Latin America justifies 
the assumption that the greater part, if not all, of agricultural 
imports from outside the region could well be obtained from within 
Latin America, 
2* Trade policy for agricultural products 
The agreements to reduce tariffs and ruantitative restrictions 
referred to in chapter I? will apply to agricultural products, but in 
view of their special nature and their importance, there will have to 
be a special system governing trade in these products, which will 
supplement, and in seme cases modify, the general systen of tariff reduction. 
The establishment of such a special treatment is in accordance 
with the provisions of chapter VII of the Treaty of Montevideo and 
ALALC resolutions 9.1 97« The special system mil have the basic 
aim of regulating trade in agricultural products through the organization 
of markets, and promoting an advance in line with the co-ordination of 
agricultural development policies. This means that the system in 
question must stress, not so much the reduction and gradual elimination 
of tariff barriers to intra-regional trade in agricultural products, 
as the adoption of measures aimed at a rapid increase in agricultural 
output and in the substitution of imports from outside the region« 
Countries should undertake to adopt such a special system within 
a period of five years, together with an effective organization of 
markets and a co-ordination of their production policies, at least for the 
main agricultural products. For this purpose studies should begin at once 




• Thus, for example, there should be a detailed stucfy of the present * 
and potential use of available agricultural resources in. the Latin American 
countries,' with a view to settling upon a more rational distribution of . 
production within, the framework of future estimated demand. Similarly, 
there should be an analysis of the factors underlying- the present' 
discrepancies in productivity and costs> and an estimate of the displace-
ment of population, groups that would result from any proposed changes. 
In this connexion an estimate will be needed of the type and volume of 
investment required to absorb the surplus agricultural population. 
At the same time there should also be, during the five-year period, 
studies to establish the bases for an effective co-ordination of policies 
on the production of and trade in agricultural products. The institu-
tional machinery proposed might well include special committees to 
consider and agree on specific programmes for the production of and 
trade in certain products or groups of products, that would cover matters 
relating to general and specific policies, as well as technical, trade, 
financial and legal questions. Such committees would have the task of 
reconciling national development programmes for each product or group 
of products. On the basis of the specific agreements the ccmmittees 
could establish a common agricultural programme that could, inter alia, 
aim at avoiding possible imbalances in the agricultural sector•for the 
region as a whole. ' 
Until this special system is drawn up and adopted, agricultural 
products would be governed by the general system of linear and automatic 
tariff reduction and progressive abolition of quantitative restrictions. 
However, in order to avoid any abrupt changes or ¿erious ill effects 
that such a system might lead to for certain major items, it is 
suggested that a saving clause should be adopted, similar to-that in 
article 28 of the Treaty of Montevideo, supplemented by ALALC resoultion 97. 
This saving clause would permit countries to apply quotas to regulate 
imports of the agricultural products concerned. The clause could be 
applied by a unilateral decision of the country affected, but the 




organs, which in case of any protests on the part of other member countries, 
would have to decide whether or not the application of the clause was 
justified, and if so, what the amount and period of duration of the 
quotas should be, the procedure to be adopted for their distribution and 
progressive increase, etc. 
For the same purpose and on. the same conditions, such quotas could 
be used to replace import permits, import prohibitions or existing 
quotas in the latin American countries in respect of imports of agri-
cultural products. The replacement could be regarded as part of. the 
fulfilment of the agreement to abolish quantitative restrictions, as 
proposed in chapter IV# 
Another point is that in some Latin Americpn countries there are 
State agencies or enterprises that have the exclusive right to import 
or market agricultural products. As it is possible through such agencies 
to control and regulate imports of these products, the community organs 
should study the possible effects of their existence in relation to the 
promotion of regional trade; and to the designing of the.system to be 
finally adopted in the field of agricultural integration. 
3» Programme of financial assistance 
In addition to the integration programme for agriculture there 
will have to be a regional programme of financial assistance to provide 
the funds needed to: (a) raise productivity, especially in the more 
backward areas, by the introduction of new techniques, new direct . 
investment, agricultural research and extension work, mechanization, 
improved facilities, increased irrigation, etc.; (b) the study of 
* alternative land use and the preparation and execution of the projects 
involved; (c) the absorption in other employment of the population 
displaced from agriculture, when no alternative economic use of the 
land is possible. In relation to the last point it should be noted 
that there are a number of areas of low fertility (either because of 
natural conditions or as a result of erosion) that could be reforested; 
this would create new sources of wealth and employment, but only over 





. Chapter VI 
REGIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY 
1» Aim of a,regional investment ..policy 
(a) Trade,„and investment policy 
In order to speed up the rate of Latin America* s integration, it 
is essential for trade and investment policies to dovetail« Trade 
liberalization alone cannot achieve integration, since it would make the 
regional inflow of investments dependent upon the more or less free play 
of the market forces® In such circumstances it would be difficult to 
ensure that sufficient resources were mobilized for the activities which 
are of major importance for regional development and integration* 
A regional investment policy would consist of a body of planned 
measures for the allocation and mobilization of resources to ensure a 
sufficiently rapid growth in sectors considered essential to the region*$ 
development and integration, and an increasing measure of specialization 
that would open the way to the benefits of economies of scale and a more 
rational use of resources« In this way a more vigorous development could 
be achieved for the whole region, and every country could be assured of a 
share in this more dynamic growth« The formulation and execution of such 
an investment policy would be the task of the community organs, in close 
co-operation with, the public and private agencies in every country* 
Essentially, a regional investment policy provides an operational 
formula that permits reconciliation of national investment policies with 
regional aims© Furthermore, it permits the integration process to develop 
at a level of major decisions which can help to determine in advance what 
advantages and obligations are involved for each country« 
A regioml investment policy is also a key instrument in solving a 
major difficulty in Latin American integration, namely, the problem that 
some of the Latin American countries are relatively less developed than 
others, and the need to eliminate these differences by promoting a joint 
development of all the countries in the Latin American system© A mere 




Montevideo has little meaning for the.relatively less developed countries, 
because of their limited capacity to promote investment, and increased 
production and exports, for. the items in"question. The removal of regional 
imbalances is therefore basically dependent on a regional investment 
policy which aims on a planned basis at .achieving a more rapid growth in 
the relatively less developed countries. 
Lastly, a regional investment policy will encourage the"formation of 
a Latin American common market because, without prejudice to the liberalization 
of all trade, the integration of key sectors of the region*s economy will 
permit this goal to be attained more rapidly in those sectors. 
However, the possibility that countries will in fact support the 
regional solution depends on the speed with which the community system 
operates in terms of offering immediate response to national ambitions. 
The countries that have already reached a more advanced level-of industrial 
development and import substitution cannot be expected to delay their plans 
in the hope of a future regional solution; 
The reconciliation of national aspirations- with, regional integration 
cannot be based merely on a'theoretical definition of the advantages of 
an integrated regional development as compared with a develonnent conceived 
on national lines. There must also be specific and immediate proposals.in 
terns of the national plans, especially in th© basic industrial sectors* 
Hence the formulation of a regional investment policy, particularly in. 
those sectors^ is the key to the reconciliation of national aims.with those 
of the region as a whole. -If Latin America accepts this approach, the 
many advantages of an integrated development will persuade every country 
from the outset to participate-actively in the integration process. 
(b) Maintenance and stimulation of competition 
The formulation and execution of a regional investment policy entails 
the adoption of protectionist measures at the regional level for the 
integrated industries. In the case of large industrial investments, producers 
might reach an understanding likely to hamper the competition that> for 
many reasons, it is important to maintain. The public interest can be 
protected by a policy of vigilance aimed at preventing monopoly agreements. 
Effective competition between the producers of the regional market, would 
stimulate industrial efficiency, and a •common' external tariff will .have the 
same effect. /The aim 
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The aim should not be for sectoral investment agreements to establish 
rules that will bar the way to other individual attempts to operate in 
those sectors® The purpose will be to channel investments towards the 
activities proposed in the regional investment policy« In so far as this 
policy is in line with the region's real situation, and with its aspirations 
for economic growth, those activities will offer the best opportunities 
for the establishment and expansion of industries« The body of incentives 
adopted should be sufficient to channel capital towards the sectors that 
are the subject of the agreements in question» 
(c) Foreign capital and a regional investment policy 
Foreign capital represents another problem that needs examination* 
Given the region's present conditions of under-development, the formation 
of a b^oad regional market in itself may give rise, especially in the 
technically complex industries, to an inflow of foreign capital in 
conditions and forms that may weaken the control that the region must 
necessarily maintain over the basic sectors of its economy» The essence 
of a balanced Latin American nationalism lies not only in the vigorous 
promotion of the region1 s development and of the living standards of its 
peoples, but also in encouraging regional capital to play a decisive role 
and in establishing the conditions for a self-sustained and independent 
development« 
A regional investment policy must ensure that foreign capital is 
absorbed on terms compatible with the region's capacity for external 
borrowing, and with the independence of its development process« The 
policy of trade liberalization is not in itself the ideal instrument for 
achieving this aim, but a regional investment policy is« 
This is another fundamental advantage which makes a regional investment 
policy the key to the process of regional integration« 
2® The fields to be covered by an investment policy 
A regional investment policy must concentrate on those activities 
which will accelerate Latin American integration and at. the same time 
strengthen the region's economic structure« At present, as a result of 




administrative staff, and the high proportion of investment that goes to 
meet domestic demand, it would be impossible to put into practice a 
policy that would cover the formation of capital in Latin America as a 
whole. Hence at this, stage the first priority would not be the formulation 
of a regional policy of investment in activities directly strictly to the 
domestic market in each country, or in such social activities as housing 
and health services, or in infrastructure projects aimed at integrating 
the national markets. 
On the other hand some, activities are of particular importance to 
the process of regional integration, and if these activities were under» 
taken within the framework of integration, every country could speed up 
its development. These activities cover mainly certain manufacturing 
branches, agriculture, and transport and communications, together with 
other activities that relate particularly trans-frontier areas in the 
region« 
(a) Industrial investment 
This includes investment in various branches of basic industry or,in 
traditional industries that lend themselves to regional complementarity, 
or are connected with certain specific integration aims such as the 
balanced development of the region as between the different countries© 
(i) Basic industries. The industries that produce industrial raw 
materials and capital goods and can be encouraged within the framework , 
of a regional investment policy appear to be steel, aluminium metallurgy, 
the heavy chemical industry (fertilizers, sodium alkalis and the basic 
petro-chemical industry), pulp and paper, the manufacture of basic industrial 
equipment (for the production of steel and petroleum, the generation of 
electric power and the manufacture of pulp and paper), transport material 
(for road, rail and water transport), machine, tools, textile machinery and 
road-building equipment. 
For many reason's the industries referred to' are of great importance 
to the integration process. Latin America as'a whole, and the relatively 
more developed countries in particular, are already far advanced in the 




projections of the trends of the region's capacity to import on the basis 
of its traditional exports show that it will be insufficient to meet the 
demand for the imports of capital goods and industrial raw materials 
essential to the expansion of Latin America's production capacity« When 
the region is forced to extend the process of import substitution to the 
capital goods industries, the smallness of the national- markets will 
raise serious problems« 
The strategic nature of the basic industries and the need to encourage 
their development is underlined by their valuable role in both assimilating 
and disseminating modern technology« The external economies generated by 
these industries has been one of the main pillars of the development of 
the more advanced countries© In addition their expansion is an essential 
condition for the diversification of Latin American production, which will 
enable the region to diversify its exports and gradually to compete on 
the viorld market in respect of the most dynamic items 
Lastly, the expansion of various branches of the basic industries 
such as metal-transforming and the petro-chemical industry is an essential 
requirement if the. region is to go beyond the present stage of exporting 
raw materials (tin, copper, iron ore and petroleum) and process them in 
the region for both the Latin American and world markets« 
Hence the key to the integration of the basic industries is a 
regional investment policy aimed at achieving within given periods certain 
production and trade targets, and for this purpose not only must national 
investment programmes be co-ordinated, but the necessary specific projects 
must be prepared« 
(ii) Traditional industries* In certain traditional industries such 
as the textile industry the formulation of a regional investment policy 
could contribute effectively to increased modernization, greater efficiency, 
more regional specialization, and easier access to world markets for 
Latin American production« The direction of this policy, and the vigour 





(iii) Special, purpose industrial projects. The balanced growth of the 
region and the promotion of a more rapid growth for the relatively less 
developed countries provides, a third field of operation for a regional 
investment policy, to the extent that the projects relating to the basic 
and traditional industries, based on principles of efficiency and 
appropriate location, may not suffice to allow those countries to develop 
sufficiently© 
The exploitation in those countries of the resources that can be 
processed for sale in the region, or to the rest of the world, may provide 
the opportunity for specific industrial programmes and.projects that will 
supplement this aspect of a regional investment policy« 
(b) Investment in agriculture 
The need to make up the existing deficit, and to meet future increases 
in demand, both in food products and raw materials for industrial use, 
calls for the adoption of measures at the national level aimed at a 
marked increase in agricultural output arid productivity. Specially . 
important are investments in irrigation works, experimental stations, 
and facilities for the storing, processing and packing of agricultural 
products, to name only the most important. ' 
The achievement of the over-all aims of integration and economic 
development should be based on the firm and steady growth of agriculture, 
enabling it to overcome the structural and other obstacles that have 
hindered its progress. A regional investment policy may encourage the 
execution of projects in the particular fields that will contribute to 
the region's supply. The reaching of the agreements on agricultural 
products referred to in chapter V will undoubtedly help to determine the 
most important subjects for a co-ordinated investment policy in this 
sector» 
(c) Investment in infrastructure 
As regional trade increases as a result of the investment policy and 
the liberalization of trade, the difficulties of communication and transport 
between the various countries will make themselves more felt. Hence there 




and inland waterway transport, which means that investnents on a regional 
basis must be made in each of these fields« 
The main aspects of a transport policy for the Latin American common 
market are dealt with more fully in chapter VIII, 
The growth of the flow of goods and services within the region will 
make it more and more necessary to expand and interconnect the national 
communications systems« The region should incorporate into its systems 
the latest technological advances« An enterprise of this magnitude can 
only be conceived within the.framework of a policy co-ordinating services 
and investment in this field« 
An infrastructure investment policy should also cover the expansion 
of installed capacity for the generation of electric power to meet the 
region's needs« From this standpoint it is of the utmost importance 
to carry out joint projects for the exploitation of multinational resources, 
such as certain hydroelectric resources, and for the increasing inter-
connexion of national electricity systems, 
(d) Investment in trans-frontier areas 
There are. in Latin America many frontier zones that constitute a real 
economic entity, and where the policies of the countries involved should 
be co-ordinated in order to meet the specific development problems of the 
whole area« This is the case, for example, with respect to the areas 
bordering on the frontiers between Colombia and Venezuela, Colombia and 
Ecuador, and Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay« The formulation of development 
programmes for the whole of these and other areas that go beyond national, 
frontiers, and of a common investment policy to promote their development, 
is a prerequisite of their economic and social progress« 
The main responsibility for the development of these border areas lies 
with the countries directly concerned. Nevertheless the community organs 
should lend their assistance in the formulation of development programmes 
and specific projects for the development of such areas«. In particular the 
Board should bear in mind that encouraging the development of the border areas 
of concern to the relatively less developed countries may be an effective way 
of increasing the economic growth rates of those countries to levels closer 
to those for the region as a whole« 
A number of international agencies have shown special interest in 





Chapter VII .• • 
AGREEMENTS ON BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY . .. 
• ffiae benefits; of integration In the industrial sector 
The main barriers to the quicker and more rational development of 
manufacturing industry in Latin America are the small size of the national 
markets, the shortage of capital, the limited technical knowledge and the 
lack of a spirit of competition that would put a premium on the achievement 
of operational efficiency in industry,1 
The establishment of a common market in this sector would make for 
the necessary changes in industrial structure and methods of operation, 
and thus pave the way for Latin American industry to compete on world 
markets« 
The immediate benefits would be a reduction/in production costs 
per unit of output ¿nd an appreciable saving in the investment needed 
to reach a specific overfall rate of growth in the manufacturing sector« 
The cost and investment savings would result from the following factors: 
(a) Advantages of selecting the location of productive activities 
in terms of the most economical sources ef raw materials, 
fuel and energy as well as other inputs with a heavy incidence 
on production costs; 
(b) Economies of scale derived from the decreasing ratio of plant 
size to unit cost in many branches of industry; 
(e) Better utilization of production capacity: and 
(d) Greater operational efficiency« 
The proportion of benefits obtained would vary according to the 
branch of industry concerned« Other benefits of equal importance would 
come at a later stage; these would take the form of cumulative external 
economies or more rapid import substitution at the regional level, said 
derive from the more intensive growth of industry under the influence of 
th© former group of factors« 
.. /This chapter 
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This chapter does not propose to make a systematic analysis of all 
the effects of market integration on industrial development* Instead it 
will confine itself to examining some of the advantages that may be derived 
in the particular conditions obtaining in Latin America© 
There are wide differences in the availability and price of the main 
industrial inputs - raw materials, fuels, energy and labour - in Latin 
America© These variations are a source of sharp disparities between the 
cost of the same product manufactured on the same seal© and with the same 
operational efficiency in different places, and thus indicate the benefits 
to be obtained from regional specialization in accordance with the 
comparative advantages afforded by each place© So far no attempt has been 
made to turn these to account, because of the tendency for the whole range 
of industrial products to be manufactured indiscriminately in every country© 
In a common market, advantages of location would be particularly 
marked for products whose cost is heavily influenced by raw materials or. 
energy since the unit cost of such inputs varies widely in Latin America© 
The chemical industries are a good example of the cost reductions that 
could be achieved through progressive regional specialization© 
The uneven distribution of natural and other resources required for 
the chemical industry in Latin America would determine the most suitable 
location for each product© Once this had been settled the process of 
integration would enable production lines to be divided up in a more 
balanced way so that each country could specialize in the particular 
branches for which it was best qualified» Some countries, for instance, 
have better natural conditions for the production of natural gas derivatives, 
nitrogen fertilizers, carbon black from gas, methanol and so on, others have 
an abundant supply of sulphurous gases as a by-product of copper mining and 
could take advantage of this cheap input to specialize in products using 
large amounts of sulphuric acid (triple superphosphates), while those 
possessing phosphorite are well-equipped to produce phosphate fertilizers 
(phosphate bicalcitim and sodium phosphates). 
The aluminium industry, on the other hand, illustrates the vital 
importance of regional specialization for reducing electric energy costs© 
These vary extensively in Latin America, and nearly all the middle-sized 
/or larger 
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or larger countries plan to produce aluminium metal if not alumina* In 
fact their incidence is so great that in two countries where the cost 
per KWh is 3 and 10 dollar mills respectively, plants of the same size 
and similar technical characteristics would have unit costs per ton of 
240 and of 36O dollars« The advantage to be obtained from optimum 
location in this case would thus be nearly 50 per cent« In a region 
that hopes to produce the bulk of the 200,000 tons of aluminium needed 
for its estimated apparent consumption in 1970* the extra cost incurred 
through a poor choice of site is a factor to be reckoned with, quite 
apart from the added drawback of the inadequate scale on which national 
aluminium industries would operate« 
V ' ' ' 
Location also has a notable effect on costs when the principal 
input consists of raw materials, since these, being a natural resource 
and therefore closely dependent on local conditions, vary widely from 
country to country. Non-ferrous metals and pulp and paper manufacture 
are cases in point« In the steel industry, on the other hand, and 
particularly the processing industries in which capital charges have 
a substantial incidence on costs, it is economies of scale that tip 
the balance« 
2« The steel industry 
(a) Location* economies of scale and costs 
A number of Latin American countries have very favourable conditions 
for steel making» The differences between these countries as regards 
advantages of location are not marked enough to prevail over all the 
other factors« 
For a hypothetical plant of the same size (producing 1«5 million 
tons of ingot), technical structure and operational efficiency in the 
principal steel--maMng locations, Venezuela (Orinoco) would probably 
offer certain advantages thanks to lower inventory costs, for raw 
materials« Next in order of preference would come Mexico (Monclova), 
Brasil (Victoria), Peru (Chimbote) and Chile (Huachipato), although 





Orinoco*s margin of advantage as regards the estimated cost of pig 
iron production would be 7 to 8 dollars over Huachipato and Chimbóte and 
even more in comparison with Monclova and Victoria* In view of the high 
cost of transport in Latin America (notwithstanding the hope of some 
improvement in this respect) which is 10 to 20 dollars per ton, Venezuela's 
advantage is probably too narrow to attract the bulk of steel production 
to that country, although large enough to rule out competition from such 
steel firms as San Nicolás (Argentina)» 
This conclusion is not applicable to the analysis of existing industxy, 
for which the factor of location is overshadowed by those of plant size, 
economies of scale, specialization and operational efficiency, which play 
a much greater part in determining the final cost of production© 
In the rolling of flat products, scales varying from 300,000 to 
1 million tons are enough to change the cost by 44 dollars, or nearly 
40 per cent in relation to the level for the most economic plant size 
(it drops from 156 to 112 dollars per ton) M Differences in operational 
efficiency (including the internal distribution of capacity) are liable 
to have an almost equally marked effect on prices© 
Given the variety of scales and levels of efficiency, etc© that are 
displayed by the Latin American steel industries, complete liberalization 
of trade might have, on several of them, an adverse and much more powerful 
impact than advantages of location, as demonstrated by the theoretical 
costs estimated for the.conditions in which ths Latin American industries 
are currently operating© If opened in the immediate future, a common 
steel market would place the San Nicolás, Paz del Río, Chimbóte and 
Huachipato steel mills at a disadvantage, since all four are inadequate 
in size, one suffers from serious imbalances in its internal capacity 
(San Nicolás), two produce an. excessively large wide range of flats 
(Huachipato and Chimbóte) and, in addition, Chimbótefs technical structure 
is unsuited to the natural resources available© 
1/ These figures are for plants using modern te^lmiques and therefore 
apply to a few oEly* Where less advanced techniques are employed, 




(b) A sectoral development programme 
The estimated differences in cost for existing industries are too 
high for transport charges to offset them, and thus prevent competition 
by the bigger or more efficient mills from having an adverse effect on 
San Nicolfis or the steel industries along the Pacific coast. The formation 
of a common steel market should therefore be planned on a sectoral basis^ 
side by side with a programme for trade liberalisation» In other words, 
the regional integration of the steel industry should be conceived as the 
outcome of a consistent and rational development programme, methodically 
prepared and applied over a certain number of years, during which the 
adverse factors that leave certain countries (particularly Chile, Peru 
and Argentina) ̂ ill-equipped to compete in a free regional market would 
be reduced or removed. The programme would provide for the necessary 
investment to balance the internal capacity of some firms, improve the 
operational efficiency of others, change the technical structure of 
certain plants and increase the operational scale of those producing 
less than one million tons of flats or 5C0,000 tons of non-flat products 
to the requisite economic minimum« Not until the whole programme has 
been carried out wiH the Latin American industry be in a position to 
play its full part in a system of regional competition« 
This programme could be applied in two successive stages, each 
probably lasting for five years» The first would be mainly concentrated 
on improving established industry. Plants would be enlarged, advantage 
would be taken of the lower investment costs that would result from 
industrial complementarity and internal equilibrium as regards existing 
plants, and recent technical improvements would be introduced (the use 
of oxygen, etc«), to raise output substantially at very little capital 
cost; no attempt would be made, however, to set up new plants« By the 
second stage, the possibility of. continued expansion of existing industry 
will have been seriously reduced, while the increase in demand would 
2/ Paz del Bio (Colombia) is something of a special case, since the 
natural barrier set up by high domestic transport costs protects 




entail the construction of new plants. These should from the very beginning 
be built of minimum economic size and with all possible technical improve-
ments© In short, the stages for gradually setting up a common steel market, 
in conjunction with a programme for modernizing existing industry, would 
be as follows: 
i . M ^ o ^ 
Introduction of technical improvements in the operation of 
existing mills 
Expansion in scale 
Elimination of internal imbalances in plant capacity 
n . i 2 2 Q r Z S 
Establishment. of new integrated industries with a minimum 
capacity of 1.5 million tons for flats and of 900,000 to 
1 million tons for non~flat products, equipped for a fair amount 
of specialization in final rolled products and with all possible 
technical improvements (particularly those implying a lower 
capital coefficient, such as LD, continuous casting,? etc.). 
The first stage would be aimed at economizing on investment and 
lowering production costs through the reorganization of the industry, 
which would give it by 1970 an economic scale and level of operational 
efficiency comparable with those of Western Europe. 
The purpose of the second stage will also be capital savings and 
cost reductions, but from 1970 onwards economic expansion will not be 
feasible except in one or tito cases« New installations will be required̂  
and these should be given the right economic dimensions from the outset 
instead of being built on a small-scale to be expanded later, as is the 
current practice in Latin America© 
Market integration would play an important part in putting a 
programme of this kind into practice. During the modernization stage 
(1965-70), integration would supply the necessary element of competition 
(potential rather than real at that stago) and emulation, in default of 
2/ The dates are arbitrary, serving merely to give an idea of the time 




which there is little hope of modifying the; actual state of relative, 
technical stagnation and serious imbalances in capacity« A contributory 
factor would be thé tariff reduction proposed in this document, . 
particularly in chapter 3V« Wherever expedient for enabling certain 
industries to operate at full capacity, the reductions might be carried 
further than the général limit. Luring the stage of establishing new 
plants, bigger tariff reductions combined with other measures of 
harmonization, would make it possible for them to be built to meet 
the requirements of regional specialization, economic size and specialized 
production programmes« 
In principle, it would not be necessary to conclude an agreement 
for regional integrationduring the first stage, since the rationalization 
of established industry could be largely accomplished through national, 
programming« However, : no country has yet embarked upon a radical 
reorganization of its steel industry, and the creation of a common 
market may well provide the stimulus needed to rouse them from their 
inertia« During the second stage, a common market would be absolutely 
essential since the large-scale specialized plants to be set up would 
cut into purely national markets, particularly in the smaller countries« 
A scheme of the kind proposed would be the solution for countries 
such as Chile and Peru which, while, possessing advantages of location 
because of the low cost of basic inputs, do not have, a large enough 
domestic market to warrant the scale of operations and specialization 
that would make their costs comparable with those of Orinoco, Monclova 
and Volta Redonda« Under the programme outlined, Huachipato should 
expand its capacity to one million tons of flat products (more than 
the additions it has just made) and change its rolling mill so as to 
specialize in certain rolled products« Chimbote would benefit from 
the recent change in its technical structure which involves the use 
of a blast furnace for reduction instead of an electric furnace, an 
oxygen converter in the steel mill and continuous casting« It should 
also enlarge the scale of its operations. and specialize in a few products« 
It is estimated that x&th this structure and a capacity of slightly over 




non-flat products for about 90 dollars which compares favourably with 
the estimated theoretical cost for Volta Redonda and would make it possible 
to export to world markets« It is essential for Peru to export, whether 
to the regional or world markets, since its own outlets cannot absorb more 
than 60 per cent of such specialised production© These examples show 
that a ten-year programme for steel modernization and development can 
make it possible for each of the Latin American countries to compete 
freely in a regional market® 
(c) Investment savings and costs 
An endeavour was made to determine the effects of the programme. as 
regards investment savings and the reduction in aggregate steel costs© 
The results of the estimates, which are provisional and considerably 
simplified, are given in tables 2, 3 and k M 
Table 2 shows the volume of production envisaged for 1965$ 1970 
and 1975« The figures derive from a projection of demand based on the 
probable growth of the gross domestic product in the different countries 
and of the industries that use steel*^ It was assumed that annual imports 
of steel products would decrease to 2 or 3 million tons less than the 
current figure© The increase in output in 1965-70 would be achieved 
entirely by means of additions and better operation of existing industry© 
In 1970-75 further additions would be made if justified by an expansion 
in the market (which is not expected to take place before 1970), but the 
bulk of the increase in production would come from new plants© 
Table 3 indicates the amount of investment represented by the industry 
in 1965, and estimates the volume needed for expanding and improving existing 
plant and establishing new facilities© The aggregate figures show the 
saving that would be obtained through the implementation of the programme, 
as a result of the drop in investment per unit of product© 
Uj A general study on the Latin American steel industry, prepared by 
ECLA in co-operation with ILAFA, HQ and ILPES, is shortly to be 
issued© 
¿/ The future rate of growth for apparent steel consumption is estimated 





ANNUAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY ENVISAGED, 1963-75 
(Thousands of tons of ingots) 
1963 1965 1970 1975 
Projected consumption or demand 9 356 18 148 27 259 
Real or programmed production 7 211 9 971 16 235 25 202 
Deficit to be covered by imports 2 145 1 913 2 057 
Production in 1963 
Additions and. entry into operation 
of new installations before 1965 
Additions and entry into operation 
of new installations between 
1965 and 1970 
Expansion by 1975 of the industry 
as it exists in 1970 
One new mill for flat products to 
enter into operation between 
1970 and 1975 (with a capacity 
of 1,5 million tons) 
Four or five new mills for non-flat 
products to enter into operation 
between 1970 and 1975 (with a 
capacity of 900 000 to 1 million 
tons each) 
7 211 9 971 16 235 25 202 
Source: SOLA. 
7 211 7 211 7 211 7 211 
2 760 2 760 2 760 








INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO DEVELOP THE STEEL INDUSTRY AS ENVISAGED 
IM THE PROGRAM!® a/ 
(Millions of dollars,, and in brackets dollars per ton of ingot 
production capacity) 
1965 1970 1975 
Investment in total installed 
capacity in 1965 4 076 4 076 4 076 
(408.78) (408.78) (408.78) 
Additions and entry into operation 
of new installations between 
1965 and 1970 757 757 
(121.63) (121.63) 
Additions in 1970 to enter intô 
operation before 1975 243 
(76.73) 
One new plant for flat products 
(with a capacity of 1.5 million 
tons) 318 
(212.00) 
Four to five new plants for non-flat 
products (with a capacity of 
900 000 to 1 million tons each) 835 
(194.19) 
4 076 4_833 6 229 
(408.78) (297.69) (247.16) 
Source: ECLA. 
a/ The figures for 1963 have not been included since four of the most important 






TOTAL DIRECT COST OF LATIN AM3HICAN STEEL PRODUCTION AS ENVISAGED 
IN THE DEVELOEMSNT PROGRAM®, AND AVERAGE CCBT PER TON a/ 
(Millions of dollars, and In brackets average cost In dollars per ton) 
Direct cost of total steel 
production in 1965 
Direct cost of additional 
production resulting from 
expansions and establishment 
of new plants between 1965 
and 1970 
Direct cost of additional 
production resulting from 
expansions between 197.0 and. 
1975 
1965 
1 313 b/ 
(131.68 ) 
1970 











Direct cost of producing 
1.5 million tons of flat 
products in the new mill 
of that capacity to be set 
up between 1970.and 1975 144 c/ 
• ( 9 6 . 0 0 ) 
Direct cost of producing 
4.3 million tons of non-
flat products in four 
or five new mills with 
a capacity of 900 000 to 
1 million tons 
1 J U 
(131.68) 




2 _ m 
(108.48) 
Source: ECLA. 
a/ Including 6 per cent of the value of the equipment for amortization and 9 per 
cent of fixed assets for debt servicing a,nd repayment of share capital, 
b/ Calculated from average input costs, on the assumption that all possible 
--technical improvements have been made to increase capacity and reduce costs 
and that the industry is efficiently run, 
c/ For modern structures with a coke blast furnace, steel mill with oxygen 




Table 4 presents an estimate of what has been temed theoretical 
total, direct cost/^in other words, direct cost per ton in the plant 
(including the cost of raw materials, fuel, energy, manpower and capital 
charges) multiplied by the volume of production (or capacity) for each 
year© It is clear from the table that the reduction in the unit cost 
of steel under the programs wiH be substantial© 
The programme will lead to a saving of investment in steel plant 
and a reduction in the cost of steel© The relevant figures, which 
should be taken as approximate estimates only, are contained in table 5 
and are based directly on the data quoted above0 
To sum up, the annual savings in the total cost of steel production 
in Latin America will be as follows: 
im 
In steel investment 375 million dollars 
In steel costs 416 million dollars 
Very considerable investment mil be needed to produce the 
15 ©2 million tons of steel represented by the expansion of the steel 
industry between 1965 and 1975 if the industry ?s structure remains 
the same and its capacity continues to be under-utilized to the same 
degree as at present© .On such circumstances the amount required would 
be 5*906 million dollars (see again table 5)« The same expansion would 
be more economical if the integration programme were carried out in two 
stages, since investment would then be reduced to 2,153 million dollars© 
The saving effected (3,753 million over the decade) is equivalent to 
slightly over 60 per cent of total investment requirements "without 
integration"© This testifies to the inefficient way in which capital 
is now being used in the Latin American steel industry and the extent 
of the benefits that would be obtained through regional co-ordination 
of its future development© 
6/ This has been calculated on the basis of the average cost of inputs 
in Latin America, with the addition of 15 per cent for capital 




. Tablé 5 
INVESTMENT SAVING AND 'COST ' REDUCTION UNDER ŒHE DEVELOPMENT 
.PROGRAMME,, 1965-75 
(Thousands of tons and millions of dollars) 
Production capacity 
Total investment required 
Investment requirements for 
the same structure of 
industry as in 1965 
Investment saving 
During the ten-year period 
, Annually 
Total direct cost of annual 
production 
Total direct cost of annual 
production based on the 
same structure of industry 
as in 1965 
Investment of annual cost 
Source: ECLA. 
a/ The investment indicated is 320 million dollars (3.2 per cent) less than 
the product of projected production capacity for 1975 multiplied by actual 
average investment per ton, because allowance has been made for the substan-
tial investment represented by existing plant that is either not worked at 
all or else on a very small scale, perticularly in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, a situation that is assumed to be the same in 1975» 
b/ Production costs in 1975 have been estimated as 6 per. cent less than the 
product of actual costs multiplied by the tonnage envisaged, on the 
assumption that the upward trend of productivity in recent years will 
continue. 
1965 ' 1975 
9 971 25 202 
4 076 6 229 
9 982 a/ 
• ~ 3 7 5 3 
375 
1 309 2 734 
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The savings that would accrue in production costs are estimated 
at about 416 million dollars annually, or 13®2 per cent of the total 
primary ex-plant cost of the steel produced up to 1975 (25#2 million 
tons)© 
Production costs would be cut much less than investment because 
full use wiH be made of plant capacity, which is currently under-
utilized© Moreover, the estimate made of the direct cost of a total 
output of 250 2 million tons in 1975 has been strongly influenced by 
the fact that 10 million tons are already being produced in 1965« The 
direct cost per ton (131 dollars) for this proportion is expected to 
be just as high in 1975 as in 1965© The reductions in cost would be 
greater if the expansions and new plant to be set up during the period 
covered by the programme at a unit cost of 77 to 102 dollars per ton 
were to be compared, solely with the new volume of production envisaged 
for the same period, i»e© 15 million tons, at the present unit cost of 
131 dollars per ton© Total direct cost is postulated in the two hypotheses 
as follows: 
Total direct cost ̂of jproducin,̂  an additional 15 million tons 
of steel between 1965 and 1975 
1© Calculated at the estimated average cost * . 
in 1965 1*965 million dollars 
2© Calculated on the basis of the unit cost 
resulting from additions and improvement 
to the capacity of existing plants and 
the establishment of new units of economic 
size 1,431 million dollars 
The resulting savings would amount to 534 million dollarsx which 
is slightly over 25 per cent of the highest estimate of total cost, 
3© Other industries 
(a) Alumijiium metallurgy 
This industry exists in only two Latin American countries Brazil 
and Mexico and is about to be established in Venezuela. Current 
production is very small in comparison with the region1 s total demand, 




estimated that by 1970 and 1975 total demand (apparent consumption) in 
Latin America will be 200,000 and 270,000 tons respectively^ In 
1 . . 
contrast to these iigures, Brazil1 s two plants are turning out about 
30,000 tons a year, Mexico's recently-installed plant has a capacity 
of 20,000 tons and. projected production in Venezuela mil begin at 
10,000 tons a year. Hence, there is ample justification for establishing 
new plants in the next few years, and the possibility is being studied 
both in the producer countries and in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru» Aluminium metallurgy is distinguished by marked economies of 
scale in costs and investment, jmd if the industry continues to develop . 
on the same lines as at present, with small units in different countries, 
Latin America would lose the benefits that it could obtain from the 
establishment of a few large plants located in the best position for 
supplying the requirements of the region as a whole«r^ 
The investment required for primary aluminium is provisionally 
estimated to vary from 1,250 dollars per ton in plants with a capacity 
of 10,000 tons to less than half (600 dollars) in plants of 180,000 tons* . 
The unit cost declines in the same proportion because of the peculiarly 
heavy incidence of capital charges« As has been pointed out, the cost 
of electric energy has a marked influence on the unit cost of aluminium^ 
As a result, the need for optimum location in terms of raw materials 
and energy supplies makes it additionally important for the industry 
to be developed with an eye to the interests of the region as a whole« 
In order to underline the practical importance of such factors, 
the total investment needed *to cover Latin American demand for primary 
alimdnium in 1975 has been estimated on the basis of two hypotheses: 
1« That each country with a market larger than the absolute 
minimum capacity of the plant sets up its own plants during 
the¡ next decade to cover domestic demand; 
2J At an annual rate of increase of 2«5 per cent for the per capita 
product« 
8/ See Los -principales sectores de la industria latinoamericana.:. 
problemas y perspectivas (E/CH+12/718), Chapter II» . " 
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2© That three large regional plants are established, one in the 
area formed by Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean ̂ a 
second on the Pacific coast and a third on the Atlantic 
seaboard» 
In order not to enlarge upon and complicate these examples, 
unnecessarily, it has been, assumed that the alumina would be imported 
from outside Latin America, although one country is already processing 
it in the region, and other countries are likely to follow in its 
footsteps despite the large economies of scale that characterize this 
stage of the industry as well. 
Investment requirements are compared below on the basis of national 
production and regional production: 
Investment requirements for supplying 
demand in 1975 
National production 
Six plants (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
and other countries) 2/ 235 million dollars 
Regional production 
Three regional plants (North of 
Latin America, and Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts) 178 million dollars 
Saving in investment .represented by regional production 57 million dollars 
The estimated saving is 57 million dollars, or 32 per cent of the 
investment required for national production© In practice, the balance 
will be tipped even more sharply in favour of regional production. To 
begin with, the first solution assumes that each plant will construct 
one plant of a larger size than is warranted by the local market, but 
experience has, shown that the Latin American countries prefer to set up 
several plants, even if their respective markets are smaller than the 
minimum economic plant capacitŷ  one of their reasons being to prevent 
2/ The "other countries" group corresponds to the sum of the capacities 
of countries with an apparent annual consumption of less than 




the formation of monopolies« Secondly, the location of domestic plants 
would necessarily be less favourable than that of the three regional 
plants, and, as indicated earlier* location (as regards raw materials 
and electric energy) is a factor of prime importance in determining 
production cost« Lastly, the adoption of a regional approach at the 
earlier stage of alumina production would result in a saving of 25 per 
cent in the large additional investment that would otherwise be needed, 
(b) Pulp and paper manufacture 
Size has an equally marked effect on unit cost and investment in 
the manufacture of pulp and different kinds of paper. If a capacity 
scale ranging from 50 to 200 tons a day is taken as corresponding to 
market sizes in Latin America, integrated paper and unbleached sulphate 
pulp production would cut investment per ton of daily capacity from 
180,000 to 92,500 dollars (i.e. by slightly under 50 per cent) and 
direct production costs from 256 to 145 dollars per ton (44 per cent).^^ 
The possibility of reducing the investment required is of vital , 
importance, for Latin America because of the large shortage of capacity 
foreseen for 1975 which v/ill entail extensive additions to existing 
industry« On© solution is to continue to build plants with a very small 
capacity (either because of the small size of many of the domestic markets 
or the wish to have more than one plant), while the other is to pave the 
way for the construction of regional plants of economic size through the 
facilities afforded by a common market® The future development of the 
industry on rational lines would also be vital, since a high cost structure 
prevails in nearly all the Latin American countries® If the sales prices 
for the major paper products are compared with world market prices (import 
averages c.i.ft), the differences will be seen to vary from 50 to 150 per 
cent to Latin America's disadvantage. 
The additional capacity needed to satisfy the predicted increase in 
demand in 1970-75 has been calculated on the basis of two hypotheses, one 
for a plant of the minimum, size (200 tons/day) and another for a plant of 
the average size current in Latin America* These figures will give some 




idea of the extent to which the future development of thé industry in 
the context of a common market will make for reductions in investment 
and costs* If the theoretical unit cost is also set against the total 
volume of capacity to be installed, it will be possible to determine the 
cost reductions to be obtained through the establishment of regional plants« 
Total pulp Total paper and 
paperboard 
Capacity shortage expected in 1970-75 
(thousand tons/year) 
Average capacity of existing plants 
(tons/day) 
Investment/ton day corresponding to 
average capacity of existing plants 
(thousands of dollars) 
Total investment needed for establish-
ing additional capacity in plants of 
average existing capacity (thousands 
of dollars) 
Unit cost of production in plants of 
average existing capacity (dollars) 
Total cost of additional production in 
plants of average existing capacity 
(thousands of dollars) 
1*893 
56 
1 2 7 
7 2 9 , 0 0 0 
1 6 3 
309,000 





4 5 5 , 0 0 0 
Investment/ton day in plants of 
200 tons/day (thousands of dollars) 85 
Total investment needed for making 
capacity additions to plants of 
200 -tons/day (thousands of dollars) 487,000 
Unit cost of pzoduction in plants of 
C00 tons/day (dollars) 119 
Total cost of additional production 
in plants of 200 tons/day (thousands 





Savings: in investment (thousands 
of dollars) 242,000 
in annual production costs 






These are theoretical calculations that involve a number of 
simplifications. In some cases it is inevitable that plants should be 
small, while in others the cost of transport to local markets may 
enable a small, plant to compete successfully with others of more economic 
size« However, the basic argument remains valid, and the resulting: 
savings in investment and costs, which are about a third less than they 
would be with national production, whether of pulp or of paper and paper-
board, are an eloquent indication of the potential offered by a Latin 
American common market for this branch of industry« 
(c) Chemical industries 
Normal production scales in the Latin American chemical industry 
are very far from the optimum, and are often below the economic minimum 
as regards market prices that are unprotected by high tariff barriers« 
The data provided in earlier ECLA studies. on the expected lack of 
sufficient capacity to meet demand for the major chemical products in 
1965-70, and the theoretical costs and unit investment with different 
production scales gives an idea of the savings to be obtained in 
expenditure and total investment requirements through the adoption of 
a regional integration plan in ideal conditions for the chemical industry« 
The reductions- that would result in both production and investment 
costs from the elimination of the deficit foreseen for 1965-70 have been 
estimated as nearly as possible,,on the basis of two alternative solutions« 
The first is domestic production, whereby each country would try to meet 
domestic demand through its own efforts, and the second regional production, 
which would make for the establishment of plants of economic size« The 
method of estimation and the simplifications that had to be made have 
11/ been described in an ECLA report*— 
11/ Las xndustrias quimicas y la integracién econòmica regional 




Millions of dollars 
Annual savings in production costs in 
respect of the expansion envisaged for 
1965-70 290 
Annual savings in investment in respect 
of the expansion envisaged for 1965-70 200 
Annual investment "with national 
production 442 
Gross value of estimated production 
(basic and intermediate chemical 
products) in 1970 2,945 
The findings relate solely to basic and intermediate chemical 
products, which constitute 50 per cent of total production in the chemical 
industry, since the very nature of the manufacturing processes rule out 
the possibility of large economies of scale in parachemical products^' -
and end goods. The annual savings will thus be 10 per cent in production 
costs and 45 per cent in investment. 
The increased competition offered to local industry by the imports 
flowing in feon other parts of the region as a result of tariff 
liberalization causes enterprises to react in a number of ways. The 
premises on which integration is based assume that such reactions will 
lead to an increase in the average productivity and efficiency of the 
industrial sector and a simultaneous drop in costs. However, the process 
of enhancing its efficiency will inevitably be accompanied by a series of 
changes in the industrial enterprises© In extreme cases, these changes 
may compel such firms to close down, or to shift to other lines of activity 
thereby losing nuch of their capital. It is vital to take the possibility 
of such disruptions into account cc as to determine the pace at which 
tariffs and other barriers to trade can safely be removed, 
12/ The name given by ECLA to chemical products whose processing does 
not involve any change in molecular structure, such as cosmetic and 
toilet preparations, paints, detergents, etc. 




The nature and intensity of the impact on local industry depends, 
first, on the degree of the competition from imports and,, secondly, on 
the conditions in which the enterprise operates, the kind of entrepreneur 
who administers it and the state of the local market. With due allowance 
made for variations in conditions, inefficient enterprises can be classified 
into certain categories in accordance with the way they react to stronger 
intra-regional competition: 
(i) Inefficient enterprises, that circumvent competition by producing 
for local markets or supplying a highly irregular volume of 
demand that holds no attraction for the more efficient concerns; 
(ii) Inefficient enterprises 'which* prodded by competition, overhaul 
their methods or change their products on the basis of their 
own efforts and resourcesj 
(iii) Inefficient enterprises that are unable to react to the spur 
of competition but can be set on their feet through soundly-
directed technical and financial assistance programmes; 
(iv) Inefficient and economically unsalvageable enterprises that, 
for reasons of national policy, have to be kept in existence 
through temporary - if sometimes prolonged - protection; 
(v) Inefficient and unsalvageable enterprises that should be 
eliminated, and partly replaced by. efficient enterprises 
aid those falling into categories (ii) and (iii), and partly 
by an increase in trade» 
It emerges from an analysis of this kind that the number of enterprises 
liable to become bankrupt is very small — although varying from one sector 
to another - and that certain steps should be taken either be .fore 03? 
conciuvently wi!Ua tariff liberalization to facilitate the reorganization 
of local industry at higher levels of productivity and efficiency« 
Labour productivity and operational efficiency is apt to show very 
marked differences within a single .industrial sector© For instance the 
productivity of the cotton textile industry in Brazil displays a range 
of from one to twelve and that, of the woollen goods industry in Uruguay 
from one to eight. The same margins of variation characterize the textile 




of industry, such as those that undertake processing and, above all, 
those in which the worker-machine adaptation and internal organization 
are of particular importance (metal-transforming industries in general). 
The first factor to be taken into account is that many of the 
lowest-productivity enterprises do not really enter into competition 
with the more productive and efficient concerns, whether domestic or 
foreign, since they manufacture special products for which demand is 
limited or sporadic, or depend on typical characteristics of the local 
market. This frequently large group of inefficient factories has nothing 
to fear from stronger competition. Although it has no direct bearing on 
integration, the question may accordingly be asked how the efficiency of 
that extensive group of plants could be enhanced if competition is not 
an effective instrument in their case. Their efficiency is dependent, 
above all, on the industrial conditions prevailing in the country in 
general and in the sector in particular, and will increase as and when 
the average level of education and training in the labour force is raised 
and the principles of industrial administration and management become 
more widely current and extend to the inefficient enterprises. This is 
a slow process, in the course of which the frequently large group of 
entrepreneurs concerned (operating primarily in the traditional and 
consumer goods industries, but in a great many metal-transforming and 
other manufacturing activities as well) will lag behind the rest of the 
sector. 
Other enterprises, which are forced to meet competition because of 
the types of products they manufacture, react chiefly in two ways# Some 
adapt themselves to the new market conditions, reorganizing their working 
methods, modernizing their equipment and thereby reducing their costs, 
while others achieve the same end by changing their production lines and 
specializing in one product or a very few, whereas their efforts wero 
formerly dispersed over too wide an assortment. 
It is hard to estimate what proportion of enterprises in a given 
sector have this capacity to adapt themselves, which depends, in essence, 
on able and flescLble entrepreneurial management, but also, in no small 




country concerned, especially as regards credit facilities during the 
transition period. An analysis of thè data on the efficiency and 
productivity of enterprises assembled in ECLA studies suggests that 
the bulk of traditional industry in nearly all countries of the region 
lacks the entrepreneurial capacity to effect such changes. A% first 
sight, traditional industry presents a picture of absolute technical 
stagnation in -which.the possibilities of recovery through its own efforts 
are- practically nil, but a more thorough examination casts some doubt on 
that diagnosis. There is no denying the low levels of operational 
efficiency, but there is nothing to prove that they have existed for a 
long time and will persist in the future. The detailed studies which 
present the data in question, relate t*> a specific period and shed no 
light on past or future trends. Accordingly, the hypothesis cannot be 
entirely rejected that some enterprises with low operational efficiency 
indexes may, at a given moment, be in the throes of a progressive decline, 
which will bring them to the point where their operation is no longer 
remunerative, and the firm is declared bankrupt and either closes down 
or passes onto other more capable hands, and thence starts to climb the 
scale of productivity and operational efficiency; while others may be 
pursuing an upward trend ensuing upon a process'of . internal reorganization 
or renovation of their equipment. This dual movement of enterprises 
would represent a dynamic situation in which the average level of 
efficiency was rising steadily throughout the sector. There are not 
enough data to give a reliable idea of vài at is really happening in; Latin 
American industry, as the searching sectoral studies available were not 
carried out until very recently. But a dynamic process of that nature 
might well be found to exist in various sectors and countries, at the 
level of the individual enterprise, in which case the adjustments entailed 
by the expansion of regional trade could be effected with less risk of 
13/ distortion in the existing enterprises.—^ 
13/ See another recent ECLA study, EL proceso de industrialización en 
América Latina (E/CN«12/716)« for an over-all analysis of the 




Subject to the foregoing reservation, it can be asserted that a 
fairly large segment of traditional industry will be incapable of 
adapting itself to the new market conditions through its om efforts 
and resources, either for want of the necessary entrepreneurial 
capacity to analyse the new situation and on that basis to determine 
the changes that must be introduced in the enterprise, or because those 
changes would entail additional investment for which the necessary . 
funds are lacking* These concerns, which may be called salvageable, 
could attain higher levels of productivity and efficiency, provided 
they were backed by sufficiently large-scale and flexible programmes 
of technical and financial assistance, organized with duo regard for 
the sector1 s special characteristics and the keener competition envisaged» 
The textile industry is the best example in this category/^ 
But a similar situation exists in other branches of industry, 
including the manufacture of capital goods» The machine-tools industry, 
which is concentrated almost exclusively in Brazil and Argentina, 
presents a disparate structure, consisting in a few largish or very 
large establishments, with satisfactory technical standards and high 
levels of efficiency, side by side with a considerable number of small 
and even tiny workshops operating less efficiently at a lower technical 
level» Some of these are clearly faced with the possibility of 
disappearing as industry expands and intra-regional and national 
competition grows stronger, or at best of continuing in their present 
rut, as producers of simple, roughly-constructed, low-cost machines 
for which there will always be some demand, however much it shrinks 
in relative terms. Recent ECLA studies on this industry have shown 
that a number of these establishments will be unable to adapt themselves 
easily to the future requirements of the metal-transforming industry, 
involving as they do a growing proportion of machines or more complex 
14/ See another ECLA document, Los principales sectores de la industria 
latinoamericana: problemas y perspectivas (E/CN„12/71tí), chapter VI, 
for a fairly detailed study of the nature and mode of application of 
an assistance programme to facilitate the reorganization of the 




design and delicate structure for the precision work and the longer series 
that are typical of the more advanced stages of the metal-transfoming 
industries in general. On the other hand, there are certain establishments 
possessing skilled manpower and satisfactory production equipment which 
will rise to the occasion, provided that some technical assistance agency, 
besides guiding them in the evaluation of future market needs, furnishes 
them with the designs of heavier and more complex models of machines and 
helps them to prepare the necessary prototypes and, in tho early stages, 
to introduce stricter standards of quality and performance. In this as 
in other similar cases, which are fairly numerous even in the more 
industrialized countries, a technical assistance and investment programme 
for the reorganization and improvement of factories will not only make it 
possible to reap the benefits of an increase in trade and specialization 
among the countries members of the common market without causing serious 
maladjustments in the existing industries, but will also contribute * 
decisively to industrial progress and the improvement of productivity 
and efficiency, by making a drive for better use of important factors 
of production already applied in the manufacturing sector. 
The remaining enterprises are completely unsalvageable, and the 
whole technical assistance programme and investment effort would be 
useless in their case. Some of them represent substantial investment, 
and both on this account and for such motives as "national security11 
and "industrial equilibrium", based on other than strictly economic 
considerations whose existence must nevertheless be recognized and 
respected, they cannot be abandoned to their fate. In the case of 
these enterprises, the sectoral agreements would have to include a 
temporary saving clause, based probably on a system of import quotas, 
which would enable them to subsist during such time as the above-mentioned 
motives remained operative. The rest of the unsalvageable enterprises, 
to which the same arguments do not apply, would represent a minor sacrifice 
- since they would clearly be few in number - for the sake of the benefits 
that would derive from the transformation of the whole structure which, at 
•the end of ah admittedly long transition period, will enable Latin American 





The assets, even in this extreme case, would not be wholly lost. 
In the first place, tariff liberalization and the consequent strengthening 
of competition would be a deliberately slow process, which means that 
for many enterprises the expiry of the period of grace might coincide 
with the end of the useful life of their production equipment« Failure 
to replace that equipment would really be the net result of the process® 
Secondly, in the still fewer cases of a rapid collapse under the pressure 
of competition, the equipment that was still serviceable would be sold 
to other concerns operating in the same branch of industry, as occurs in 
any normal process of internal competition, 
5. Sectoral integration within ALALC 
ALALC has two instruments at its disposal to promote the integration 
of markets for manufactured products: the yearly negotiations to reduce 
customs duties and the compl©aentarity agreements in respect of specific 
products or groups of products« 
Although the yearly negotiations have resulted in the inclusion in 
the National Schedules of a not insignificant number of manufactures, 
trade in those products has not increased greatly as a result, nor for 
various reasons, could it logically be expected to do so in the future. 
The system of negotiation product by product, by pair's of countries, 
the concessions agreed upon being extended to other countries, tends 
to be centred on new products which are not yet produced in the region, 
or are produced only in small quantities, and to by-pass those already 
being manufactured, where regional competition might cause maladjustments 
in the existing industries. But new investment is required before 
reductions in customs duties on items that are not yet produced, can be 
turned to account; and this in turn necessitates the assurance that 
tariff reductions will not be withdrawn or altered in the next negotiations, 
but will actually be extended to the point where all obstacles to trade are 
eliminated. This requirement would be met by the inclusion of products in 
the Common Schedule. However, the limited number of really important 
manufactured products hitherto included in the Common Schedule shows that 
there are serious impediments which preclude trusting to the yearly 
negotiations as a means of furthering industrial integration, 
/The Montevideo 
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The Montevideo Treaty provides for another ¡instrument specifically 
intended to promote industrial integration, namely, complementarity 
agreements. 
(a) ' pornplémeritarity agreements 
These agreements are dealt kith in articles 15> 16 and 17 of the 
Montevideo Treaty, Each agreement should include a specific liberalization 
programme and rules for maintaining the preference margins agreed on • 
vis-à-vis third countries, as well as provisions designed to reconcile 
the treatments accorded to imports from third -'countries,-to co-ordinate 
government programmes and incentives (including those 'relating to the 
treatment accorded to capital and services from inside and outside the 
Area) and to establish regulations for the prevention of unfair trade 
practices. 
Only two complementarity agreements have been negotiated and 
ratified to date,; in connexion with certain types of calculating-machines 
and with electronic valves. Although the results obtained seem 
encouraging, it is clear from the limited field thus far covered and 
the obstaclés to the conclusion of other such agreements that as regards 
speeding up liberalization for manufactured products, this is not the 
solution either. 
The difficulties probably stein from the fact that complementarity 
agreements, as applied in practice, àre not very different from a normal 
negotiation which culminates in the inclusion of specific tariff 
reductions in the National Schedules. Although the'Treaty concedes *' 
that the agreements, may contain provisions over and above the mere 
reduction of duties, connected with the establishment, wholly or in . 
part, of a single external customs tariff and the harmonizing of other 
competitive conditions, such as foreign capital régimes, etc., such;a 
procedure is not practicable for the following reasons: ; 
(i) The Treaty fails to establish rules and procedures for 
defining such additional commitments; 
(ii) Nor does it lay down procedures or rules, even of a general 
character, for the inclusion of promotional provisions, although the 




(iii) If a complementarity agreement were so formulated as to include 
specific provisions for the promotion of a given industry, ALALC*s present 
institutional structure would make it difficult to implement them, 
particularly in regard to supervision of the fulfilment of commitments 
and to the execution of investment and technical assistance programmes 
designed to promote new production activities or to facilitate the 
adaptation of those already existing; 
(iv) Lastly, there would be no agency in a position to prepare 
complementarity agreements of the required complexity, and it would 
be unrealistic to. expect the interested parties to draw them up on 
their own account. 
This situation has long been realized by ALALC itself, which in 
the last few months has adopted certain measures to remedy it« The 
first important step in that direction has consisted in the establishment 
of the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development (Comisión Asesora de 
Desarrollo Industrial ~ CADI) and the work it has done thus far, 
(b) CADI and the sectoral study* groups 
The Advisory Committee on Industrial Development (CADI) was 
established by virtue of resolution 31 of the Standing Executive Committee 
of ALALC, pursuant to a recommendation made by the First Meeting on 
Planning, Promotion and Orientation of Industrial Development, held at 
Lima* Resolution 75 of the Conference of the Contracting Parties of 
ALALC, adopted at the Conference's third session, stipulated that the 
Standing Executive Committee should direct CADI to make a study of 
the Contracting Parties * industrial policies and to define the problems 
affecting the integration of industry. CADI*s first meeting, held in 
May 1964, had two particularly important results: it approved a number 
of bases for the formulation of the Area's industrial development policy, 
and recommended to the Standing Executive Committee that four study 
groups should be set up, three of which would be concerned with the . 
elucidation of integration problems in specific branoh.33 of industry. 
The bases for the formulation of an industrial development policy 
applicable in the Area represent a conceptual advance with respect to 




and constitute the first enunciation of an industrial integration policy. 
This advance is manifested in three principal ways: 
(i) The concept of "the programmed location of industries of 
importance for the Area" is accepted, "in view of the different structures 
and levels of development in the ALALC countries", and it is recognized 
that this objective requires "the adoption of a common policy in the 
production sector under consideration"; 
(ii) The bases explicitly state that the aim of such programming 
should be "an equitable distribution of the benefits deriving from 
integration"; and 
(iii) They establish that the devices and incentives to be used in 
the programing of integration should include not only trade policy 
instruments, but J1all others capable of influencing a process of industrial 
integration by sectors". 
Thus CADI would appear- to be upholding a genuinely region-wide foim 
of sectoral programming, ;which.is a far broader concept than that of the 
complementarity agreements, However, one important point remains to be 
clearly defined* Complementarity agreements have been conceived for new 
. production lines and as a means of reconciling the advance of integration 
with protection of the position reached by each country1s existing 
industries. This characteristic of the approach to. complementarity . 
agreements constitutes a serious,limitation, to which,.it would seem, 
the new bases formulated by CADI, ambitious as they are in many respects, 
will also be subject» Indeed, though they mention the aim of securing 
"the fullest and most efficient use of regional resources" and recognize 
that "competition between producers in the Area.will stimulate the., 
reorganization of industry in ALALC countries", , the bases still harp, 
on industrial complementarity and place special emphasis on the "study, 
installation and development of industries of- importance to. the Area", 
thus clearly envisaging the development of new and as yet non-existent 
industries, rather than the real integration of industry which would 
make no distinction between new and established branches, except as 
regards the type of measures adopted in the case of each category. 
/The study 
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The study groups were to be composed of technical experts from the 
ALALC secretariat and from inter-American economic co-operation agencies 
(ECU, IA-ECOSOC and IBB), in addition to experts designated by the 
Governments members of ALALC by way of technical co-operation rather 
than official participation. Three of these groups were to be concerned 
with problems affecting steel-making, the petro-chemical industries, and 
the pulp and paper industry, respectively. 
The three study groups met several times towards the end of 1964 
to devise a method of work for compiling the data considered essential 
for an analysis of integration prospects and difficulties in their 
respective fields. Recently, at its second meeting, CADI examined the 
methodologies proposed by the groups, set the targets for the ensuing 
stage of their work and suggested ways and means of attaining them. 
3h their reports the groups have recognized the full magnitude of 
the task assigned to them and the need for ample and specialized resources 
with which to accomplish it. As pointed out by the ALALC secretariat in 
a report presented at the second meeting of CADI, the experience of the 
international agencies engaged in making descriptive studies of sectors 
of industry in ALALC countries shows that, given several experts working 
exclusively on one sector, and the funds required for visits to the 
countries concerned, the wo?4c takes about three years. 
CADI is to comment on this at its second meeting* The lines along 
which the ALALC sectoral groups will ultimately work are not yet known, 
but the decisions taken will perforce be influenced by the fact that, 
since the date of its first meeting, the Conference of the Contracting 
Parties has adopted two important resolutions which will have a decisive 
impact on the course of industrial integration activities. At the same 
time, one of them in particular throws even more clearly into relief the 
disequilibrium existing between the targets accepted by the member countries 
and the institutional machinery available to further their attainment. 
(c) The industrial integration policy embodied in Conference 
resolutiorTSo (IV) 
The more frequent use of complementarity agreements has been hampered, 




provisions of the Treaty relating to the. multilateral extension of the 
concessions agreed, on* Only two countries. (Paraguay and Ecuador), 
considered as being at a relatively less .advanced stage of economic 
development, would be entitled to benefit by exemption from the most-
favoured-nation clause, In other words, the Montevideo Treaty did not 
affort scope for sub-regional agreements, and precisely the likeliest 
possibilities of complementarity, in a restricted sense, seemed to 
exist in smaller groups of countries, often being of interest to a 
single concern established in the countries in question. 
Resolution 99 (XV) of the Conference of the Contracting Parties 
of ALALC opened up fresh possibilities for such sub-regional arrangements, 
by admitting exceptions.to the application of the most-favoured-nation 
clause. Under the terms of article XXI of this resolution, the Contracting 
Parties, expressly agree that those of them which are not parties to a 
complementarity agreement shall only benefit by the reciprocal concessions 
agreed-on between its signatories, subject to the granting of fair 
compensation. This compensation will have to be negotiated with the 
interested parties, while it will, be incumbent upon the Standing Executive 
Committee to declare the agreement compatible with the general principles 
and aims, of the Treaty, It is also for the Copnittee to settle any 
differences of opinion likely to arise in the course of negotiation as 
to what is meant by "fair compensation", 
A more, liberal attitude in regard to the formation of sub-regional 
groups is undoubtedly necessary if agreements by sectors of industry are 
to be more flexible adapted to the real conditions of a region where there 
are notable disparities between the development levels and aptitudes of 
the various countries. But at the same time, it would entail a risk of 
undue and perhaps irrevocable fragmentation in the industrial integration 
process« To prevent this, the application of exemptions from the most-
favoured-nation clautse would have to be strictly regulated. 
The purpose of resolution 100 (IV) of the Conference is to formulate, 
in broad terms and in the light of past experience, the basic guidelines 
for economic policy in relation to customs, monetary, agricultural and 
industrial development questions, as - well as to draw up a programme of 
action for the implementation of such policies, 
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The guidelines for industrial development policy embody all the 
criteria proposed by CADI, but also lay down the following bases for the 
studies and work connected with industrial development in the Area: 
(i) Particular stress should be laid on sectoral integration as 
a means of furthering Latin America's economic development, and it should 
be made clear that this presupposes the development of the branch of 
industry concerned, in line with the joint programming schemes established 
to that end; 
(ii) Recourse should be had to all possible ways of achieving 
complementarity, in the sphere of industrial production, not solely 
to the agreements provided for in article 16 of the Treaty; 
(iii) Special attention should be paid to production activities as 
yet undeveloped or at an incipient stage of development; 
(iv) In the case of industries offering limited complementarity 
possibilities on the basis of joint programming, fair competitive 
conditions should be established to ensure that they can take an. 
systematic advantage as possible of the expanded market. 
It should be noted that such criteria place strong emphasis on 
industrial integration through the joint programming of sectors of 
industry and the use of instruments other than complementarity 
agreements; but at the same time a distinction is still drawn between 
new and existing activities, joint programming being regarded as 
acceptable only for the new branches of industry. The two concepts 
would appear to hamper the formulation of a policy for industrial 
integration by sectors which would promise complete success« 
The programme of action draw up for the implementation of industrial 
policy also seams inadequate, despite the emphasis laid on the quest for 
new procedures» It comprises the following features: 
(i) Sectoral, study groups, including those already established and 
those to be set up by the Standing Executive Committee with 
the advisory assistance of CADI; 
(ii) A study by the ALALC secretariat to classify the industrial 
activities of the Area according to their level of development 




(iii) Establishment of the bases for securing fair competitive 
, conditions for existing industries, 
(d) The need for new instruments' to proraate industrial integration 
The aims of industrial integration policy are set forth boldly 
in resolution 100 (IV) and reflect a dear realization of the importance 
of the undertaking. But there are also evident weaknesses in the 
proposed programme of action, which is clearly inadequate in the face 
of such a herculean task. These weaknesses would appear to be, briefly, 
of three kinds. First, there is the insistence on differentiating 
between new or incipient activities and those already in existence, 
and the effort to establish completely distinct and separate means 
of action in each case - complementarity agreements or not too clearly 
defined joint programming agreements for the former rules of competition 
for the latter. Such a distinction seems very hard to put into practice 
in a region where two or three highly industrialized countries have 
nearly every conceivable type of industry in operation at some stage 
or another, unless the definition of such industries is reduced to the 
level of the individual product or specific model of manufacture, which 
would be incompatible with the joint sectoral programming approach. 
Moreover, the advisability of reserving the sectoral programming 
approach to the new and dynamic sectors is open to question. Such a 
step might result in a tendency to sanction the unprogressiveness and 
virtual technological stagnation now prevalent in many of Latin America's 
traditional industries. Instead of respecting and even accentuating the 
disparities in productivity and operational efficiency between the new 
and the traditional sectors, industrial integration ought to aim expressly 
at eliminating them little by little, extending to the whole of the 
manufacturing sector th© benefits of competition as an instrument for 
promoting efficiency and technological progress, and using sectoral 
programming as an effective means of gradually and systematically 
modernizing the traditional industries, as well as of promoting 
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Secondly, the type of instrument to be used for establishing tariff 
and non-tariff commitments with a view to sectoral integration has not 
yet been determined, although ALALC itself recognizes that complementarity 
agreements as defined in the Treaty are unsatisfactory« 
Thirdly, once the best instrument for furthering sectoral integration 
is chosen, a method of preparing it would have to be established, with all 
that involves in the way of processing and analysing technical and economic 
data. The procedure of setting up study groups attempted by ALALC through 
CADI has proved ineffectual so far, and perhaps, given the nature of the 
groups, could be successful only in the case of very short-term objectives. 
Lastly, it remains to ascertain whether an agreement relating to a 
sector of industry and representing a genuine sectoral and regional 
development programme, in which recourse would be had to the whole range 
of indispensable non-tariff instruments, could be implemented and 
supervised through the existing institutional machinery* 
6. The nature of sectoral agreements 
The proposed sectoral agreements aimed at meeting the aforementioned 
requirements constitute legal instruments designed to adapt the general 
economic integration formulas and instruments to the particular conditions 
of specific branches of manufacturing industry, with a view to speeding up 
integration in the markets concerned, 
(a) Possible lines of approach 
The purpose of sectoral agreements is both to harmonize competitive 
conditions and to promote development of the sector of industry concerned. 
It would seem that all sectoral agreements should contain provisions 
relating to the two objectives, but in what proportion will depend a good 
deal on the approach adopted to the question, which may lay greater 
emphasis on one or the other. To take the two opposite extremes, for 
the sake of simplicity, two typical models of sectoral agreements might 
be described as follows: 
(i) Harmonization agreements^ which represent a set of rules designed 
to harmonize competitive conditions, institute free trade and 
establish the principle that comparative advantages should be 
the main consideration determining such trade flows; 
/(ii) Promotion 
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(ii) Promotion agreements» which relate primarily to the,.final 
results desired as regards investment distribution and the 
furthering of production and trade, with a view to "indicative 
programming" for the sector. 
In the first case, the prime objective of the provisions included 
in the agreements is to permit the free play of competition, without 
there necessarily being an express consensus of opinion among the 
signatories as to what are the desired results in respect of trade and 
of the regional distribution of investment. This is apparently the 
type of sectoral agreement which culminated in the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community, Although it included technical 
assistance and financing provisions in favour of enterprises which were 
expected to suffer from competition, they were in the nature of saving 
clauses designed to facilitate the transition to completely free 
competition, and did not reflect an active policy for investment and 
orientation of trade flows dictated by development considerations. In 
tiie European Coal and Steel Community treaty, attention is focused 
exclusively on the question of eliminating factors of distortion in 
price formation* with a view to establishing free and fair competition. 
And this gave rise to the obligation to observe a great many 'frules of . 
competition", designed to prevent discriminatory treatment in regard 
to transport rates, price fixing, etc. 
The second type of agreement is concerned with harmonization only 
as regards salient disparity or discrimination problems, • and devotes 
special attention to the establishment, of criteria and rules for 
consultation with a view, to correcting, a posteriori« such unfavourable 
trends as may appear in the sector1s development. These agreements 
include, as an essential factor, a set of technical and financial 
assistance provisions, in favour of countries that are harmed, by competition, 
owing to insufficient basic resources, limited markets or some other , 
initial shortcoming which can be mended by such provisions, and a region-
wide co-operative effort. 
The aims of these two types of sectoral agreement entail very . . 




harmonization agreement must establish not only formulas for the reduction 
of duties, but also detailed rules of competition and provisions for 
harmonizing structural features* The supervision of compliance with 
all those rules and provisions calls foi burdensome institutional machinery. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to. ensure that the increase in investment and 
trade due to market integration, even if all the rules of competition and 
harmonization provisions are fully and efficiently applied, will result in 
the well-balanced development of the whole region. Considerations bound 
up with external economies, with the lesser risk of investing in large 
markets that are not so dependent on exports, and with other factors, 
might give rise to some concern as to the results of an integration 
process based entirely on automatically operating machinery« 
Conversely, an agreement aimed at programming the development of a 
sector on the basis of specific commitments with respect to results (in 
the fields of investment and trade flows) within periods of five and 
ten years, could, dispense with rigid rules and provisions, at least in 
the early stages, establishing ad hoc consultation machinery for the 
solution of difficulties and the adoption of any remedial measures that 
might prove necessary. This seems to be the best type of sectoral 
agreement under present conditions in Latin America. 
These agreements stand out because of their pragmatic character 
and the way in which they subordinate trade policy formulas to certain 
development criteria, 
(b) The pragmatic element in sectoral agreements 
Sectoral agreements are a method of obtaining the advantages and 
solving the difficulties described in the foregoing paragraphs on the 
basis of commitments over and above those generally applicable, which 
are negotiated. pragmatically in accordance with the specific circumstances 
of each sector. The reduction of internal customs tariffs is carried 
beyond the targets (particularly the ceiling) which form part of the 
formula applied in general. The pertinent objectives are established 
in line with regional cost conditions for the products of the sector 
concerned — especially the disparities between one country and another, 
and in some cases between enterprises — and also with the possibilities 
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of salvaging the inefficient segment of the. industry, its size, and. the' 
period within which the inevitable changes would have to be introduced. 
The common external tariff is also, established in terms of the minimum 
required to prevent the deflection of intra-regional trade flows and to 
eliminate any disequilibria in basic competitive conditions that might 
result from marked differences in the import duties levied on raw 
materials and parts and spares from third countries. The margin of 
difference between external and internal tariffs, which is compatible 
with an increase in intra-regional trade on a normal competitive footing, 
varies in each case, and is closely related to the internal -tariff 
levels, maintained. The more headway it is desired to make in,, the ; 
#reduction of internal tariffs, the more necessary .it will be to establish 
a single external tariff» Moreover,, this whole question is greatly 
influenced by the expected intensity of intra-regional trade, the unit 
value of the typical products of the sector and the effect of existing 
and foreseeable transport costs.on such products. 
However, competitive conditions are not exclusively the result of 
the, tariff framework within which trade is conducted. The sometimes 
widely differing practices that prevail in each country in , respect of 
foreign capital have a strong impact on. the pattern of investment and, 
therefore, on the generation of new trade flows. The same applies, to 
tax systems, . policies for subsidizing and promoting new activities, 
and so •forth*. The reconciliation of policies connected therewith, 
which would be very difficult on a general plane,-over the short or 
medium term, becomes feasible when action is taken within narrow limits, 
care being taken to avoid very specific problems which can be identified 
or foreseen in each sector. This effort to interpret the minimum 
essential requisites for the advance of integration in a given sector 
constitutes the pragnatic element in sectoral agreements® .. 
Another of their salient features is that trade policy measures 
and action designed to promote, development are adopted simultaneously* 
Or rather, the impl«mentation of provisions for the liberalization of. 
trade is, in fact, subordinate to certain criteria, and commitments 
bound up with the development and structure of the sector concerned. 




(c) I M ^ ^ ^ M J ' ^ sectoy.al^pproach 
There now arises the problem of' standardizing the criteria applied 
to the different branches of industry in a sectoral approach. Uniform 
bases for competition are gradually established for each separate sector 
of industry, and formulas, instruments and commitments are adapted 
pragmatically to the conditions prevailing therein, while some account 
is also taken of the varying entrepreneurial attitudes to integration. 
The tax systems of the various member countries, their policies, and 
the treatments they accorded to capital and enterprises owned by third 
countries, would be standardized or reconciled - within certain limits -
for each separate sector of industry, in line with different criteria 
in each case. If this pragmatic system is followed of seeking the minimum 
commitments required for the integration of each sector, the nature and 
degree of harmonization attained might be very different between one sector 
and another. 
Such a procedure would entail the risk of splitting up the regional 
economy into other watertight compartments and replacing the distortions 
between countries by sectoral distortions. That would be tantamount to 
replacing one problem by another, and at the end of a long and difficult 
process of sectoral integration a real Latin Merican economic community 
would still be far away. 
Certain precautions will have to be taken to avert this danger. 
In the first place, sectoral agreements should be prepared for a fairly 
large number of sectors representing a considerable proportion of total 
manufacturing industry. In addition, they should be drawn up and 
negotiated simultaneously or within a fairly short span. This will 
permit an over-all view of the situation and enable relatively uniform 
criteria to be applied to each sector in relation to the essential 
degree of harmonization and the method of attaining it© 
Secondly, sectoral agreements should fit into an over-all framework 
of customs tariff commitments and harmonization of policies relating to 
the economy as a whole. These general commitments cannot progress far 
in the early stages, during which the specifically sectoral commitments 




the general commitments will have to become gradually heavier and mor© 
specific, which will progressively reduce the margin for variation and 
disparity of the sectoral commitments 0 To accomplish this aim, the 
final objectives of integration will have to be established right from 
the start; in other words, it vail be necessary to ensure that the 
particular measures devised in subsequent stages will, converge towards 
a final specific target. 
Structure and characteristics of a model sectoral agreement 
The salient points regarding the definition of a sectoral agreement 
are described above, the next step being to analyse more thoroughly the 
modes of applying such agreements and the characteristics they show in 
operation. The study'will cover the following questions: definition of 
the sector and its geographical sphere of application; the structure in 
outline of a model sectoral agreement; a salient feature of its structure 
relating to investment and technical assistance programmes; and the 
application of the most-favoured-nation clause, 
(a) Definition of the sector and its geographical scope 
It would be advisable, in principle, for sectoral agréments to 
b© drawn up and signed by all countries members of the common market 
and to apply to broad sectors of industry rather than to individual 
products or groups of products. In this way there would be more 
assurance that the agreements would be conducive to the general 
harmonization of conditions of competition, without distinctions as 
to countries or branches of industry, which is the final aim of 
integration. However, to adhere rigidly to this procedure would mean 
limiting the scope of the practical liberalization and harmonization 
provisions which might be included in those agreements. De facto 
circumstances relating to the unequal development levels of the Latin 
American countries also counsel that consideration be given to 
agreements of more limited scope, both in the geographical sense and 
as regards the products covered. 
The first problem that arises concerns the relatively less developed 
countries. There is no denying that there is a definite tendency to 
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concentrate certain, important industries in the larger Latin American 
countries and that this might render integration in some sectors less 
attractive to the countries concerned« Accordingly, a determined effort 
should be made to ascertain the feasibility of sub-regional agreements 
between the small and medium-sized countries, followed by their integration 
with the major countries. 
Sub-regional integration projects, based on an ad hoc, product 
by product approach, (or in relation to sub-branches within each main 
branch of industry), would constitute a method of achieving faster 
progress in.some directions and, provided they were subject to far-sighted 
regulations, they could be compatible with final integration aims. Such 
sub-regional integration projects should be accompanied by a gradual , 
reciprocal opening up of the markets of country groups so established, 
with a view to. establishing free competition throughout the region. 
Secondly, there are many cases where the capacity of existing 
industries is not fully utilized, which might make it advisable to 
provide for the complete abolition of customs duties for short periods. 
Concessions of that, kind could play a major part in ensuring that capacity 
is used to the full, without requiring the country according them to . 
adopt any final, decision, regarding its future structure of production. 
Such agreements, however, should be advocated only when there are major 
obstacles to more permanent concessions between countries, and once they 
have lapsed, customs tariffs and other trade restrictions should be 
restored at a level not higher than that determined by the application of 
the general system for reducing tariffs * 
Lastly, account should be taken of the interest displayed by many 
of the Latin American countries in developing a broad range of basic 
production lines, even in some extreme cases of small-scale operation 
and high costs, with the object of attaining a well-balanced structure 
of industry or of accumulating external savings in favour of other 
activities, thereby creating exceptional situations within the broad 
schemes of regional specialization. 
The foregoing considerations appear to show that it would not be 




to the whole range of products of each individual branch of industry. 
On the contrary, some thought might be given to defining different 
integration procedures for given groups of products in each branch of 
industry, according to their specific characteristics as to magnitude 
of economic scale of operation in relation to the size of the domestic 
markets, the incidence of raw materials in production costs, the 
geographical distribution of resources, etc. There would be no reason 
for such procedures to give rise to a great many integration agreements 
by products and by groups of countries, since the same sectoral agreement 
with respect to a complete branch of industry, and to all the countries 
members of the integration area, could specify the different rules to be 
applied in each case, that is, to specific products and groups of products 
and to the sub-regional groupings concerned« 
It seems essential to establish all sectoral agreements in two 
stagest the period of transition during which industry would be reorganized 
and would prepare to operate on a competitive footing, and integration 
proper when competition would be full-fledged. The duration of the 
transition stage and the procedures used therein would in some respects 
depend on the rules established in the general formula adopted by the 
Latin American countries to strengthen the economic integration process; 
during this phase the countries concerned should be provided with the 
technical and financial assistance they need to be able to introduce the 
necessary adjustments in their industries with a view to-making them more 
efficient and competitive. To that effect, an agency specialized in the 
study and application of such assistance measures should be in operation 
by the time agreements for the regional integration of industries begin 
to be implemented» 
In short, it might be said that: 
(i) The member countries, in adopting the provisions concerning 
the new stage in the process of forming a common market, would undertake 
to negotiate with one another and to conclude, in the course of the 
ensuing five years, integration agreements relating to a limited number 
of major branches of industry;. the branches specifically listed would 
represent a minimal commitment, it being desirable to prepare and negotiate 




(ii) The minimum list of industries could consist of the following: 
steel, aluminium, copper, pulp and paper, fertilizers, alkalis, petro-
chemicals, heavy industrial equipment (for the aforementioned sectors 
and other basic industries), transport material (for road, railway and 
water-borne transport)> machine-tools, textile machinery, energy 
generating equipment, mining equipment, tractors and agricultural 
machinery, road-making equipment, and textiles* 
(iii) Sectoral agreements would cover major branches of industry 
instead of individual products or limited groups of products; nevertheless, 
such agreements could establish different rules for separate products or 
groups of products; 
(iv) The agreements would be approved by the member countries and 
would be binding upon all of them, although there might be special rules 
for sub-regional groups with respect to a certain product or groups of 
products, or even the whole industry; 
(v) The provisions of sub-regional scope might or might not require 
exceptions to the most-favoured-nation clause| regulations covering such 
exceptions will be dealt with later; 
(vi) Sub-regional agreements, or agreements relating to products 
or limited groups of products, could be concluded over and above a 
general sectoral agreement, even if the parties had not undertaken to 
prepare a sectoral agreement within the initial five-year period of the 
new phase of integration« 
(b) Structure of a model sectoral agreement 
The main feature of a sectoral agreement would be its adaptation 
to the specific conditions and difficulties of a particular branch of 
industry and, in this respect, there could not be two identical sectoral 
agreements* None the less, they must all have the same structure. The 
principal characteristics of a model sectoral agreement would be: 
(i) A development programme for the sector throughout the region, 
designed to indicate the framework for the evaluation of trade development 
and industry location trends, investment needs, etc., in successive years, 





(il) An investment programme, i,e#, an estimate of the investment 
needed if the branch of industry is" to grow in line with the assumptions 
of the above-mentioned sample programme, and also of that required to 
eradicate or correct the weaknesses of certain countries òr enterprises 
as regards intra-regional competition, according to the diagnosis of the 
industry prepared and included in the development programme; 
(iii) A technical assistance programme parallel with the investment 
programme, aimed at helping the competitors that are likely to suffer most 
when intra-regional competition is'intensified, describing the procedures^ 
areas of application and manpower and financial resources needed; 
(iv) A programme for the reduction of internal customs duties over and 
above the targets established in the general formula, as consistent with 
the specific conditions obtaining in the industry itself; and procedures 
for applying the safeguard clause in case of maladjustments in existing 
concerns, adapted to the particular conditions of the industry in question 
(for example, liberalization by means of quotas as applied to a growing 
proportion of the market); 
(v) A programme 'aimed pragmatically at standardizing the external 
tariff in so far as it is strictly necessary to prevent distortions in 
competitive conditions .'and shifts in trade flows, in the light "of the 
particular conditions ruling in the branch of industry concerned; 
(vi) A set of commitments for the reconciliation of certain aspects 
of economic policy which carry most weight in the branch of industry 
considered (systems of incentives to industry or regulations governing 
foreign capital and enterprises, tax provisions, etc»), representing 
the indispensable minimum to avoid obvious distortions; and consultation 
machinery to mitigate the difficulties that might arise in this connexion 
in future, since it is'deemed very difficult to establish rulings, a priori. 
for all the action called for without the risk of carrying the arduous 
task of reconciliation beyond the limits of future practical requirements; 
(vii) A set of provisions concerning the use of exceptions to the 
most-favoured-nation clause admitted in the general formula, favouring the 




the sample plan prepared for the sector; that is, provisions relating 
specifically to countries at a relatively less advanced (and medium) 
stage of economic development. 
(viii) Measures for the practical implementation of the provisions and 
programmes included in the sectoral agreement, use being made of the 
institutional mechanisms of the common market (the Board and the Promotion 
Agency) and other instruments which might be created especially for the 
sector concerned (producers* counsels or advisory boards for consultation 
regarding the harmonization of conditions for inflows of foreign capital, 
etc.); as a matter of general policy, it might be as. well in the early 
stages to have recourse exclusively to the general organs of the Treaty 
in the way of permanent bodies, and to accept new sectoral agencies or 
mechanisms only on a consultation or advisory basis, 
(c) Investment and technical assistance programmes 
A sectoral agreement should comprise, as an integral part of the 
commitments and provisions relating to the sector, an investment programme 
in which the capital needed to expand the industry1s capacity during the 
period covered by the agreement would be estimated in accordance with the 
growth targets and projections of demand. These estimates would cover the 
whole of the industry and all the countries members of the common market, 
and would discriminate in favour of investments designed to improve the 
competitive position of particular countries or groups of enterprises. 
The investment required for the sector1s growth would be decided by 
the countries concerned and financed essentially by the national and 
international resources which each country and the region as a whole are 
able to Kcbilize/ It would be as well, however, if a proportion of the 
investment were the joint responsibility of all parties to the agreement. 
This proportion would be earmarked directly for eliminating the outstanding 
weaknesses in the structure of the industry concerned, in one or more 
countries, which would constitute an obstacle to increasing competition 
or might bring about serious disruptions in existing industry* In other 
words, it would be advisable that the investment designed to remedy 
shortcomings in the structure of the industry concerned - the rapid 




of means of production to other manufacturing lines, the modernization of 
installations and equipment or the introduction of more advanced 
techniques - should constitute a joint responsibility, in the sense that 
the relevant international financing should be. negotiated with the support 
of all parties to the agreement, and- that the application of the 
commitments to reduce customs tariffs in those countries whose position 
had been recognized in the sectoral agreement as being disadvantageous 
and meriting technical and financial assistance should be conditional 
upon the prior or simultaneous investment envisaged, 
. This point may be illustrated through the broad outline of a 
possible investment programme for the steel industry, as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. Given the preliminary and illustrative 
character of this,description, no discrimination was made between 
investment for promoting the industry's normal growth and that needed to 
improve the competitive position of certain countries. However, attention 
has been drawn to the likely problems that would need to be solved by 
means of additional investment and technical assistance in order to reach 
the stage of complete tariff liberalization in the steel industry. The 
investment programme predominates over the technical assistance programme 
in this sector, although a large proportion of the funds envisaged are 
earmarked for improving the industry's techniques and operational 
efficiency. 
In other.industries, including textiles, technical assistance for 
improving their internal organization and operational efficiency would 
be at least as. important as the remedial investment. The latter would be 
used for replacing obsolete machinery, which exists in very high 
proportions in several countries of.the region, but if proper use is to 
be made of the new machinery, far-reaching and lasting action will be 
required for the complete modernization of working methods in regard,to 
the organization of production, control of productivity and operation of 
the equipment, etc. On the other hand, the need to obviate a mass shift 
of manpower ¿LS A result of the replacement of machinery, if carried out 
on a large scale and with a high level of automation̂ . urges th©t its 




For all the above reasons, the technical assistance programme aimed at 
raising the industry's standards of operational efficiency should be 
the main instrument used to place the textile industry on a sound 
footing with regard to regional competition, In other sectors which, 
like textiles, have a high level of manpower absorption and low levels 
of internal organisation, more attention could justifiably be paid to 
technical assistance than to additional investment. 
Lastly, mention should be made of the important role which the 
joint financing of regional factories by several countries could play 
in sectoral agreements. One of the conclusions of the Latin American 
Seminar on the. Integrated Development of the Chemical Industry (Caracas, 
December 1964)^ convened by ECLA and the United Nations Bureau of 
Technical Assiètance Operations (BTAO), is that the removal of obstacles 
to trade in the ¡nain chemical products should be accompanied by schemes 
for the expansion of production in the best possible locations, through 
large regional factories whose capital was financed jointly by the 
principal consumer countries. To sum up, it would be a question of 
opening up the markets to imports from other countries of the region, 
while at the same time establishing multi-national enterprises backed 
by intra-regional financing, to cope with the new large-scale manufacturing 
output for export. In principle, the contribution of capital from each 
country would consist of its own public or private resources. In practice, 
however, given the shortage of capital in nearly all the countries 
concerned, in all probability the contribution of importing countries 
would have to be financed by international credit. This conclusion seems 
to be equally applicable to other branches of industry, and is perfectly 
in keeping with the investment programme of a sectoral agreement, 
(d) Exceptions to the most-favoured-nation clause 
The rules governing the non-extension to third countries of the 
concessions agreed upon in sectoral agreements between groups of countries 
might be summed up briefly as follows; 
(i) In the case of products manufactured by industries not included 
in the list of sectors for which the Latin American countries had undertaken 
to negotiate sectoral agreements proper in the first five years, the said 
/countries would 
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countries would be free to conclude between one another any sub-regional 
agreement that might be in their interests, without application of the 
most-favoured-nation clause to the countries members of the common market 
but no parties to the agreement^ and without the need for the approval 
of those countries through the organs of integration; the establishment 
of such sub-regional commitments would require only the observance of 
certain rules "calculated to make the commitments in question converge 
towards the final target of a common market; 
(ii) As regards products manufactured by industries classified as 
being subject to the negotiation of sectoral agreements of regional scope, 
countries would also be free to enter into sub-regional agreements, 
provided they agreed to the extension of the concessions arranged between 
them to third countries of the region; the opinion of the Board would 
be required if sub-regional commitments should in any way conflict with 
the sectoral agreement in course of preparation for the same branch of 
industry; however, its opinion would not be essential to the entry into 
force of sub-regional agreements of this kind; ' 
(iii) For the products of basic industries, for which sectoral 
agreements were being prepared, the approval of the competent community 
institutions would be required wherever the countries parties to the 
sub-regional agreement wished to be absolved from extending the most-
favoured-nation clause to other member countries, 
A set of rules of this type tirould apparently reconcilè the possibility 
of sub-regional agreements with sufficient incentive for countries 
preferably to negotiate and enter into region-wide sectoral agreements 
in relation to the most important branches of industry» 
In the case of sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii), once the region-wide 
sectoral agreements were concluded ànd approved, thè sub-regional 
commitments that had entered into force for the products or groups of 
products of the same branch of industry would be embodied in those 
agreements in the form of spécial rules or provisions of more limited 
scope» In other words, the sub-regional agreements relating to products 
would retain their individuality only until such time as the agreements 
for the whole region and branch of industry entered into effect. Once the 
/general agreements 
E/CN. 12/728 
Page 144 ; 
general agreements were signed, the sub-regional agreements would be 
incorporated in them» The compatibility between them would be assured 
from the start by the rules referred to above. 
Lastly, it would be useful to establish certain conditions for 
the compulsory implementation of sub-regional agreements, in order to 
ensure their ultimate reconciliation with the general integration targets 
and commitments and to prevent them from becoming merely provision? for 
the reciprocal reservation of markets in small groups of countries, or 
even understandings confined to products of exclusive concern to a single 
enterprise or consortium of enterprises, with no real integration alms. 
Preparation and implementation of sectoral agreements 
Programmes for the regionally integrated development of major branches 
of industry, like the sectoral agreements described above, require careful 
and necessarily slow preparation on the basis of a considerable quantity 
of technical and economic data concerning the position of the industry 
concerned in each country, its growth prospects and each country's 
capacity for developing it. The preparation of such technical data would 
require the establishment of a specialized body, such as an investment 
development agency. 
The. preparation of sectoral agreements for each of the industries 
agreed on, to be submitted for negotiation by Governments, represents a 
gigantic task, given the complex nature of the agreements, the need to 
accumulate and analyse a huge quantity of data, and the geographical area 
covered by the work. A very comprehensive study would have to be made of 
the existing situation and the factors conditioning the future development 
and geographical location of each industry, and the necessary technical 
and economic data - usually not easily available - would have to be 
collected and processed before such draft agreements could take shape. 
Because of the need for the negotiation to be carried out on such lines as 
to cover several sectors of industry at once, so as to facilitate a well-, 
balanced distribution of the advantages among the participating countries, 
the task of preparing the relevant data would have to be accomplished on 




The many studies ECLA has carried out on industry in the last few 
years, and the recent intensification of those studies through the 
establishment of the Joint ECLA/H\J"ST/IDB Programme on Integration of 
t Industrial Development, sponsored by ECLA, the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), have resulted in the accumulation of valuable data and 
diagnoses on the steel, aluminium.,. chemical, pulp and paper, basic 
industry equipment, machine-tools, textile machinery and textile 
industries. These studies, most of them well advanced, provide a 
useful point of departure for the action required '¿r^ 
Once the provisional versions of the sectoral agreements relating 
to a certain number of industries were ready, thfe Board would consider 
them in the light of general integration mechanisms and commitments. 
After introducing the amendments or additions it thought fit, it would 
submit them for the consideration of the member countries* 
15/ The report Los principales sectores de la industria latinoamericanas 
problemas y perspectivas, op^cit., contains a summary of those 
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Chapter VIII 
TRANSPORT IN RELATION TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Introduction 
Transport and communications constitute an essential basis for economic 
integration, since their function is to overcome the obstacle of distance and 
enable goods, people and knowledge to circulate freely. Every market 
presupposes a transport and communications systen* and this requisite is 
all the more indispensable in the case of a common market. 
In several of the Latin American countries the transport networks are so 
deficient in many respects that they represent a serious obstacle to economic 
development» From the regional standpoint, the situation is still more 
unsatisfactory. With the exception of the Central American area, where 
international overland transport enjoys a measure of relative importance, 
Latin Ame:cica*s transport system is virtually confined to shipping» By sea, 
and by international inland waterways, whose relative importance is slight, 
the Latin American countries carry on almost the whole of their reciprocal 
trade, the volume of which accounts for barely one-fifth of the regions total 
foreign trade. Of this proportion, 70 per cent corresponds to liquid fuels; 
Hie predominance of maritime transport in intra-regional traffic is 
symptomatic of the way in which economic activities are concentrated in 
isolated centres along the seaboard of the continent. 
The structure of the national networks also reflects this characteristic 
of the Latin American economies, inasmuch as roads and railways converge 
on the coastal centres, and such few international overland routes as exist 
make no major contribution to the geographical integration of the region, as 
they often cross areas that are marginal to the economic activity of some of 
the more developed countries, or link these with the countries at less 
advanced stages of development, 
k basic requisite for the economic integration of Latin America, 
especially if the long view is taken, is the gradual establishment of a 
continental transport and communications network that will join up all the 
countries of the region. For various reasons, however, including the long 
distances involved, a leading role will still devolve on maritime transport, 
which means that it is essential to improve port facilities and supplement 
/them with 
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them with an adequate network of international overland routes. Despite 
the progress made in recent years, there are still not enough international 
highways; and inter-country rail connexions, too, are few and far between, 
or even, over vast.areas, non-existent* Furthermore, advantage should 
be taker) of Latin America's inland waterway traffic potential, and optimum, 
air transport, postal and telecommunications services should be established. 
The availability of a satisfactory transport network, with low costs 
and good-quality infrastructure and services, would improve existing 
conditions with respect to economies of scale, especially for the new 
industries that will have to be established during the next few years at 
the multinational level; it would facilitate access to raw materials and 
to markets, and would influence all the factors that determine the location 
of industries. It would also be equally important for the more rational 
distribution of agricultural production in the region. 
Concurrently with the gradual establishment of a regional transport and 
communications network, Governments would have to adopt decisions aimed at 
ensuring optimum joint utilization of international routes, including 
arrangements to eliminate possible discrimination in respect of transport 
rates and conditions, as well as transport cost and tariff practices that 
might introduce artificial distortions in competition among producers in 
the various countries of the region. 
1, Transport in theT Latin American Free-Trade Area and, in the 
, Central American common market area 
The experience of ALALC in the field of transport may usefully be 
reviewed in broad outline, as well as the progress made in this respect 
under the Central American economic integration movement0 
The Montevideo Treaty contains no provisions relating to transport. 
Nevertheless, because of the vital importance of shipping routes in 
regional trade, the Conference of the Contracting Parties and the Standing 
Exëcutive Committee of ALALC have been interesting themselves during' the 
last few years in the development of the mercantile marines of the member 




greater flexibility, and the shortcomings of the region's seaports-
In compliance with a resolution adopted by the Conference of the Contracting 
Parties, the Advisory Committee on Transport of ALALC prepared, for 
consideration by the Governments, a preliminary draft of a general agreement 
on maritime, river and lake transporté 
Certain reservations and objections with respect to this preliminary 
draft have been formulated by several of the signatories of the Montevideo 
Treaty, and it is at present being discussed by the Governments of the ALALC 
countries. At the Fourth Conference of the Contracting Parties of ALALC 
(Bogotá, 1 9 6 4it was agreed that a meeting at the governmental level should 
be held in order to analyse.the various aspects of the Association's 
waterborne-transport policy, on which occasion the final text of the proposed 
agreement is expected to be drawn up« This meeting is to take place early 
in May 1965o 
Under the terms of the draft agreement, SO per cent of intra-ALALC trade 
cargo is reserved on a bilateral basiá, for the two countries between which 
the trade flow is generated; of the remaining 20 per cent, 10 per cent would 
be distributed on a multilateral basis among the regular shipping lines of 
all the countries members of ALALC, and the other 10 per cent among the 
regular shipping lines of ALALC countries and of third (including extra-
regional) countries. 
Despite the initial concession, limited to the application of the 
multilateral principle in relation to the mercantile marines of all the 
ALALC countries, the essentially bilateral character of the draft agreement 
is hard to reconcile with the multilateralism that should prevail in a free-
trade area and still more in a common market* De facto» the draft text tends 
to crystallize the existing situation. Apart from the fact that for various 
technical reasons its provisions would be difficult to apply in practice, 
the principal disadvantages of bilateralism in this field consist in the 
excessive splitting-up of a volume of cargo which is already tiny enough, 
and the consequent under-utilizaticn of available hold space, which has an 




rates on certain routes would rise too high. Moreover, the essentially . 
bilateral character referred to may lead to discrimination in intra-Area 
transport among the ALALC countries and their merchant shipping. ' 
As regards the Central American common market, attention may be drawn 
to article XV of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, 
under the terms of which the signatories undertake to ensure full freedom 
of transit through their territory, subject to no discrimination or quantita-
tive restrictions, for goods proceeding to or from the other signatory States, 
as well as for the vehicles transporting these goods. 
In view of the vital importance of a regional infrastructure, the Central 
American countries adopted, in September 1963, for the purposes of the 
integration and development of the area, an over-all plan for the improvement 
and construction of a regional network of 13 international highways, linking 
up all the countries, and representing a total investment of 73 million 
dollars. This network will be nearly 5$ 200 kilometres long in all; more 
than half is already paved, and all-weather roads constitute a substantial 
proportion of the remainder. 
In respect of air transport, a Central American corporation has been set 
up to improve traffic conditions, and pl&ns are afoot for the creation of a 
Central American airline consortium, which will involve a considerable saving 
on equipment and administrative overhead. 
In May 1964* the Governments concerted a draft agreement for the 
establishment of a regional telecommunications system> which will necessitate 
investment amounting to about 7 million dollars. Study is at present being 
devoted to the possibility of adapting the network as proposed in the draft 
to a system with broader specifications that will permit of inter-connexion 
with the rest of the Americas, . . . 
2. Other undertakings relating to regional transport problems 
Of great significance for the 'future- is the growing interest that is 
being displayed in Government and other circles in transport problems and 
their importance for the economic integration of the .regign. 
/The chief 
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The chief manifestations of this interest include the establishment 
of the Latin American Association of Shipowners (ALAMAR), in July 19&3, the 
creation, in March 1964, of a Latin American Association of Railways. Other 
of recent date and worthy of mention are the conclusions of a meeting of the 
Argentine-Chilean Commission on Economic Integration, held in Santiago early 
in 1965, the report of an Inter-American Development Bank mission on the 
integration of Colombia and Venezuela; and the stepping-up of efforts and 
the progress of the studies in connexion with the construction of the C arret era 
Marginal Bolivariana de la Selva, The Governments of Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay have also signed agreements at the ministerial level granting reciprocal 
facilities to simplify frontier formalities for loaded lorries from the 
signatory countries« 
3« Transport in relation to the acceleration of the economic 
integration of the region 
— W I — l i l m i » » m i l l !• » i w o — t m m l a w w A ^ — M « 
The acceleration of the region's economic integration process calls for 
the adoption and execution - by the Governments and by the competent regional 
agencies - of a whole body of measures and commitments in the field of transport. 
The transport measures which should be studied and applied to this end are 
sketched out below. The measures and commitments that could be adopted by 
Governments, and the studies that could be carried out by the appropriate 
agencies, are analysed separately and in succession, 
(a) Measures and commitments for a new phase 
The primary objective of such measures would be to minimize transport 
obstacles to the full implementation of the set of commitments assumed in other 
fields and sectors, and to establish sounder bases for more complete economic 
integration in the next phase. The measures outlined are dictated by a 
spirit of flexible progressiveness, and would also be of special importance 
in relation to sectoral agreements in specific basic industries and 
to the situation of the countries at less advanced stages of development, 
whose position is particularly unfavourable in respect of transport. Where 
maritime transport is concerned, the measures proposed have already been the 
subject of lengthy discussion in ALAL3, the outcome of which has been the 
formulation of a preliminary draft agreement on maritime, river and lake 




acme that have already been introduced in other parts of the world, 
particularly in Europe, where they were adopted even before the formation 
of the Common Market« 
(i) Maritime transport. A regional pact or agreement on maritime 
transport should be adopted in the near future to which all the Latin American 
countries could accede. It should be based, as was suggested a propos 
of .What is happening in ALALC's case, on the multilateral principle of the 
free, although organized, participation of all the Latin American mercantile 
marines in intra-regional traffic. However, the rapid and unconditional 
application of this principle might give rise to difficult problems in 
connexion with the competitive position and the relative operational cost 
levels of the various national merchant fleets, and with the assistance, 
subsidies, and other concessions which these are accorded in seme countries. 
In such circumstances, provision should be made, bu virtue of the principle 
of progressivesss, for the gradual enlargement of the proportion of intra-
regional cargo reserved on a multilateral basis for all the Latin American 
mercantile marines, until by the end of the intermediate phase a very high 
percentage had been reached. This would give plenty of opportunity to adopt 
the measures of adaptation and co-ordination.that in the course of time 
would be needed in this field. 
Another problem calling for long-term studies - although they would 
not cover the whole of the intermediate period - is that of fixing the 
aggregate proportion of intra-regional traffic which should be reserved 
for the Latin American mercantile marines, and, correlatively, the proportion 
that should be left open to the merchant shipping of third countries not 
belonging to the region. This raises the complex problem of the degree of 
protection that the mercantile marines would need in order to ensure their 
optimum development. The allocation of too small a share to the merchant 
shipping of third countries might - as has already been objected in 
connexion with ALALC*s existing draft agreement - produce adverse effects on 
freight levels in Latin Americans trade relations with other parts of the 
world. It would be impossible to deal with this problem, however, without 




adoption of the multilateral principle that all the Latin American mercantile 
marines should participate in intra-regional traffic® 
In addition, the agreement should include certain other provisions, 
notably those bearing on questions which were discussed at length during 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development» They would relate, 
in particular, to the organization of consultation machinery whereby close 
co-operation could be established at the regional level between shippers 
and the liner conferences and shipping companies. Such a system, besides 
giving shippers complaints a hearing would be an essential instrument 
for extensive co-operation and consultation on all matters connected with 
shipping services and freight, especially in so far as they affected the 
development of intra-regional trade and the contribution of maritime 
transport in this field. 
The ECtA Trade Committee, at its fourth session (November, 1964) 
endorsed the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and recommended to the Governments of the Latin American countries 
that, as a first step, they should adopt forthwith the measures needed to 
establish the system of consultation referred to above. The Committee also 
recommended that the Governments should establish, at the Government level, 
with the participation of shippers and associations of national shippers, 
"units to study problems of maritime transport" and freight, which would 
meet regularly to report on the progress of their work, exchange, information 
and co-ordinate their activities, and would be able to call on "toe advice 
and assistance of the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, 
Although these measures cover maritime transport as a whole, both 
intra-regional and extra-regional, they are of particular importance in 
relation to the former* 
The relevant resolution of the Conference on Trade and Development also 
laid considerable emphasis on the incidence of cargo handling costs ' - . 
(including the cost of ship*s time spent in port) on the total cost of 
maritime transport. The shortcomings of many Latin American ports are well 
known, and all the countries of the region should therefore pledge themselves 
to make in the next few yeatrs, a resolute and co-ordinated effort to 
/jpodernize ports 
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modernize ' ports' and'rationalize port opêrati<>ns:>\,Wvlth.;.1bhe. ̂requisite-. . 
international aid and financing, as well as the. technical assistance, 
envisaged in the resolution referred to« The matter had already been taken 
up, on the same lines, in a resolution adopted at Punta del Este. 
Lastly, the 'Governments of the region should undertake to expedite 
the execution of a'series-of measures, already recommended in broad outline 
by ALALC, to facilitate regional maritime transport and endow it with greater 
flexibility. These measures would include some relating to the simplification 
and standardization of clearance papers for inbound and outbound ships * 
* . * 
(ii) Internationa,l hrailways^ The progressive implementation of 
the various regional trade commitments may. lead to a considerable expansion 
of international rail transport, especially' in the southern tip of South 
America, where such few international railway cpnsiexions as Latin America 
possesses are concentrated. The present almost negligible volume of traffic 
on these lines means that -they are really under-utilized, and could carry a 
good deal more without its entailing much investment, although in several 
cases they might have to be modernized or reconditioned to some extent. 
Projects might be formulated for the financing of these requirements through 
IDB or under the programmes of the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, an 
increase in the traffic on the lines in question would itself improve the 
economic situation of the railways and therefore facilitate their technical 
and physical reconditioning. Thus great interest would attach, and in 
several instances high priority should be assigned, to a specific study 
on the state of the existing international railways and their needs in respect 
of reconditioning and modernization, with a view to their adaptation to the 
requirements of an accelerated regional integration process. 
In the railway sector, a number of problems also arise in relation to 
government promotion of technical, administrative and commercial co-operation 
among the railway companies possessing international lines, with the aim 
of improviing the quality of: the services provided, facilitating the 
expansion of international traffic through greater flexibility•in every 
respect - including administrative and customs formalities -, and reducing 
/operational costs 
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operational costs and rail fares. Particular attention should be devoted 
to rail tariffs for basic industries covered by sectoral and complementarity 
agreements» 
It would therefore be an excellent thing for Governments to push 
co-operation in this field during the intermediate phase. Such action 
could be channelled through the newly-created Latin American Association 
of Railways (Asociación Latinoamericana de Ferrocarriles - ALAF). This 
may be regarded as the embryo of a Latin American organization similar to 
the International Union of Railways (Union International des Chemins de 
fer — UIC), which has its headquarters in Paris, and even before the time 
of the Common Market played a considerable part in the work of developing 
and facilitating international rail traffic in Europe. 
Furthermore, in conformity with the principles of progressivesss 
governing the advance towards a Latin American commom market, provision 
should be made, even in the intermediate phase, for the elimination of 
discriminatory practices that might interfere with the application of the 
projected trade measures. Discrimination of the kind referred to would 
result, for instance, from differential tariff rates depending on the 
country of origin or destination of the goods transported, A similar 
difficulty would be created by special development or support rates which 
might perhaps hamper the implementation of sectoral agreements in respect 
of basic industries.» But for the less developed countries, recourse to 
such rates - in order, for instance, to encourage their intra-regional 
exports - might constitute a wise and equitable measure* It seems desirable, 
in any event, that provision should be made for such discriminatory practices 
and special tariffs to be submitted to the consideration of the institutional 
agencies of the common market, which would be empowered to make recommendations 
to Governments with respect to their compatibility with the requirements of 
the Free-Trade Area and of the prospective common market. 
(iii) International highways and motor-vehicle transport. Similar 
considerations apply to the potential expansion and the possible means of 
encouraging and facilitating international highway traffic, of which there 
is at present very little in Latin America, except among the Central American 
countries. Although several countries are already concerning themselves with 
/this problem 
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this problem or. have,̂ adopted measures to improve the operation of inters : 
national serviceŝ  :els®where international traffic is still carried on . 
in distinctly unfavourable conditions, since the compulsory trans-shipment 
of cargo at the: frontier swells the costs of international transport and 
burdens it with a number'of other disadvantages. ..•*•• . . 
Among the feasible commitments in this field that should be envisaged 
for the intermediate phase, the following deserve special mentions 
The conclusion of the pacts or agreements, at the regional level, 
needed to facilitate/and increase the flexibility of., the customs, 
administrative and other traffic formalities to which.motor-vehicle 
transport is subject at' frontiers; 
The establishment of uniform standards and regulations applicable to 
vehicles in transit (covering, inter alia4 technical requisites, 
weight, and dimensions)- and to the' drivers of international-service 
motor Vehicles;^ . • • - -
The adoption of'measures' to"improve operating conditions in inter-
national services and ensure that- a fair share in intra-regional traffic 
"is available to the transport enterprises of the countries concerned. 
In this connexion, it would be as well to bear in mind the relevant -
provisions adopted by the European countries, on the basis of resolutions, 
pacts and agreements concerted within the Economic Commission for Europe ' 
and the European Economic Community. The special conditions prevailing 
in latin America would of course have to'be carefully taken into account, . 
including the fact that because of: the vast distances to be covered, 
international traffic would be circumscribed for a considerable length 
of time to groups of neighbouring countries and frontier areas, especially 
in South America» Hence several aspects of international motor-vehicle 
transport might be the subject of agreements and arrangements concerted 
on a bilateral or area basis, but in'conformity with principles that would 
1/ These matters were dealt with in the Convention on Road Traffic signed 
by the United Nation's Conference on Road and Motor Transport at Geneva 
in 194?» It was ratified by only nine Latin American countries: 
.Argentina, Chile, Ciiba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, 




be the same far the whole of Latin America.—' Progressiveness and flexibility 
would.be particularly to-the point in'-this field,'as it often happens that 
only experience can reveal the possible stumbling-blocks and lay down 
guidelines for progressive-, liberalization agreements-,' 
At the same time,: high priority would have to' be given to a firm 
commitment by virtue of which the Governments of the region would intensify 
their technical, and financial co-operation, within the institutional framework 
contemplated in the present .document, in the tasks of improving the existing 
international highways, where.necessary, and speeding up the construction 
•of new international routes of common interest, for which carefully studied • 
projects are or very soon may be available, and which could open up substantial 
regional traffic flows or break through the total or relative isolation of 
regions and areas with considerable development potential. 
Apart from the Pan American Highway's several inter-governmental 
agreements have already been concluded - especially between adjacent 
countries - for the construction of international highways that are of 
vital importance f©r the economic integration of the countries concerned« 
Reference was previously made to the projected Carretera Marginal 
Bolivariana de la Selva. In the same context, attention should be drawn 
to the importance, of the prospective construction of a stretch of the 
Pan American Highway, over SCO kilometres long, on the frontiers of Colombia 
and Panama,, to cover the so-called-Darien Gap, which at present interrupts 
road communication between Central ánd South America* The engineering studies 
relating, to the selection of the route and the actual road-building are under 
way. Other projects of great potential significance for integration, which 
have lately been discussed by the Pan American Highway Congress - with 
reference, inter alia, to financing possibilities - are a proposed road 
from Rio Blanco, Cruzeiro do Sul and Boqueirao in Brazil to Pucallpa in Peru, 
2/ A resolution on this question was also recently adopted by the 
Permanent Executive Committee of the Pan Amèrican Highway Congress, 
in relation to a draft agreement on international transit of motor 
vehicles over the Pan American Highway system. 
/which would 
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which would form part of the Brasilia-Lima highway., and the Pan American 
Transverse Highway (Carretera Transversal Panamericana) in South America 
(Lima-La Paz, Asunción-Paranaguá). 
As in the case of railways, high priority should be assigned to 
a specific and systematic study of the state of all the existing and projected 
international highways in the region, with particular reference to their 
importance and priority for the acceleration of Latin Americafs economic 
integration process. Several national road transport programmes envisage 
the improvement or construction of international highways, but as a rule 
the execution of the projects is held up for want of funds. At all events, 
from the suggested study might emanate a co-ordinated set of projects that 
could be financed through IDB, the programmes of the Alliance for Progress 
and the international credit institutions® 
(iv) International inland waterway transporto In large under-developed 
areas, Latin America has a vast river network hitherto under-utilized, 
especially by international traffic, with the exception of the Rivers Paraná 
and Paraguay in the River Plate basin. Fuller use of this network would be 
of particular interest and importance for several of the less-developed 
countries. During the intermediate phase, it would be highly desirable for 
the Governments to assume a firm commitment to co-operate more closely in 
the adoption of measures whereby navigability conditions could be immediately 
improved, river fleets developed, regional inland waterway transport 
facilitated and better river port facilities provided*, especially on those 
reaches that might open up the way for rapidly expanding intra-regional traffic 
flows. Projects with high regional priority in this field might be financed 
throu^iIDB or the programmes of the Alliance for Progress®. In view of Its • 
great advantages for the development of basic industries, inland waterway 
transport would also merit special attention in sectoral agreements relating 
to industries in that category that might be located in river basins, 
(b) Preparation of long-term, commitments.; formulation of a common 
transport polis/ 
Stress has already been laid, in the introduction to the present 
chapter, on the high priority that in a long-term approach must be assigned 




network, as a basic requisite for economic integration and for doing away 
with the present partition of Latin America into what are practically 
closed cellso 
The preparation of government commitments with this end in view 
should also be supplemented by the study and formulation of those to be 
assumed in two complementary fields. They would be directed, on the one 
hand, towards the elimination of such obstacles to the establishment of 
the general common market and to the smoothly co-ordinated development of 
the whole region as are represented by the operational conditions of 
transport services; and, on the other, towards the progressive formation 
of a common market for the transport services themselves. International 
transport transactions are no different, in reality, from those relating 
to other activities in a common market, which implies the free circulation 
of services as well as of goods; the common market for transport services 
themselves would also constitute an indispensable requisite for the optimum 
utilization of the international network. 
A common transport policy, as an integral part of over-all economic 
integration policyf and the commitments deriving therefrom, which should 
be studied and formulated within the institutional framework outlined 
elsewhere in the present report, would therefore cover the basic questions 
mentioned, and embrace all means of transport - maritime, inland waterway, 
overland (roads and railways) and air transport media - as well as 
communications, i.e., postal and telecommunications services. The transport 
and communications system in fact constitutes an organism, rather than 
the mere sum of its component parts. 
The great complexity of the problem is obvious, from the fact that 
a plan for a future integrated transport and communications network can 
only be drawn up in close relationship with a forward-looking and dynamic 
view of the geographico-economic structure of the whole region. Clearly, 
an optimum Latin American transport system would be one of the most 
important determinants of a more rational division of economic activities 
and of more balanced and harmonious development throughout the region. 
In any event, another top-priority study would be one whose purpose 
was to map out in broad outline, with possible alternatives, a future 
/regional transport 
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regional transport network for I^tinAmerica.; There wpul^b^ no guestion 
of arriving at- firm conclusions or :re commendations ̂which mighii. ia. the ;,; .. 
near future give rise to commitments that could be assumed by the. Governments. 
This, would. beiOver̂ aiTibitiousT, anview of the complexity qf:. the.. problem and 
the conjectural nature of: the. conclusions.that could.-be drawn from .an. 
initial, study«, would be a.matter, in essence, of drawing up:a frame 
of - reference, indicating the main lines along which an integrated regional 
network might possibly be developed, and serving to guide ..the policy and 
decisions-of common market institutions in other.fields, especially that, 
of the development of regional industries. 
The situation in this respect is not at all the sam̂ .. in Latin America 
as in the continent of Europe, where an international network had already 
been developed in the.past and only needed expanding and improving« But 
a point of interest in-relation to the task that has to be tackled in 
;Latin America is that,as early as 1950 sixteen States members of the 
Economic Commission for Europe sigri§d a declaration relating to the 
construction or reconstruction of a European road, network, comprising 
22; arterial highways and 50 secondary or appi-oach roads, , which the signatories 
undertook to build as part of their own.national programmes.. In subsequent 
years, the European Conference of Ministers of. Transport approved several 
roads, rail and inland waterway infrastructure programmes of regional 
importance, In I960 and 1961, the Commission of the European Economic 
Community submitted recommendations to Governments bearing on a- plan for . 
3 major- railways, highways and navigable waterways of interest to the Community.* 
2>J One of the Commission's general recommendations contained a statement 
to the effect that the networks had-been.constructed in. terms of the 
particular economic requirements of each individual State and of 
various extra-economic factors« Hence the national networks constituted 
, • .more or less watertight compartments, with defective inter-connexions, 
heterogeneous infrastructure characteristics in frontier areas, 
"deficiencies in the links between the major seaports and the industrial 
areas, and a tendency for the means.of communication to converge upon 
the capital cities or certain industrial centres, which did not take 
sufficient account of the requirements of a sound regional policy. 
In the light of these,.observations, . which may seem, surprising at a first 
glance, the problems confronting the' Latin American countries loom 
larger still. - - '•>•; - • • • 
/ I t should 
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It should be pointed out in this connexion that in Latin America the 
determination of the location of industries in terms of existing factors 
and conditions might consolidate the present structure of the Latin 
American economies and make it difficult to reorient them in the future, 
since location decisions relate to the long term and are largely irrevocable. 
Hence there would be an imperative need for, close co-ordination of industrial 
development and transport policies through the common market agencies. 
A regional transport network that is satisfactory in respect of its 
structure, density and quality may do much to ensure that the less developed 
countries obtain their fair share of the benefits of integration® Their 
position at the present time is particular unfavourable from the standpoint 
of transport* Consequently, in the formulation of a transport policy 
directed towards the creation of such a network., the possibilities of 
doing harm to these less developed countries must also be borne in mind* 
The improvement or construction of international routes linking such 
countries or areas only with others at more advanced stages of development 
might in fact expose the former to keener competition from the producer 
centres already located in the more highly developed areas or countries© 
To obviate this risk, an essential requisite is that the internal transport 
networks of the less developed countries should be improved at the same 
time, in order to strengthen their potential comparative advantages and 
their ability to offer inducements for the location of industries and to 
establish new focal points of development« This goes to show once more 
that in the field of transport, too, regional integration is only a single 
element - although an important one - in the indissoluble whole formed by 
national and regional development problems« 
The foregoing remarks are likewise applicable, mutatis, mutandis, to 
the region's postal and telecommunications services, since any considerable 
intensification of intra-regional trade would be inconceivable without an 
optimum network of postal, telephone and telegraph services at.the continental 
level. 
As regards the need to eliminate the obstacles that the transport 
system may place in the way of the establishment of the general common 
market particularly practices in the transport sector which might be 
/capable of 
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capable of distorting over-all competitive conditions' ** a M ths necessity 
of - forming a common market for the transport, services themselves', the 
first steps that- it would: be .advisable to take' in: this direction- halve 
already been outlined in the context of• commitments for the intermediate 
•phase. • • 
• The commitments that should be studied and prepared inthese inter-
dependent fields, with a view to the longer term, and with the requisite 
degree of progressiveness and flexibility, would relate to the following 
requirements: 
(i) The progressive readjustment, -co-ordination and orientation 
.of national transport, systems-and policies in the light of 
regional economic integration needs and objectives;' 
(ii) The establishment, of-rules-and principles - as far as possible 
standardized, with due-regard to the differing characteristics 
of the various, transport media - for the operation of services, 
• as well as,for tariff-rates.and transport conditions in regional 
services; 
(iii) -Unrestricted freedom of participation in regional transport 
for the enterprises and services of the various countries. This 
liberalisation would be effected in progressive stages until 
the final objective was attained, ioe., the constitution of 
a single regional territory within which Latin American transport 
. services would operate freely but in conformity with appropriate 
regulations; and 
(iv) Development of the mercantile marines of the Latin American 
countries in the framework of a promotion policy based on 
special agreements, in the same way as was suggested for 
industries ,of regional importance,, 
Such objectives, are indubitably ambitious, but as final targets they 
seem indispensable for the purposes .of a common .market, although it* is 
true that the gradual and staggered implementation of the corresponding • 
measures, and commitments calls for long-term studies« From all points of 
view, the introduction of such measures even by. degrees- would raise a number 
of extremely delicate problems:.in relation to. the progressive" harmonization 
/of the 
E/CN,12/728 
Page 2093 ' 
of the social, fiscal and technical factors that might affect competition 
in regional services among the several means of transport and among the 
various cotintries* enterprises» There are wide disparities between the 
Latin American countries in this respect; for example, differences 
- sometimes considerable - in the relative levels of operational costs 
are determined not only by the factors indicated but also by economic 
distortions that influence transport just as they affect the other sectors 
of economic activity« 
The immense complexity of these problems is clearly evidenced by 
the fact that the formulators of the Rome Treaty were also unable to reach 
complete agreement on the subject; the provisions of the Treaty do not 
precisely determine the content and underlying principles of a coimon 
transport policyJ^ 
Separate mention must be made of air transport, which is perhaps one 
of the fields of greatest importance for regional integration, since the 
over-dispersion of national efforts and the bilateralism that still prevails 
in this means of transport are particularly self-defeating and anti-economic. 
Nor has reference been mads, in the review of possible commitments for the 
intermediate phase, to those that might be viable or appropriate in this 
particular sphere, since from the existing studies no reliable idea can 
be formed as to the precise scope of the joint integration and operational 
measures, at the regional or area level, that might be put into practice 
in the immediate futuree In any event, it would be worth while to make 
a careful evaluation of the progressive integration possibilities in 
respect of regional civil aviation, even during the intermediate phase. 
Lastly, a basic feature of a common Latin American transport policy 
would be the formulation of its possible principles and commitments as 
regards the region's relations with other areas« This is of special importance 
k/ The programme of action drawn up by the European Economic Community 
Commission in 1962 in relation to a common transport policy is 




with respect to mritiitie and air-transport/.since^ apart-:froinlc6mnnicàtions 
proper, these 'media; ;would constitute the 'continentVB' links with thé outside 
world.»' ;As regards maritime transport, at all events,' it -should-be pointed 
out that-, the report of the meeting of government, expertsheld at Brasilia 
in January 1964, and the Charter of Alta Gracia, together with the discussions 
and conclusionŝ  of - the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
have laid the foundations and established-the guidelines for a common 
Latin American policy within the world framework. 
/Chapter IX 
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. Chapter IX 
MONET ART AND FINANCIAL POLICY 
The integration process calls for a policy and instruments by means of 
which each country's monetary and financial situation can be adapted to 
the requirements of intensive trade and keener competition, and which 
will meet the special needs that are bound to arise in respect of trade 
and investment payments and financing» 
The pressing necessity of a monetary and financial policy is thrown 
into relief by the variety of situations found in Latin America» While 
some of the countries of the region enjoy a healthy balance-o inpayments 
position and internal monetary stability, others are afflicted by chronic 
foreign exchange deficits, and have to cope with high rates of inflation* 
All this creates distortions as between the exchange rates in force and 
domestic price levels, which are reflected in varying degrees of over* 
valuation or under-valuation of national currencies. 
Some apprehension is felt lest these exchange rates, which are 
artificially high in relation to those of other Latin American countries, 
may in many cases constitute a factor even more unfavourable to the 
progress of the integration movement than the disparities caused by the 
differential tariff treatments applied to third countries in respect of 
raw materials. As the tariff barriers between the countries of the 
region are gradually lowered, a country which persists in over-valuating . 
its currency mil have difficulty in keeping up its intra-regional exports, 
while at the same time it will tend to increase its imports. Conversely, 
an under-valuated currency implies a subsidy for exports and a disincentive 
for imports® Corrective measures are not easily brought into play, since 
the country concerned may be unwilling to revise an exchange rate which 
is usually adjusted to serve its interests in relation to the bulk of 
its world trade; and the regional imbalance will therefore be likely to 
persist. 
This state of affairs is almost inevitable as long as the inflationary 
processes affecting various Latin American countries remain in operation. 
In face of exchange rates which are apt to be rigid, the increases in costs 




the international competitive relationships previously existing within 
the framework of intra-regional trade® 
Furthermore, a discrepancy between a country's exchange rate and its 
theoretical parity rate with other countries of the region may also emerge 
in the case of countries with a high level of internal monetary stability 
and a sound aggregate balan ce~oinpayment s position» In these latter, 
the exchange rate is essentially determined by their transactions with . 
the rest of the world economy, and is the one calculated to maintain 
over-all balance~of~payments equilibrium« Where export earnings create 
a very high capacity to import, it almost naturally follows that the ; 
value of the national currency, in international terms, tends to be high 
in relation to the currencies of countries with balance-of-payments .. 
difficulties» Thus a gap opens - somestimes widely - between the exchange 
rate required for the maintenance of over-all equilibrium, and the one . > 
which would correspond to the other Latin American countries1 different 
price levels« The difference between the two rat^s of exchange will be 
proportional to the disparities in productivity between export activities 
and the other economic sectors in the country concerned. The result will 
be an artificially high exchange rate with respect to the rest of Latin 
America, which will minimize intra-regional sales opportunities for products 
other than the traditional export lines» Presumably there will be some 
danger that, owing to this artificially high rate, countries where 
productivity is much higher in the traditional export activities than in 
the rest of the economy may find their balance of payments with the region 
invariably showing a deficit, unless other corrective factors come into 
play or continue to operate* 
This chain, of disequilibria .unquestionably distorts what ought to be 
a steady and growing trade, and may handicap some countries in the movement 
towards a common market.« The region must therefore take this situation 
into account, and expedite the preparation of measures or systems to 
counteract it» 
Nevertheless, recognition of the danger, and of the need to devise 
ways and means of lessening it, should not mean that its implications are 
over-estimated or that the integration process is halted or retarded until 
the problem has been fully solved» Jt would be a serious mistake, for 
V /example, to 
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example, to contend that only when stability has been achieved, and 
realistic exchange rates, consistent with a break-even level for all the 
countries of the region, have been established, can progress be made in 
implementing liberalization commitments0.. Such an attitude might vitiate 
and inhibit the integration movement, which is just what could, through 
competition and the solution of balance~oinpayments problems at the 
regional level, effectively help to overcome the difficulties deriving 
from inflation and external disequilibria» 
Hitherto, it has not really been possible to verify the scope of the 
distortions in practice; nor has a reliable method yet been established 
for defining or measuring the extent to which the currency is over-priced 
or under-valuated, or the ratios between exchange distortions and rates 
of inflation. First and foremost, the problem calls for much more carefully 
prepared and systematic studies and investigations than have been carried 
out so far0 
It is safe to say that while the studies in question are being under-
taken, and until permanent and specific solutions are discovered, the 
commitments suggested in the present document a3 means of furthering the 
integration process tacitly imply sufficient correctives to prevent 
serious trade disequilibria from arising in the course of the next few 
years as the result of exchange distortion* In the first place, there 
are the margins of protection which will still remain in force after five 
years, and even after the ten years corresponding to the next phase* 
Secondly, one of the essential aims of the principle of-reciprocity will 
be to avert or remedy marked imbalances in trade flow30 Thirdly, the 
proposed regional institutions will be responsible for ensuring that 
countries which-have to cope with specially difficult situations (and a 
serious distortion would be a case in point) can state their problem and 
secure appropriate solutions« 
Again, the fact that the distortion problem can be partly solved by 
means of indirect measures during the forthcoming phase makes no difference 
to the above-mentioned necessity of devising direct and permanent basic 
solutions. The most decisive and constructive of these consists in the 
/gradual approach 
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gradual appr6ach to internal*, financial and monetary equilibrium in all 
the countries of the region« This objective is unlikely to be attainable 
over the short term, in view of the formidable difficulties which some of 
the Latin American countries are at present encountering in the financial 
. . . . i» 
field« But, at all events, the ende^your to adopt and implement . 
stabilization policies will lead, little,by little, to a more hopeful 
situation in this respect. 
An essential requisite for the purpose is the establishment of. 
contacts among leading Latin American financiers, and, in particular, the . 
Presidents and other senior officials .of the central banks. Such contacts, 
besides helping to elucidate and define the real characteristics and scope 
of the distortions, may be,conducive,, to, the adoption, of realistic, exchange 
rates calculated to prevent them, while at the same time an effort can be 
made to contribute to the studies, attitudes and decisions likely to 
promote the attainment of integration objectives« 
The proposals now being broached, to the effect that Directors of 
central bafiks should meet at regular and frequent intervals, with a view 
to the study and solution of distortion problems, constitute a decisive 
step forward. 
Consideration might also be given to other expedients. There has 
been some discussion, for example, of the possibility of establishing a 
system of compensatory rates, which could be applied by a country whose 
exchange rate was artificially high, subject to given conditions aid 
characteristics« Such a system might help to stabilize intra-regional 
trade balances, inasmuch as it would discourage imports« Another formula 
that some experts have outlined consists in the establishments of ad hoc 
exchange rates among Latin American currencies, which might differ from 
those in force for the: rest of the world, and would be determined in the 
light of the corresponding internal terms of trade* 
Both these procedures, however, call for;very detailed analyses which 
have not yet been carried out^ so that for the moment it is difficult to 
put them forward in concrete terms, . 
In addition to the problem of exchange distortions, another and more 
universal difficulty is the shortage of foreign exchange under which almost 
all the Latin American countries labour« An instrument that would facilitate 
/intra-regional trade 
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intra-regional trade payments and would thereby encourage transactions 
would be one means of mitigating the effects of this shortage and 
spurring on the integration process, 
One of the possibilities that has been discussed of late, with 
steadily increasing regional unanimity and international approval, consists 
in a number of variants of the compensatory payments system, based on 
multilateral credits, and aimed at reducing the need for the direct and 
invariable use of hard currencies in all intra-regional trade transactions« 
The characteristics of a satisfactory system to facilitate inter-
latin American payments have been considered in specialised studies 
carried out by the central banks and by such institutions as IDB and 
CEMLA, apart from the efforts made in the same direction by ALALC and 
ECLAo It seems unnecessary, in a general document like this, to set out 
the various technical alternatives in detail» But What is important is 
to stress the desirability of a decision on the part of financial authorities 
in Latin America to form, at the earliest possible date, a regional 
payments union, understood as a system of compensatory payments, combined 
with credit margins, for intra-regional trade. Naturally, balances not 
covered by the credits would have to be settled in gold or convertible 
currencies« By means of such a payments union proper attention to each 
individual countryis exchange problems could be ensured, and the need to 
co-ordinate exchange policies and systems could be met* 
Another very interesting prospect relates to the creation of a 
coxmon reserves fund, which has already been the subject of preliminary 
discussion among representatives of the central tanfe of several Latin 
American countries* The constitution of such a fund would permit much 
more rational utilisation of the reserves maintained by all the countries 
at the present time« The effects of the seasonal nature of each individual 
country's exports would be minimized, and the fund might constitute a 
special source of short-term credit to relieve the temporary difficulties 
of particular central banks, besides serving to guarantee loans from other 
sources. This idea, which may have far-reaching repercussions, is being 
actively elaborated, 
To sum up, Latin America should consider the following possible lines 
of action in relation to its regional monetary and financial policy: 
/(l) Stress 
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(1) Stress must be laid on the importance of continued study of 
the problem of monetary distortions, in search of specific solutions 
applicable in those phases of the integration process1 when the levels, 
of protection stili maintained will not be enough to compensate the 
effects of the distortions in question. The assumption of the commitments 
proposed for the new "phase, however, must not be conditional upon the 
disappearance of these distortions, so long.as provision is made for the 
tariff levels to be kept high enough to offset the risks which the 
distortions entail, and inasmuch as in any case the application of the 
principle òf reciprocity wpùld also operate as a corrective; 
(2) Not only in order to further the attainment of equilibrium in 
intra-regional trade, but also to enable due advantage to be taken of the 
opportunities opened up by the overfall tariff reduction propess and 
specific requirements of regional investment policy torbe met, permanent 
instruments will have to be established which, at the .highest level, will 
be responsible for co-ordinating thè monetary and exchange policies of the 
Latin American countries» To procure this co-ordination will be one of 
the principal functions of the net* institutional system; 
(3) It is also a matter of urgency for the common agencies to 
expedite the adoption of the following regional measures, which, among 
others, will be indispensable if the opportunities offered by the t . 
integration process are to be intensively exploited : 
(a) Establishment of a regional payments system to facilitate 
transactions, reduce the need to use h&rd currencies and 
bring down the cost of strictly financial operations in inter-
Latin American trade, at the same time providing, such 
reciprocal credit as may be appropriate and necessary; 
(b) Study of the possibility of creating a common reserves fond, 
to be drawn upon in accordance with regional criteria; 
(c) Expansion of the export financing systems that IDB has 
already launched for some products; 
(d) Organization and intènsification of suitable liaison, arrange-
ments among, commercial banks in Latin Merica, so that trade 
operations can be facilitated to the utmost possible extent; , 
(e) Organization of a regional system of insurance and reinsurance, 
as a'means of avoiding the heavy disbursements of hard 
currencies at present made under these heads; and 
(f ) Study of the organization of a Latin American stock exchange, . 
with a view to channelling the capital market on regional lines» 
/Chapter X 
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Chapter X 
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
The establishment of community institutions that are effective and 
adequate to the task is an important condition of the integration process. 
The obligations entailed by integration cannot all be foreseen and fixed 
in advance in final form. The search for a common trade policy, the 
formulation and putting into practice of a regional investment policy, 
and the co-ordination of financial and monetary policies, aU call for 
a great capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Hence there must 
be community institutions empowered to deal effectively with such 
circumstances, since otherwise the process will be in serious danger 
of coming to a halt, despite apparent activity that is, however, not 
translated into deeds or positive achievements. 
Latin American integration cannot make any satisfactory progress 
unless it has strong institutions appropriate to a new stage at which 
efforts must be made not only in the field of trade, but also in such 
other areas as sectoral industrial complementarity agreements, which are 
the warp and woof of real integration. In a region like Latin America 
economic development cannot be expected to result from automatic economic 
forces. The institutional basis of integration must be as well organized, 
if not more so, as in the developed areas, which also need an institutional 
structure capable of providing the essential political impetus, within 
the framework of a great regional concept formulated by an organ which 
meets the needs of the community. 
Although national Governments will, of course, reserve the right to 
formulate their own economic policies, participation in a common market 
will oblige them to bring these policies into line with the interests, 
of the region and to consider the views of the other countries. In addition 
the freedom of the market needs to be supplemented by a planned development 
policy, both at the regional level and within each country, since freedom 
of trade can and should go hand in hand with the pursuit of economic and 
social aims» Some of those aims will form part of the conmon purpose of 




of the individual countries, since all will continue to make their own 
efforts, decide on the social policies that suit them and encourage the 
sectors of production that they consider most promising. All this involves 
the co-ordination of national development policies, and the establishment 
of community institutions responsible for this task. 
The institutional structure should reflect a balance between the 
national interests, of the individual countries and the common interests 
of Latin America. It would not work, for example, if it consisted only 
of an organ at a high political level without a technical body to voice 
the interests of the community. Such a lack of institutional balance 
» 
could hamper, weaken and even bring to a halt the whole process of integration. 
What is proposed is not a political integration but the establishment 
of community institutions that are more independent, and have more freedom 
and scope for action, than the existing ALALC organs, but would at the 
same time have the same Latin American character as those organs, without 
prejudice to any co-operation that might be received from inter-American 
or international institutions» 
At the first stage of integration the community institutions should 
fulfil specific practical purposes2 including the following: 
(a) in many cases, before establishing how the new agreements would be 
applied, or proposing solutions for particular problems for the countries 
to decide on, it would be necessary to make evaluations based on an 
objective study of the facts. This objective evaluation could not be 
submitted to an agency concerned mainly with negotiations based on 
reciprocal concessions. 
(b) As integration progresses the need will arise for new obligations to 
be assumed in fields or respects not covered in the initial agreements. 
If the continuity of the integration process is to be preserved, there must 
be an institution that can formulate and study new agreements from the 
standpoint of the interests of the community, and subsequently submit them 
to the Governments* Such an institution could make specific recommendations 




(c) 3h addition, it is essential to have agencies to promote and 
encourage actively, and on a continuing basis, the full and prompt 
exploitation of the new trade and development opportunities provided 
by the agreements signed. 
(d) Lastly, there must be a high-level organ than can adopt decisions 
relating to the execution of the agreements concluded, and propose 
amendments to the Governments0 
To fulfil these functions, the community organs should be: 
1, The Council 
2» The Board 
3. An agency to promote investment 
4. A committee of entrepreneurs and workers 
5. The parliamentary assembly 
60 Ad hoc arbitration tribunals. 
lo The Council v IMK i mi— a——— 
The Latin American community should have a high-level political 
organ, the Council, which xvould be responsible for taking the decisions 
required for the progress of integration. It would not only supervise 
the satisfactory fulfilment of the agrements signed, but above all it 
would decide on the new agreements that would be needed to promote 
integration. With an organ of this nature the integration process 
would be under the immediate and continued supervision of the Governments 
concerned, through their Ministers for Foreign Affairs or other Ministers 
who would take their place when certain special subjects were considered. 
The Ministers, by virtue of their posts, would have direct access to the 
head of State, Congress and the parliamentary committees. This xvould 
make government action in support of integration much more rapid and 
effective. 
The Council would consist of representatives of the various countries, 
and consequently, although it would be a community organ, it would also 
provide expression for national interests, within the context of the aims 
of Latin American solidarity. It would be a Ministerial organ, consisting 
of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all the member countries3 who could 




jurisdiction over any special questions that might come up. The Council 
would be the highest organ of .the community, and would meet at least twice 
a year, or more often if necessary» - In any case the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs would be represented by alternates to deal with the day-to-day 
problems of the Association. If the Council's operational requirements made 
it necessary, each country could appoint & special Minister in charge of 
integration affairs. 
The Council would have the following basic powers in relation to the 
integration process: 
(a) To decide on any formulas for advancing the process of tariff 
reduction submitted to it by the Board that would require the adoption of 
new agreements. 
(b) To take a decision on the regional investment policy formulated 
by the Board. 
(c) To take decisions on the financial, monetary and payments policy. 
(d) To take decisions on a policy covering cultural matters and 
questions of scientific and technical development. 
(e) To rule on all questions submitted to it for decision by the Board. 
(f) To adopt all the decisions and provisions necessary for the 
fulfilment of the agreements concluded. 
(g) To decide on programmes of future action. 
(h) To represent the Association in dealings with third countries, 
and international agencies or bodies, cn questions of community interest. 
The Council would also represent the community in signing contracts and 
other documents of public and private law. 
(i) To elect, for a period of one year, a President* and two 
Vice-Presidents. 
(j) To elect the members of the Board. 
(k) To approve the Association^ annual budget. 
The decisions and resolutions of the Council should be adopted 
unanimously, but could be reached by a simple majority in the following 
cases: 
(a) In deciding on requests for exception to the rules in force, in 
the light of the Board!s recommendations, If the Council does not take a 
decision within a certain period, the applicant country may act in accordance 
with the Board*s recommendation until the next meeting of the Council, when 




(b) 2h dealing with disputes between Contracting Parties arising out 
of the application of the agre&ients. The Council would have a specific 
time-limit for deciding on any question submitted to it, and if this period 
expires before a decision is taken, the Parties can apply to the arbitration 
tribunal for a decision on the question. Similarly, the parties can appeal 
to the tribunal against decisions of the Council. 
The Council would be empowered to establish technical committees 
composed of government officials to advise the Board in particular fields 
in order to facilitate its work and expedite its decisions. 
2* The Board 
Experience in Latin America and in other countries shows that it is 
essential to have an organ that represents the interests of the community 
and encourages the integration process, with powers to make studies and 
propose action with complete freedom from any kind of limitation* This organ, 
that could be known as the Board, would be the prime mover of integration. 
The interests of the community can only find expression in a collegiate body 
on which all members have the same standing» The same purpose cannot be 
fully achieved by means of a secretariat, however broad its powers, since 
it would necessarily consist of a subordinate technical body and a single 
chief who would be finally responsible for establishing the ruling principles. 
In the Board, on the contrary, the exchange of views would take place between 
members with absolutely equal rights and powers« If agreement could not be 
reached, the divergent views should be reconciled in a form that genuinely 
reflects the interests of the community. 
The Board would essentially represent the interests of the community, 
but it would not be a supranational authority, since it would not impose any 
new obligations on the Parties«, However, in expressing the interests of the 
community, it would adopt a supranational approach. The Board would consist 
of a few persons appointed by the Council on the basis of their general 
suitability. The members would be elected for specific periods, and they 
could be reappointed for one or more additional periods. They would elect 
a Chairman for the same number of years as their own period of office. The 




. . The: Board should includé representatives :of the various groups of 
countries-that can be distinguished from the standpoint of level' of develop-
ment, and only nationals of members states could be apointed. The members 
of the Board would- act with complete independence, without seeking or 
accepting instructions from any Government or from any national or international 
organisation* The members of the Board should refrain from any attitude 
incompatible with their position as representatives of the community. The 
Contracting Parties, for their part,' would refrain from seeking to influence 
the members in the .discharge of their responsibilities. The Board would take 
decisions by a simple majority. 
It is believed that only a body composed of persons of high reputation 
in latin America would have the necessary authority to fulfil the basic 
function of representing the community interest, both present and future, 
of the Parties. 
The Board would have the following functions: 
(a) A supervisory function, in watching oyer the faithful and.strict 
fill filment of the agreements concluded and of decisions adopted by the 
Council and the tribunal. 
(b) The dynamic function of proposing projects, programmes or 
provisions to the Council, and formulating any recoriiiaendations it deems 
desirable for the better fulfilment of the agreements and for the conclusion 
of new agreements. In this conne:don, in the light of the general aims of 
integration, the Board would undertake to carry out certain specific 
activities such as the following: 
(i) Formulating and submitting for the approval of the Council a 
regional investment policy, and promoting its implementation.. 
This function would include seeking to achieve a suitable 
balance of the advantages resulting from integration,. as between. 
• all member ôountries, and hence special attention to the needs 
; of thè relatively less developed countries, 
(ii) Submitting to the Council, for its approval, programmes, rieasures 
and provisions in the field of trade' policy aimed at facilitating 
and accelerating integration. , . 
/(iii) Submitting 
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(iii) Submitting programes and measures to reconcile the trade and 
tariff policies of the member countries with respect to third 
countries, 
(iv) Proposing to the Cornell the bases for a common agricultural 
policy, 
(v) Formulating and proposing to the Council a cultural and 
educational policy, and promoting its implementation, 
(vi) Studying how far the discrepancies in other national policies 
(for example, in the monetary, social and tax fields) are, 
important factors in distorting the competitive situation, 
and proposing measures to deal with them» 
(vii) Proposing to the Council projects aimed at avoiding the 
harmful effects of the lack of uniformity in national 
legislation, for example, those relating to the treatment 
of foreign investment* 
(viii) Submitting an annual report on the progress of integration, 
and on the measures that should be adopted to encourage and 
support integration, 
(c) A promotional function in furthering economic development 
within the framework of the regional investment policy« For this purpose 
the Board would undertakes 
(i) To encourage sectoral complementarity agreements and projects 
for the establishment of new industries as a joint operation 
by several countries» Such projects would cover not only 
manufacturing, but also infrastructure^ especially.transport 
and the supply of electric power between countries® For the 
less advanced countries the Board should work out and support 
development projects in the strict sense, 
(ii) To encourage programmes, for the reconversion of industrial and 
agricultural activities, or for the modernization and renewal 
of machinery in undertakings or sectors adversely affected by 
the removal of barriers to imports0 




Page 178 ' 
( a ) A co-ordinating function, • by virtue of which the Board would 
act' as ¿''-link between national agencies , for the planning anè promotion 
of development, and would facilitate and encourage the consideration, 
and promote thè complementarity, of projects of common interest to several 
countries» 
(e) An evaluating function«» in determining and considering the 
facts on which are based requests for exemption from the general rules 
in force, and in making recommendations on how such requests shall be 
dealt with, • 
(f) A conciliatory function, in relation to disputes that may 
arise from the application of the agreements, through the recommendation 
of solutions. 
The Board would be empowered to establish committees to deal with 
specific subjects, such as trade questions. The Board should encourage 
meetings between the Central Banks of the member countries with a view 
to establishing the principle of co-ordination between monetary, credit 
and exchange policies. 
The Board could play an important part in solving the many problems 
that arise from thè participation of foreign capital in the integration 
process. In general foreign enterprises would have more funds and easier 
access to sources of finance. Hence they would be at an advantage in 
participating in multinational projects. The fear of the financial, 
technical and administrative superiority of such enterprises might lead 
to resistance and hamper the conclusion of certain agreements. Consequently 
the basic activities of the Board should include the promotion of the right 
conditions to enable Latin American enterprise to take full advantage of the 
benefits of integration, and in particular of sectoral complementarity 
agreements, and to compete with foreign enterprises, or associate with 
them on terms of real equality. This kind of support may. take various 
forms. When deciding on formulas for sectoral integration or multinational 
projects the Board should take'into account the, position of the existing 
Latin American enterprises and the interests of Latin American investors, 




For this purpose the Board could take part in joint efforts to convince 
Governments of the need to co-operate in establishing a given system of 
tax or tariff incentives. 
The safeguarding and promotion of Latin American interests in an 
enterprise would be considerably facilitated if a Latin American community 
agency could acquire shares and hold them temporarily. The agency could 
acquire temporarily whatever shares reserved for private subscription 
were not subscribed and paid for, and could later make them available 
to the public again. The national development agencies could acquire 
part of whatever shares the community agency could retain. Some 
proportion would have to be established between the shares to be sold in 
the country where the industry would have its headquarters, and the 
volume of shares to be offered to the other Latin American countries, 
as well as the total that could be subscribed by investors outside the 
region. By empowering the community agency to acquire shares, the danger 
would be avoided that, because of the fear of private investors of running 
certain risks, Latin America would be unable to establish the enterprises 
or undertake the activities needed for integration. A system that would 
thus safeguard the integration process would effectively protect the real 
interests of Latin America. 
A balance and harmony between strictljr national interests and the 
interests of the Latin American community could be achived through an 
exchange of views and through the functional relation between the Council 
and the Board, The existence of the Board, with its dynamic and 
promotional functions, will permit the systematic and serious study of 
long-term problems and the establishment from the outset of the bases 
that would allow an extension of the agreements concerned at the subsequent 
stages. 
3. The investment promotion agency 
Integration does not automatically achieve the reduction or abolition 
of obstacles to trade between nations, but Is the fruit of a great collective 
effort in the field'of investment and of production in general, with a view 
to taking full advantage of the new opportunities offered by a broader 
/market. Hence 
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market. Hence there must be a promotional machinery;to provide an 1 : 
active stimulus to investment through the preparation of specific. 
projects, which should be conceived within the general:,frame of v 
reference afforded by'the regional investment policy formulated by 
the Board and approved by the Council. 
Thé agency in- question should be established by an agreement' 
between the' Board and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This -
agreement would lay down the Agency1 s terms of reference, which, should 
include serving the interests of the'Latin American community in 
accordance with the géneràl principles and directives established by. 
' the Board. IDB would provide the Agency-with the funds needed to 
begin and continue its abtivitieô and to meet, inter alia» preinvestment 
costs. Thé Agency would be directed and administered by a governing 
council on which the Board atìd IDB would be-represented, and to which, 
only nationals of member countries of the Latin American economic 
community - could be appointed.'The Agency would carry out the regional 
investment policy by translating it into specific projects. Although 
the initiative in preparing such projects could come from the Board, the 
member countries-or the Agency, the latter would be responsible,for making 
the necessary studies and conducting the discussions and consultations, 
with the authorities and entrepreneurs of the countries concerned until 
thè technical and economic aspects of the project took final shape. In 
discharging its functions the Agency would have the assistance of technical 
advisers and the co-operation of other institutions such as ECLA, the 
Latin American1 Institute for Economic and Social Planning, etc. The Board 
would examine all the projects prepared by the Agency, whatever their ' 
prior origin, and would verify that they were in line with integration 
aims, the regional investment policy, and trade policy, and the directives 
laid down by the Board itself and by. the Council. The Board would then 
proceed with the promotion and negotiation of the projects. 
The Agency would act specifically in relation to the following: 
(a) The preparation of draft projects of sectoral agreements; 





(c) The execution of particular aspects of sectoral agreements, when 
. the Board so requests, in particular those relating to technical 
assistance* 
(d) Advice to the Board to ensure the correct functioning of the 
sectoral agreements and the fulfilment of the obligations they 
involve. 
With respect to the special support that should be given to Latin 
American enterprise, the functions of the Agency may be of particular 
importance. Thus, for example, it could provide Latin American investors 
with technical assistance to enable them to take advantage of the 
opportunities opened up by the process of integration, and could 
co-operate with existing Latin American industry in improving its 
production conditions and competitive footing* 
4« The committee of entrepreneurŝ  and workers 
This organ would provide expression for.national economic forces, 
in particular entrepreneurs and workers. In co-operation with the Board, 
the Committee would assist in clarifying and defining the region's 
problems and interests. It would consist of a given number of representatives 
of the entrepreneurs and workers of each of the Contracting Parties, and 
its members would be appointed by the various Governments for a given 
period, and could be re-elected» 
The Committee would be of an advisory nature, and would meet in 
plenary session twice a year, although at the request of the Board it could 
appoint advisory committees on a temporary basis for special problems 0 
The Latin American parliamentary assembly would consist of 
representatives of the Congresses of each of the member countries. This 
body could perform a valuable task in that it would permit the establishment 
of a group of persons who would act in their respective national 





. Its functions would include submitting to the Board projects for 
the unifying of national legislation in fields: where the existence of 
provisions that conflict, or are not sufficiently consistent, hampers 
trade and integration. The Assembly would receive the Board's annual 
reporto 
The legislators of the various countries have already given 
evidence of their desire for such a development by meeting in Lima in 
December 1964 and establising the Latin American Parliament. If it were 
thought advisable, this Parliament could be incorporated into the proposed 
new institutional structure. 
6. The ad hoc arbitration tribunals 
No tribunal would exist as a permanent organ, but one would 
be established every time it proved necessary» 
In each case the tribunal would consist of members of different 
nations appointed by lot from a five-member panel submitted by each 
country. It would be competent to deal, in the first instance or on 
appeal, with complaints relating to non-compliance by one of the Parties 
with agreements or obligations entered into under the Treaty, or other 
instruments deriving from the Treaty. If the country affected by the 
veridict does not comply with it, the complainant would be able to adopt 
whatever compensatory measures the tribunal considers appropriate for 
restoring the balance of advantage. 






ALALC AND THE NEW COMMITMENTS 
The new pomndtments herald the beginning of another stage in the 
evolution of the Montevideo Treaty* Consequently they represent a necessary 
improvement upon the existing system rather than the creation of a different 
system« 
In the preamble to the Treaty, the Contracting Parties state their 
determination "to persevere in their efforts to establish, gradually and 
progressively, a Latin American common market510 In other words, they 
recognize that a common market has to be reached by successive stages, at 
each of which certain work is done, the accomplishments of the preceding 
stage are consolidated and Latin America is brought a step nearer to a 
common market and the integration of its economies * 
As indicated in chapter II, ALALC1s activities have had far-reaching 
results in terms of the number of concessions granted, the reversal of the 
downward movement that. had brought intra-trade to very low levels and the 
more than satisfactory fulfilment of its basic tariff reduction commitments» 
Moreover, ALALC has made Latin America generally aware of the vital role 
that integration can play in developing the economy and raising the levels 
of material and cultural welfare® This awareness, which has become equally , 
widespread among entrepreneurs, Government circles and the public in general, 
provides the social and political background to the new commitments in 
default of which it would hardly be possible even to visualize the fulfilment 
of other stages of improvement and progress in the integration movement. 
When new obligations and procedures are evolved for satisfying the aim 
of the Contracting Parties to advance progressively towards the establishment 
of a Latin American common market, the criteria and methods adopted should 
be those indicated in the Treaty itselfe At the same time the new 
commitments should be a true and faithful reflection of the demands of the 
new stage in so far as they should expedite, invigorate and strengthen the 
process of integration while creating more favourable conditions for a 




to make every effort to direct their policies with a view to the creation 
of such conditions» Article 61 provides that on the expiry of the twelve-
year term starting on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the 
Contracting Parties shall study the results of its implementation and 
initiate negotiations with a view to fulfilling the purposes of the 
Treaty more effectively and, if desirable, adapting it to a new stage of 
economic integration. The fact that this examination must be carried out 
without fail at that time dpes not prevent the Contracting Parties from 
proceeding to do so earlier, if. they deem it expedient. 
This imperious need is the outcome of the different factors and 
circumstances that have been analysed in the course of the present document» 
The Montevideo Treaty expressly states the form in which amendments are 
to be couched. On Article 60 it is specified that such amendments should 
be set out in protocols that would enter into force upon ratification by 
all the Contracting. Parties and after the corresponding instruments have 
been deposited with the. Government of Uruguay. This procedure might also 
be adopted for the new commitments since this would comply with the spirit 
and letter of the Treaty and at the same time manifest the continuity of 
Latin America's efforts to bring about the establishment of a common market 
and integration. 
This element of continuity should not be limited to the formal or 
legal aspects of the development of ALALC's present system; it must become 
part of its basic achievements and of the utilisation of the abilities and 
experience which, at every level, have made such achievements possible. 
The Montevideo Treaty, not only provides for the gradual and progressive 
fulfilment of the commitments directed towards the establishment of a common 
market, but aims at the incorporation of all the Latin American countries 
into that market. There is also a practical reason for redoubling the 
efforts made to ensure that the new commitments form the basis for an 
understanding into which all the countries of the region can enter. In fact, 
the greater the progress made towards a common market, the greater the 
concessions agreed upon by the member countries of ALALC. This undoubtedly 




expected to reciprocate all previous concessions granted© For this 
reason, every effort should be made to bring into the Association those 
countries that have so far not joined* The way to accomplish this has 
been set forth in Article 58 of the Treaty. The Central American 
countries^are in a different situation because they already form a separate 
system, and are bound by the Treaty of Managua not to accede unilaterally 
to new treaties that might affect the principles of Central American 
economic integration» Suitable conditions would have to be created to 
enable these countries to join the Association as a single unit. The 
coalition of the two systems would entail separate negotiations and 
formulas, but would in no way prejudice the past achievements of the 
Central American community ox- the future course of integration in that 
area. 

